【作者】 李艳峰；

【导师】 刘建林；

【作者基本信息】 江西师范大学 ， 应用数学， 2009， 硕士

【摘要】 优先发展公交是解决日趋严重的城市交通拥堵问题的一个重要手段。然而,公交企业的运营受到多种因素的制约,公交服务质量的提高、公交系统的发展都会产生巨大的财政需求,单靠公交企业自身经营是很难是实现的,为此,许多国家都纷纷提出“公交优先”战略,并对公交给予了巨额补贴。但政府对公交的巨额补贴也导致公交企业开支增加、工作效率低下的弊端产生,政府对公交提供补贴是为了更好的提高公交服务质量和社会福利以便吸引更多乘客而达到稳定的财政收入和缓解城市交通拥挤以及解决因交通带来的环境污染问题,但这一目的很难达到。因此,探索政府对公交企业的规范性补贴机制,对缓解国家财政压力,激发公交企业的活力并促使其最终走向市场具有现实意义。本文提出政府应对公交企业同时进行常规性补贴和激励性补贴。在常规性补贴中,从社会福利最大化和企业利润最大化两个角度,构建了补贴计量模型,为政府对企业补贴提供了一种计量方法。在激励性补贴中,政府对公交企业补贴由两部分组成:一个固定部分和一个变动部分。变动部分是为了激励企业努力提高服务水平和社会效益,本文构建了促进企业努力降低成本、提高效率、提高服务水平和社会效益的委托代理模型,进而实现政府追求的社会福利最大化和促进企业服务水平的提高,从理论上分析了激励补贴的可行性及有效性。由于政府和公交企业之间存在信息不对称,对于公交企业是否真正努力降低成本、提高效率和服务水平,作为委托人的政府并不可能完全把握,需要政府的监督与管理,本文建立了基于监督和激励补贴的委托代理模型。通过分析模型解得出:在政府监管下,企业的努力水平有所提高,激励强度有所增强,政府追求的社会效益明显提高。最后考虑了单委托-多代理模型,认为当信息非对称时,通过代理人之间的竞争可以提高服务水平,且代理人的努力程度随着竞争程度提高也随之提升。更多还原

【Abstract】 Public transport priority is an important means to solve the increasingly serious problem of urban traffic congestion. However, public transport enterprise’s operating is restrict to a variety of factors. Improving quality of service and developing public transport system need lots of money, it is hard to achieve only rely on their own businesses. So, huge the government is given by the government in many countries. But many defects such as high expenditure, low working efficiency are raised. The goal of the government the government is improving quality of service to attract more passengers, so that public transport enterprises can get stable revenue. On the other hand, Well-developed public transport can alleviate the traffic pressure and environmental pollution. However, it is difficult to achieve this purpose. So, researching government’s public transport enterprises normative subsidy mechanism is of great significance.We think the Government should give public transport enterprises conventional subsidies and incentive subsidies at the same time. In the conventional subsidies, we build the subsidy model through welfare and corporate profits max. The subsidy model provides a good measurement method. In the incentive subsidies, Government subsidies to public enterprises are composed of two parts: a fixed part and a part of change. The part of change is to motivate enterprises to improve service levels and social benefits. We build a principal-agent model to analyze the feasibility and effectiveness.Because 0f the information asymmetry between government and public enterprises, the Government must establish a monitoring mechanism to supervise public transport enterprises. By analyzing the model, we have the following conclusions: Under the supervision of the government, the level of efforts and social benefits are improved obviously .At the end of the paper, we consider a single commission - multi-agent model, and come to the conclusion: when the information is asymmetric, through competition among agents can improve the service level. Furthermore, we find that the more intense the competition among agents, the higher level of effort.更多还原