【作者】 方小欧；

【导师】 陆介雄；

【作者基本信息】 浙江工商大学 ， 民商法， 2008， 硕士

【摘要】 从我国建国以来,一直由政府为商业银行的倒闭提供隐形的信用担保。一旦问题银行陷入不能清偿债务的破产清算的边缘,政府便会承担起问题银行的全部债务。然而,随着我国入世并取消对中资银行特殊保护时刻的到来,我国政府不得不改变过去传统的做法,必须让问题银行遵循市场经济优胜劣汰的法则退出金融市场。于是,我们面临着如何完善这种问题银行退出市场的法律制度。此外,完善的问题银行退出机制也是成熟的金融市场的标志,这也是我国现今金融制度改革所追求的目标。它有利于维护银行业的稳健运行,有利于维护银行业公平有效的竞争,也有利于防止银行逆向选择的道德风险。当前,国内学者对银行破产也有诸多研讨,研讨的内容涉及银行破产的理念、价值追求、主导机关、破产财产等诸多方面。笔者在研读多位国内外学者的文章的基础上,就以下几方面内容提出自己的观点。第一,银行监管机构在银行破产程序中享有的权利。在完善银行破产制度中,必然会碰到监管机构与法院的权利冲突问题,必须处理好两者的关系。在银行破产程序的主导机构问题上,笔者认为,我国应坚持监管机构主导重整型向法院主导清算型转换的二元模式,发挥监管机构和法院在破产程序不同阶段的优势。同时,要发挥监管机构在银行破产预防中的作用。第二,商业银行的破产原因。在破产原因的规定上,笔者认为除了适用“流动性标准”和“资产负债表标准”外,可以参考美国的“监管性标准”。第三,商业银行破产的申请主体。现有的立法对申请主体的范围确定过于狭窄,笔者认为应当确定的范围为:国务院银行业监督管理机构、债务人、债权人。第四,银行破产财产的分配顺序及原则。在破产财产的分配问题上,要注意优先保护公积金中心、养老金中心等特殊机构的存款债权。第五,政府援助。商业银行的破产涉及社会方方面面的利益,不主张一刀切地对任何出现问题的银行都实行破产。当出现“银行太大而不能倒”和“系统性危机”的情况下,应当由政府进行援助,但是这种援助必须限定在严格的条件中。第六,跨国商业银行的破产。各国对跨国银行破产适用原则的选择上,做法不一,为了保护好本国债权人的利益,笔者认为,我国可选择适用“新实用主义”。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since the founding of China it has been the Government that has provided the commercial banks with credit guarantee. Once the insolvent banks are on the brink of bankruptcy, the Government will take up all the bank’s debt. However, after China’s accession to the WTO and the lifting of bank-funded special protection, our government had to change the traditional practice in the past. Banks must follow the law of survival of the fittest in the market economy. As a result, we are faced with the problem of how to adapt our banks to the new legal system. A full range of banking issues from the mature mechanism is also a sign of our current financial system reform. Safeguarding the soundness of the banking sector is conducive to the maintenance of fair and effective competition in the banking industry. It is also conducive to banks to prevent adverse selection and moral risk.At present, domestic banks bankruptcy scholars are having a lot of discussion concerning the bank’s philosophy, values, etc. After reading widely on the topic the author holds the following view. First, in the proceedings, the regulatory authorities and courts are bound to find conflicting rights. The author believes that a shift from the regulatory agencies’ re-conversion to court-led liquidation is necessary. At the same time, regulators have to play a important role in the prevention of bank insolvency. Second, the reasons of the commercial banks’ bankruptcy. The author believes that in addition to the application of the "liquidity standard" and "balance sheet standards", a reference to the United States "regulatory standards" is necessary. Third, the main body in the applications for bankruptcy of a commercial bank. The existing legislation on the subject of an application is too narrow, the author believes state banking regulatory agencies, the debtor, and creditors are the three major bodies. Fourth, the order for the distribution of assets in the bankruptcy proceedings. It is necessary to give priority attention to the protection of the central provident fund, pension and other special agencies of the central deposit claims. Fifth, the government’s aid. Bankruptcy of a commercial bank has deep social consequences. A broad-brush approach to the issue is not appropriate. When big banks are facing crisis the government should offer assistance carefully. Seventh, cross-border insolvency of commercial banks. Banks in the different countries have very different practice in the insolvency issue. The author believes that in order to protect the interests of creditors our country can choose to apply the "new pragmatism."更多还原