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证券投资基金管理人信赖义务研究

The Research on the Fiduciary Duty of Securities Investment Fund’s Manager

【作者】 陈士林

【导师】 石宏伟;

【作者基本信息】 江苏大学 , 马克思主义理论与思想政治教育, 2008, 硕士

【摘要】 依托信托原理建立起来的证券投资基金,因基金财产所有权与经营权的分离而产生了委托——代理问题。如果得不到有效监督,基金管理人就可能滥用经营权而损害基金持有人利益,实践中我国基金管理人与持有人之间时常发生利益冲突。为此,必须赋予基金管理人信赖义务,使基金当事人之间形成有效的权利制衡机制。基金业发达的国家对此已有相当多的研究成果,并制定了完备的法律制度。但是,我国理论界从法学角度研究证券投资基金的并不多见,且大多集中在对证券投资基金业的监管、基金管理人具体义务等问题上,全面系统研究基金管理人信赖义务的学术成果相对较少。该文以基金管理人的信赖义务为主线,运用比较和实证等研究方法,在确立基金管理人法律地位的基础上,论述了基金管理人信赖义务的基本理论,详细探讨了注意义务和忠实义务的基本内容、具体要求及判断标准,并立足我国现状论述了监管基金管理人履行信赖义务,保护基金持有人正当权利的有效措施。该文由六部分组成:第一部分,导言。主要分析了证券投资基金的信托基础和制度缺陷,由于建立在信托基础上的证券投资基金存在委托人与代理人之间信息不对称的情况,从而会出现逆向选择和道德风险损害委托人正当权益,同时,基金业中存在契约不完全的问题,会导致剩余控制权与剩余索取权的不对应,这些都蕴涵着基金财产遭受管理人侵蚀的风险。接着,总结了我国证券投资基金发展的现状,并从外部环境、基金监管、基金评级、基金托管等方面分析了我国基金存在的问题。第二部分,证券投资基金法律关系模式的选择。首先对证券投资基金的基本性质作了界定,由于证券投资基金具备组织体的基本特点,建议出于维护投资安全,保障投资者合法权益的目的,在法律性质上应将其定位于投资组织;接着在总结评析主要基金管理人法律关系模式的基础上,对我国现有“共同受托人”模式进行了分析,提出界定我国基金法律关系模式应当考虑保护基金持有人利益、合理解释各当事人职责、坚持信托基本原理、符合本国具体国情等因素,并提出明确各当事人基本职责,取消连带责任等改进措施。第三部分,证券投资基金管理人信赖义务的基本理论。首先对信赖义务的内涵作了辨析,并对基金管理人的信赖义务进行了确认,简要介绍了信赖义务的具体内容;其次,针对我国的规定,提出以信赖义务取代诚信义务来规定基金管理人对基金持有人所负的义务;再次,对基金管理人信赖义务的性质进行了分析,提出管理人信赖义务是一种区别于物权和债权的独立义务形态。第四部分,证券投资基金管理人的注意义务。通过对英美法系和大陆法系的比较对注意义务的含义进行了阐释;采用比较的研究方法归纳了基金业发达国家和地区对注意义务的具体要求,从投资范围和投资方式等方面进行了分析;从注意义务判断标准的历史演进,提出我国应采纳现代投资组合理论来判断注意义务的履行情况。第五部分,证券投资基金管理人的忠实义务。对忠实义务进行了基本论述,指出利益冲突是基金管理人违反忠实义务的主要原因;通过比较分析的方法分析了证券投资基金管理人忠实义务的主要具体形态,包括本人交易、共同交易、代理交易等问题。第六部分,对证券投资基金管理人履行信赖义务的监管对策。在评析世界主要国家基金监管模式的基础上,提出现阶段我国应采取以政府监管为主导,以内部监管为核心的内外有机结合的监管体系,在充分发展市场机制的前提下,对基金市场进行宏观引导和适度政策扶持;接着主要从市场机制、政府监管、行业自律等三个方面对信赖义务的外部制约机制,从基金持有人监管、基金托管人监管和基金管理费安排三个方面对信赖义务的内部制衡机制提出了改进措施。

