【作者】 陆丹；

【导师】 刘桂良；

【作者基本信息】 湖南大学 ， 会计学， 2008， 硕士

【摘要】 现实审计环境的复杂性,导致了审计关系人的现实角色与理想角色的错位和扭曲,审计关系人的正当利益失去应有的保护,进而导致了审计合谋的产生,而审计合谋又进一步加剧了审计关系失衡。审计合谋之所以一直未能得到有效的治理,究其原因关键还是在于审计关系人利益分割不公平或不合法及其权责利不明晰。审计合谋治理是一个世界性的难题。因此,研究审计合谋治理在理论上和实务上都具有重要意义。本文以信息不对称理论、有限政府理论、审计合谋共生理论和投资者保护的法律论等作为研究的理论基础。本文首先对审计关系人的范畴予以重新界定,将预期审计报告使用者纳入审计关系人范畴以取代传统审计关系下的委托者。并且将作为监管者的政府与新审计关系人一同纳入审计合谋利益关系主体的范畴。认为当审计合谋泛滥时,作为监管者的政府应当承担政策失误和监管无效的社会责任和行政责任。然后,结合我国的国情分析了审计关系人利益失衡的原因和审计合谋机理,认为审计关系人的经济人特性和审计环境的复杂性决定了审计合谋是各方利益主体之间的一个长期共存和博弈的过程,并对此进行博弈分析和案例分析。提出被审计者的信息权优势决定了其相对于审计者而言应当为审计合谋的后果承担更大的责任,同时认为预期审计报告使用者拥有获取真实而完整的审计信息的权力和投资损失的有限求偿权。本文通过利益均衡分析,最后立足于国情提出审计合谋治理应当遵循的思路是:被审计者和审计者有效自我约束、委托者有效监督、政府有效监管和投资者有效信赖。并提出审计合谋的“三维治理观”,即动机诱正、过程控制以及结果的监督和惩戒。更多还原

【Abstract】 The complexity of realistic audit environment leads to the distortion phenomena of audit relationship. So the legitimate interest of audit relationship parties can’t be completely protected, then audit collusion happened, which deteriorates the imbalance of audit relationship. The reason of why audit collusion is so difficult to be solved is that the interest of audit relationship parties can’t be distributed fairly or legally, the power and responsibility are not transparent. Audit collusion is a world-widely difficult problem. So it is meaningful to research on audit collusion governance.The study is based on the theories of imbalanced information theory、limited government theory、audit collusion accrete theory, the juristic protection of investors theory and so on. First of all, we redefined the category of audit relationship parties, replaced the traditional audit receiver with prospective audit report users, and defined the audit collusion interest relationship bodies, which contains auditors、managers、prospective audit report users and the government. We think the government should be responsible for its policy mistakes and non-effective supervision when accounting cheat and audit collusion exist seriously. Secondly, with the consideration of our country’s situation, we deeply analyzed the reasons and mechanism of audit collusion, we also used a game model and a case to analyze it. We think the management authorities of listed company should have greater responsibility for audit collusion and the loss of the investors, and prospective audit report users have the right to gain real information and be compensated limitedly. Finally, through the analysis of balanced interest, we point the leading idea of audit collusion is as follows: the management authorities of listed company and auditors must restrict themselves effectively、auditor receiver supervision effectively、government supervision effectively and investors trust effectively. We also put forward the three-dimensional governance viewpoint, which contains motivation correction、process control、the result supervision and punishment.更多还原