【作者】 程玲玲；

【导师】 黄新建；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 会计学， 2008， 硕士

【摘要】 大股东利用控股地位侵占中小股东的利益,严重影响了上市公司的正常经营活动,损害了投资者的信心。股权分置改革是我国证券市场经历的一次重大制度性变革,主要用于解决非流通股与流通股问题。股改以后,大股东侵占的影响因素有何变化,是本文主要研究的问题。大股东侵占的理论基础是大股东与中小股东之间的代理问题,而代理问题产生的条件是控制权与现金流量权的分离。控制权与现金流量权分离后,控制权通常大于现金流量权,控股股东可以用较小的股权达到控制上市公司的目的。本文在理论研究基础上,分析了我国上市公司大股东侵占的途径,并解析了我国发生大股东侵占行为的制度背景和外部环境。本文将2006年股改后的上市公司作为基本样本,并以当年未股改的上市公司作为比较样本。研究在不同控制权与现金流量权分离程度下,大股东侵占有何不同,为此把已股改公司的样本分为4类,加上未股改公司样本,共得到5类样本。并用上市公司与大股东的关联交易度量大股东侵占,提出8个解释变量与2个控制变量,构建多元回归模型。通过回归分析发现,现金流量权与控制权的分离程度越高(大于或等于10%)时,变量对大股东侵占影响越大。控股股东与第二大股东持股之比是最明显的因素,在5类样本中均显著正相关。控股股东性质、董事长与总经理是否为同一人以及审计意见均不是大股东侵占的关键因素。变量对未股改公司和已股改公司的影响差别不大,唯一区别是,未股改公司的控股股东持股比例与大股东侵占不显著,而已股改公司的控股股东持股比例与大股东侵占负相关。最后,根据分析结果,本文对后股改时期大股东侵占的治理提出了相应建议。主要包括以下几个方面:(1)优化股权结构,加强公司治理,建议在我国引进机构投资者以改善股权结构,完善独立董事制度以加强公司治理。(2)完善信息披露制度,最大程度保障投资者获悉信息的公平性。(3)加强法制建设,建议借鉴发达国家经验,引进新制度。(4)加强诚信建设与职业道德建设,增强广大中小投资者的保护意识。更多还原

【Abstract】 Large shareholders utilize their control position to snatch interests from medium and small shareholders; these behaviors have seriously damaged normal business activities of listed companies and done harm to the confidence of investors. Equity division reform is an important institutional transformation of stock market in China. Equity division reform has solved the problem of non-circulating stock and circulating stock. What’s the difference between pre and post of equity division reform? It is the main problem that this paper to be studied.The theoretical basis of large shareholders expropriation is the agency problem between large shareholders and medium-small shareholders. And production condition of agency problem is the separation between control rights and cash flow rights. After the separation of control rights and cash flow rights, control rights is usually larger than cash flow rights, controlling shareholder can achieve the goal that control listed companies by using less stockholding. On the basis of theoretical analysis, this paper analyses invading ways of large shareholders, and describes the system background and external environment of large shareholders expropriation.This paper chooses listed companies which have finished equity division reform in 2006 as basic samples, and chooses listed companies which have not reformed as contrast samples. In order to study the differences of large shareholders expropriation under different separation degrees of control rights and cash flow rights, this paper divides reformed samples into four kinds, together with samples which have not reformed, there are five kinds of samples. This paper uses related transaction to measure large shareholders expropriation. Eight explanatory variables and two control variables are adopted in the multivariate regression model. The results of regression analysis show that the higher separation degree between control rights and cash flow rights is, the greater influence (equal to or greater than 10%) of variables to large shareholders expropriation will be. The ratio between controlling shareholder and the second shareholder is the most significant factor of all, it is positive correlated with all the five kinds of samples. The nature of controlling shareholder, whether board chairman and general manager is the same one, and audit opinion are all not the key factors of large shareholders expropriation. The difference of variables’influence between reformed listed companies and non-reformed listed companies is very little; the only difference is the relation between stock-holding proportion of controlling shareholder and large shareholders expropriation, it is not obvious in non-reformed listed companies, but it is positive correlated with large shareholders expropriation in reformed listed companies.At last, this paper gives several treatment advices of large shareholders expropriation in the post equity division reform era according to the analytical results. It mainly concludes the following several aspects: (1) Optimizing equity structure and strengthening company governance. And we should introduce institutional investors to improve stock right structure and perfect independent director system to strengthen company governance. (2) Perfecting information disclosure system to guarantee fairness of investors’information acquirement to the utmost extent. (3) Strengthening legal construction. And we should learn the experiences from developed countries and introduce new legal systems. (4) Strengthening credit construction, professional ethics construction and protection consciousness of the most medium-small investors.更多还原