【Abstract】 Securities investment fund which is established by trust principle,has the request—proxy question because of the fund’s separation between property ownership and rights of management.If can not get valid supervision,the fund manager may damage fund holder’s benefits by abusing rights of management.In practice,conflicts of interest often ocurrs between fund manager and holders in our country.Therefore,in order to form a valid right mechanism to keep in balance between fund parties,we must authorize fund manager the fiduciary duty.Those countries where the fund industry is well developed, has achieved considerable research in this field and formed comprehensive legal system in the legislation.But,current academic research in the securities investment fund from the legal point is small in our country theoretical circles.In the research results,most of all are focused on the supervision of securities investment fund industry,fund manager’s specific obligations and so on.Comprehensive and systematical academic achievement to fund manager’s fiduciary duty is relatively few.This article take the fund manager’s fiduciary duty as the master line,use the research methods such as comparison and real diagnosis,establishes fund manager’s legal status,elaborates the elementary theory of fund manager’s fiduciary duty,discusses the basic content,the specific requirements and the criteria of the duty of care and loyalty in detail,and elaborates the effective action to supervise manager to fulfill the fiduciary duty,protect the fund holder’s right based on our country’s present situation.This article is arranged as follows:The first part is preface.The anthor mainly analyzes the foundation and the flaw of trust by which securities investment fund is established.Securities investment fund has the request - proxy question,so it may cause the Adverse Selection and the Moral Risk which harms the trustee’s just rights,and the fund industry has the contract-incomplete problem,which may cause correspondence between the right of surplus domination and surplus claim,these all contain the risk that the manager may suffer fund properties.Then, summarizes securities investment fund’s present situation in our country,and analyzes our country fund’s question from external environment,fund Supervision,fund rating, fund trust and so on.The second part focuses on the pattern of securities investment fund’s legal relationship.Firstly,the author difines the basical nature of securities investment fund.Because the securities investment fund has the essential feature of organization,in consider to maintain investment security,safeguard the investor’s legitimate rights,the author suggests that we should locate the securities investment fund in the form of investment organization in the legal nature.Then the author evaluates main legal relationship pattern of various countries securities investment fund,and evaluates our country’s "Common trustee" pattern,proposes that in order to difine our country’s fund legal relationship pattern,we have to consider the fund holder’s benefit,comforming to explaine each parties’ responsibility,insisting basic trust principle,conforming to our country’s concrete national condition and so on,and proposes many improved measures such as defining each parties’ responsibility,canceling joint liability.The third part centers on the legal basis analysis of the fund manager’s fiduciary duty elementary theory.Firstly,discusses the implication of fiduciary duty,and confirmes the fund manager’s fiduciary duty,briefly introduces the concrete content of fiduciary duty;secondly,in view of our country’s stipulation,proposes that we should replace good faith duty with fiduciary duty to be fund manager’s official duty;thirdly,analyses the nature of fund manager’s fiduciary duty,proposes that fund manager’s fiduciary duty is a distinguished duty which is different from the real rights and the creditor’s rights.The fourth part focuses on the securities investment fund manager’s duty of care.Explaines the meaning of the duty of care by comparing to the Common Law System and the Civil Law System;induces the developed countries and the areas’ specific request of the duty of care concering ways and areas of investmeng by comparison method;according to the entire evolution of the judgment standard of the duty of care,suggestes that our country should adopt the modern investment profolio theory to judge the duty of care.The fitch part focuses on the fund manager’s duty of loyalty.Pointes that the conflicts of interest are the primary cause that fund managers violate the duty of loyalty;elaborates the specific patterns of the duty of loyalty,including myself transaction,joint transaction,agent agency transaction and so on.The sixth part focuses on the measures of supervising fund manager’s fiduciary duty.In foundation of evaluating main countrys’ fund supervising pattern,proposes that country should adopt the system "take government supervision as the hauling,take internal supervision as the core,carriy on the macroscopic guidance and the moderate policy support to the fund market" at present;then mainly proposes improving methods to improve fiduciary duty’s exterior restriction mechanism from three aspects,the market mechanism,government supervision,the profession autonomy and so on,improve fiduciary duty’s interior restriction mechanism from holder’s supervision,fund trustee’s supervision,the fund management fee and so on.

  • 【网络出版投稿人】 江苏大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2009年 10期
  • 【分类号】F832.51
  • 【被引频次】4
  • 【下载频次】98
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