【作者】 王耿；

【导师】 宋增基；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 技术经济及管理， 2008， 硕士

【摘要】 CEO报酬越来越受到理论界以及社会各界的广泛关注。合理的经营者报酬制度成为了建立有效的公司治理的核心内容,众多学者对公司管理人员的报酬进行实证分析。本文运用人力资本理论、交易成本理论、委托代理理论、管理学和其他学科知识,构建CEO报酬模型来研究中国上市公司中股权结构在报酬契约方面的能力。本文采用沪深两市2006年报数据,通过引入公司发展特征、CEO个人特征衡量股权结构对CEO报酬水平的影响。在CEO报酬水平研究中,本文采用不同于以往研究的变量如成长性(净利润增长率)、股权集中度(CR3、CR5、H5)、股权控制度(CR1、Z)、第一大股东的性质等。另外还涉及公司绩效、规模、CEO年龄和任期等控制变量。通过多元逐步回归模型研究各因子对薪酬的影响。另外,由于我国大型企业和中小企业股权结构差异性比较大,影响因子的解释存在异议,本文利用两组数据分别研究了两者的股权结构对CEO报酬的影响,更加准确地解释各变量对CEO报酬影响。统计研究发现:大型企业CEO货币报酬高于中小企业CEO,但总报酬偏低;公司的绩效和成长性并不因为规模的庞大而降低;国有股的比例随着规模减小而降低,外资股随着规模减少趋向于降低,流通A股则随着规模减少而提高;大型和中小企业第一大股东控制度并不特别强,但大型企业表现三大股东的联合控制,而中小企业股权相对分散。实证结论表明:无论大型企业还是中小企业,公司规模都是决定CEO报酬的重要因素,公司绩效与中小企业CEO总报酬显著正相关。股权收益已经逐步成为我国上市公司高管人员整体薪酬计划中的重要组成部分。外资股权与CEO总报酬正相关,但是大型企业外资比例高是由于外资流通股比例高,公司治理机制弱化,CEO实际控制度增强,报酬增加,中小企业则是外资直接投资增加,报酬政策标准越高,CEO很可能收到高的货币报酬。股权集中度与CEO报酬并不呈现正U型关系,而是呈现负相关。中小企业CEO是因为股权分散,而获得高比例的个人股以增加股权收益,而大型企业CEO更倾向于利用股权分散的公司治理问题而提高个人报酬收益。最后本文对CEO报酬机制提出建议,并对以后的研究方向做了展望。更多还原

【Abstract】 The CEO compensation has come under more and more consideration in academia and industry. The construction of rational manager compensation system is a core content of efficient governance, and many academicians start to carry on the empirical analysis to corporate mangers’compensation. In order to investigate the effectiveness of listed corporate’ownership structure to compensation, my paper constructs the CEO reward influence the structural model under the property right theory, the transaction cost theory, the principal-agent theory, the management science and other discipline knowledge.Base on data from annual report of companies listed in Shenzhen and Shanghai in2006 and 2007, this paper analyses effectiveness among enterprises’features, stockholding structure and CEO compensation. This article used variable like growth potential (the net profit rate of increment), the stockholder’s rights concentration degree (CR3, CR5, and H5), and the stockholder’s rights controlled the system (CR1, Z), the first major stockholder’s nature and so on. In addition, it involves controlled variables and so on company achievements, scale, CEO age and tenure in office, and study various factors to compensation influence through multi-dimensional stepwise regression model. Because our country Major industry and the small-sized enterprises stockholder’s rights structure difference is in evidence, the explanation to the interrelated factors the exist objection. This article studies the influence, relating to both stockholders’rights structure separately to the CEO compensation, with two groups of data. They can accurately explain the relations of the variables and CEO compensation.In the model, the research discovered that, The MP reward of CEO from the major industries is higher than small and medium-sized enterprises, while the total compensation is lower. The huge scale does not reduce the efficiency of companies’performance; the state-owned stock proportion reduces along with the scale reduces, and the foreign capital stock tends to along with the scale reduction in reduces, and circulates A stock proportion reduces along with the scale enhances. The controlling of the most major stockholder of large-scale and the small-sized enterprises are not strong, however, the major industries displays several major stockholder’s union controlling, while the small and medium-sized enterprises stockholder’s rights relatively disperser, moreover the first major stockholder and second major stockholder disparity in strength is not remarkable.The real diagnosis conclusion indicated in follows: first, Regardless of the major industry or the small and medium-sized enterprise, the company scale is the determining factor deciding the CEO reward, the company achievements and the small-sized enterprise’CEO total compensation is remarkably connected. Secondly, the stockholder’s rights income already gradually became to be listed high tube personnel overall salary plan the important constituent in our country. Third, the headers in the state-owned companies also are supervised and restrained by the government, the relatively, their stockholder’s rights proportion are fewer. While the foreign capital direct investment to small and medium-sized enterprise increases, the reward policy standard is higher, and CEO possibly receives the high monetary payoff; if the large-scale business owner the foreign capital circulation stock increase, CEO actual increase the controlling of the system, and also the reward increases. The stockholder’s rights concentration degree and the CEO reward do not present the U relations, but present the inverse correlation. The concentration degree is higher, the reward is lower, because the stockholder’s rights of small and medium-sized enterprise is dispersible, he can obtain the high annual bonus by increasing the stockholder’s rights income, while Major industry CEO favors in enhancing the enterprise by using the company governance problem.Finally, this article proposes to suggest about the CEO reward mechanism, also has made the forecast to later research direction.更多还原