转型期乡村庇护网络与基层治理变迁研究

【作者】 徐向科；

【导师】 陈周旺；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 政治学理论， 2009， 硕士

【摘要】 权力与治理是乡村中国研究的两个主题,20世纪80年代开始,中国进入转型期,国家一社会关系不断调整,这对乡村社会的关系网络和治理过程产生了重大影响。对于转型期权力结构与地方治理的变化,国家中心理论和社会中心理论进行了不同的解释。从国家视角进行解释的学者强调国家制度对行动者的作用,一方面,国家税收制度和权力下放,激励了地方政府和官员的行为,促进了乡镇企业的发展和地方经济的转型;另一方面,国家行政制度中干部管理和监控制度扭曲了地方官员的行为,基层精英的滥权行为恶化了基层治理和社会秩序。而以社会为中心的理论则强调非正式制度对行动者的影响。在社会资本理论的影响下,认为社会组织(包括庙宇、教堂和宗族等)的发达程度决定了乡村治理的方式和水平,这样,社会中心理论解释了社会结构和价值规范与基层治理的关系。本文在整合这两种理论视角的基础上,主张从权力的关系网络角度解释地方治理的变化。权力的关系网络在本文被定义为庇护关系网络,其来源于交换理论、网络分析和理性选择理论,权力关系网络视角认为关系网络结构影响共同体的资源动员和集体行动。通过对T村的实证研究,发现转型期,乡村社会的庇护网络结构发生了变化,这种变化直接影响了公共产品的供给方式和水平。具体变迁过程如下:转型前期,国家农业税收和计划生育政策的实施,强化了基层精英的代理人地位,在权力资源增多和农民利益诉求的驱动下,乡村社会延续了基层政治精英一村民间的庇护关系。单一的庇护网络结构被应用于村落共同体的公共治理时,保证了资源动员和集体行动的成功。与此不同,转型后期,乡村社会在市场化、城市化的渗透下,出现了阶层的分化,经济精英作为一个群体形成。同时,国家对农村的制度和政策重新进行调整。在市场和国家的互动作用下,乡村社会单一的庇护网络结构分裂为多元结构,形成了乡村政治精英一经济精英,经济精英一村民和政治精英一村民三种庇护形式。庇护网络结构的变化导致了村落资源动员和集体行动的失败,进而影响了乡村治理水平的提高。综合以上分析,可以得知本文的核心理论假设是:单一网络结构有利于资源动员和集体行动,多元网络结构则相反,基层社区的关系网络结构决定了乡村治理的方式和水平。通过对T村的个案分析,本文检验了这一理论假设。更多还原

【Abstract】 For Students, power and governance are the two themes in the study on rural China. With the economic and social transitions in China from the beginning of the 1980s, the state-society relationship also follows changes, which influences power relations and process of governance in rural society. Then what changes happen to power relations in rural China? How do these changes bear upon rural governance? How to explain the deterioration of governance level in rural areas? Why do the village election institutions not improve the level of rural governance?To respond the questions, some analysts develop two approaches: the state-centered theory and the society-centered theory. The statist approach focuses on state institutions’ roles in process of modernization involving two kinds of viewpoints. On the one hand, some students claim that local governments and incumbents gain more incentives to develop local economy under the reform of fiscal institution and power transformation toward state agents, which are regarded as "developmental state" according to the experiences from other East Asian states. On the other hand, some analysts challenging developmental state model argue that Chinese administrative institutions including cadre management and monitoring systems, personnel system reshape local agents’ behaviors, which means local cadres’ abuse of power over society. As the result, there are more and more social conflicts and contentious events in countryside. The state-centered theory is criticized for neglecting informal institutions’ roles in grassroots governance by society-centered approach. The social approach from social capital theory emphasizes social norms and autonomic organizations values on rural governance. Thus from the social approach, to some extent, governance level in rural areas depends on amount of social capital available. The social-centered theory explains why there is maybe high-level governance for some areas with low-level economic performance, but it doesn’t explain why there are different governance performances in the whole period for the same community. In addition, how marketization and urbanization impact on rural goverance is not exlpored. Therefore this study attempts to incorporate the two types of approaches into one framework-power relations network theory, that is to say, rural goverance and changes will be explained by this approach.In this study, power relations is defined as patron-client relations which are based on individual choice, resources exchange and network norms. The core point of power relations network theory is that network structure has great effect on resource mobilizaiton and collcetive action determining the supply of public goods and services in grassroots community. According to my investigations on T village, structural changes of clientelism network in rural area influence governance methods and process for the supply of public goods. The process of changes in detail is following:(Ⅰ) In the former period of Chinese transition, rural elites, losing the absolute control over distribution of economic resources acquire more power resources as local state-agents with the agricultural taxation and family-planning policies being implemented. Meanwhile, these resources and policies directly get involved in villagers’ interests. Under the interaction between power elites and peasants, the single patron-client relation structure remains as the one in Maoist era. Thus being applied to public governance, such relation network structure is capable of keeping effectiveness of resources mobilization and collective action.(Ⅱ) In the late period of Chinese transition, social differentiation appears in rural area under the impact of marketization and urbanization which is characterized by the rise of businessmen as a group. Besides the social structural changes, central government also adjusts its policies toward villages, especially abolishing the agricultural taxation. Hence, under the interaction between market and state, the single clientelism relation network splits into three forms of patron-client relations which is involved in political elites-economic elites relation, economic elite-peasant relation and political elite-peasant relation. Trilateral clientelism network structures is unable to ensure effective collective action in the provision of public goods, thus influencing the governance level in rural areas.In a few words, from the statements above, we can get the core research hypothesis is that single relation network structure contributes more to resources mobilization and collective action for supplying public goods than plural network structures do. To some extent, relation network structure determines the level of governance in rual community. In the thesis, the research hypothesis is tested with qualitative data from fieldwork at T village.更多还原