【作者】 杨美琴；

【导师】 龚日朝；

【作者基本信息】 湖南科技大学 ， 产业经济学， 2009， 硕士

【摘要】 我国是地震、洪水等自然灾害的多发国家,巨灾风险分布地域广、种类多、发生频率高、损失重。特别是2008年以来,我国相继发生了南方雪灾和四川大地震等巨灾,对我国的经济发展和社会稳定构成了重大威胁,人们急需巨灾保险这种社会化的风险损失承担机制发挥作用。然而,由于巨灾保险产品的特殊属性,巨灾保险市场存在市场失灵,从而阻碍了巨灾保险市场的发展。为此对导致巨灾保险市场失灵的几个问题进行分析。巨灾保险是一种介于公共物品与私人物品之间的具有利益外溢的准公共物品,利益外溢的存在使得巨灾保险具有正外部性的特点。巨灾保险在经营过程中,保险市场的主体间具有信息不对称,道德风险及逆向选择是保险市场信息不对称的两种主要表现形式,在不对称信息存在的情况下,投保人道德风险的均衡解只能是一个部分保险合同,即市场均衡的合同一定需要投保人自己也承担部分风险。只要是充分竞争的保险市场,投保人的逆向选择的存在,混同均衡是不存在的,只存在分离均衡,在此分离均衡下,高风险的投保人进行完全保险,低风险的投保人只能进行部分保险,完全保险的保险费率为高风险投保人发生事故的概率,部分保险的保险费率为低风险投保人发生事故的概率。根据公共物品原理,我国应建立政策性的巨灾保险模式,根据巨灾保险的正外部性原理,政府应对居民巨灾保险进行补贴,建立政府对巨灾风险的合理分担。针对投保人的道德风险,规避道德风险的主要的、有效的策略是设计具有针对性的保险条款。针对投保人的逆向选择,首先要加强核保控制,其次是建立科学的理赔机制。更多还原

【Abstract】 There are many natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods in our country. The catastrophic risks have a broad geographical distribution. All kinds of the catastrophic risks have high frequency and huge loss. Especially since 2008, the south snowstorm and the Sichuan earthquake had successively taken place in our country, greatly threaten the economic development and social stability. The people greatly need the catastrophic insurance to play an important role in undertaking the catastrophic risk. However, because of the special attributes of catastrophe insurance goods, there is market failure in catastrophe insurance market so as to hindering the development of catastrophe insurance market. For this reason, analyzing some problems which lead to market failure of catastrophe insurance.Catastrophe insurance is a quasi-public goods has the benefits of spill-over between public goods and private goods, catastrophe insurance has positive externality characteristics because of the existence of spillover benefits. There is asymmetric information between the main body of the insurance market when catastrophe insurance in the course of business. The two main forms of information asymmetry in insurance market are moral hazard and adverse selection. In the circumstances of the existence of asymmetric information, the insured balance of moral hazard can only be a partial solution of the insurance contract, in other words, the contract market equilibrium that is required the insured must also bear part of risk. As long as they are fully competitive insurance market, the existence of adverse selection of the insured, there is separating equilibrium but pooling equilibrium. The high-risk insured select full insurance and the low-risk insured select partial insurance in the separating equilibrium. The premium rates of total insurance is the probability of the high-risk insured take place an accident, The premium rates of part insurance is the probability of the low-risk insured take place an accident.According to the principle of public goods, China should establish a policy of catastrophe insurance model. According to the principle of positive externality of catastrophe insurance, the government should subsidize catastrophe insurance of residents, the establishment of the Government’s reasonable share of catastrophic risk. In view of moral hazard of the insured, designing pertinence insurance clause is a primary and efficient strategy to avoid moral hazard. In view of adverse selection of the insured, the first is to strengthen insurance underwriting control, the second is to establish mechanism for scientific claims.更多还原