民营企业上市模式、大股东控制与经营绩效

【作者】 卿校成；

【导师】 曾勇；

【作者基本信息】 电子科技大学 ， 数量经济学， 2009， 硕士

【摘要】 在我国特殊的制度背景下,上市是一种稀缺的资源,民营企业直接上市困难重重。同时借壳上市的制度环境相对宽松,于是大部分民营企业通过借壳的方式实现间接上市。因此,与发达资本市场不同,借壳上市取代了直接上市,成为我国民营企业上市的主要模式。不同上市模式使得上市公司及其控股股东在上市成本、资产质量和上市承担的风险等方面都具有不同的特征。这必然影响到上市公司治理结构的安排和控股股东的行为,进而影响到上市公司的经营绩效。本文首先分析了我国民营企业上市的现状和发展历程,在此基础上对不同上市模式的上市公司的控股股东特征进行了比较分析。然后,对我国440家民营上市公司2003-2006年的数据进行了实证分析,发现上市模式与公司治理结构以及控股股东行为密切相关,是影响上市公司经营绩效的重要因素。本文的研究发现主要包括以下四个方面。(1)不同上市模式的上市公司治理结构存在显著差异,直接上市公司控股股东持股比例要显著高于借壳上市公司,而控制权和所有权的分离程度要显著低于借壳上市公司,同时直接上市公司的控股股东更倾向于指定上市公司的管理层。(2)对于直接上市公司,借壳上市公司更容易发生资金占用,且占用程度更高。制衡性股东和独立董事对控股股东的资金占用行为有一定的监督作用,但是总体来说这一监督作用并不明显。(3)现金股利和资金占用负相关,直接上市公司股利分配率高于借壳上市公司。(4)公司的经营绩效和资金占用负相关,直接上市公司的经营绩效要好于借壳上市公司。在直接上市公司中,控股股东持股和任命管理层对上市公司的经营绩效有显著的正向影响,在借壳上市公司中影响则不显著。本文的研究结论,对完善民营上市公司治理结构、促进民营经济的发展有一定的现实意义和理论意义。更多还原

【Abstract】 Under special institutional situations, such as the arrangement of stock issuing regulation and the strict regulation, it is very difficult for China’s private enterprises to go public directly and going public indirectly by the mode of backdoor listing is much easier. The majority of private enterprises go public by the mode of backdoor listing. So instead of IPO(Initial Public Offerings), backdoor listing becomes the main mode of private enterprises going public which is quite different from the developed capital market. The companies and their controlling shareholders in the two listing modes have different characteristics with respect to asset quality, cost and risk of listing, etc. Those characteristics will certainly affect the governance structure and the behaviors of controlling shareholders, and further cause companies to perform differently.Firstly, this paper analyses the current status of the private listed companies, and reviews the history of the private enterprise going public, based on that we compared the characteristics of controlling shareholders in the two listing modes. Secondly, using a sample of 440 A-share private listed companies in China from 2003 to 2006, the empirical study of this paper finds that the listing mode is closely related to corporate governance structure and the behaviors of controlling shareholders, and listing mode is also a very important factor that affects corporate performance. Followings are the main research findings.(1) The corporate governance structure of the firm with different listing mode is significantly different. The ownership structure of direct listed company is more concentrated than that of backdoor listed company and the separation level of control right and cash flow right in backdoor listed company is much higher than that in direct listed companies. Besides, direct listed companies are more inclined to appoint the managers.(2) Compared to direct listed companies, backdoor listed companies have a higher probability and degree of having fund embezzlement problem. The Empirical study also shows that check-and-balance shareholders and independent directors have some influence on controlling shareholders’behaviors, but the impact is limited. (3) Cash dividends rate is inversely correlated with fund embezzlement rate, backdoor listed companies pay less cash dividends than direct listed companies.(4) Corporate performance is negatively correlated with fund embezzlement rate, direct listed companies have significantly better performance than backdoor listed companies. In the direct listed companies, events that the controlling shareholder holds more shares or appoint listed company’s managers have positive effect on corporate performance, but in backdoor listed companies the effect is not significant.To summarize, this study has its practical meaning and theoretical meaning in promoting the development of the private economy and improving corporate governance of listed private companies.更多还原