欧盟对华反倾销的博弈分析

【作者】 徐艾洁；

【导师】 李树；

【作者基本信息】 西南政法大学 ， 国民经济学， 2008， 硕士

【摘要】 反倾销是世贸组织赋予进口国自我保护的一项合法权利,近些年,我国企业频频遭受欧美等国反倾销指控。现实中,反倾销已经严重影响了我国出口贸易的健康发展,我国已成为反倾销的最大受害国。由于我国企业对反倾销知识缺乏了解,缺少反倾销诉讼方面的经验,在应对反倾销诉讼时往往败诉,不仅使企业自身遭受了严重的经济损失,而且损害了我国在国际贸易领域的形象。本文运用博弈思想将理论与实践相结合,将定性研究和定量研究相结合,将现代博弈理论与中国传统博弈思想相结合去分析当我国面对欧盟发起反倾销时应该如何去对抗。具有现实的经济意义和较强的实践指导意义。整篇文章以博弈论作为分析工具,选择以中国和欧盟为切入点来研究两国存在的反倾销对抗问题。主要内容如下:①欧盟对华反倾销现状以及研究本课题的意义:②欧盟反倾销调查的主管机构,欧盟反倾销行政调查程序、行政审查程序和司法诉讼程序,对反倾销的贸易保护进行了博弈分析;③从积极和消极两个方面分别对出口国和进口国讨论了倾销的经济效应;④建立了反倾销诉讼模型和反倾销应诉模型;⑤对反倾销行政调查过程运用博弈方法建立了中国和欧盟间的反倾销的静态和动态博弈模型;⑥通过对企业参与反倾销司法诉讼的博弈模型的建立分析了企业是否应该参与司法审议;⑦结合第三、四、五章中得到的推论以及建议,运用博弈的思想从出口企业间的博弈和出口国企业与进口国企业间的博弈两个角度出发,进行了归纳和总结。本文主要得出了以下几点结论:①在进口国是否参与诉讼他国倾销时,进口国企业参与诉讼的可能性与同类产品企业数目成反比。②针对出口国是否进行应诉的问题,通过建立2个企业的反倾销应诉博弈模型,进而扩展为N个企业的反倾销应诉博弈模型,得出了“随着同行业内企业数目的增多,各个企业不应诉的概率会增大”的结论,从而解释了部分企业想通过不应诉获利的“搭便车”现象,根据此不良现象,文中指出了事实上无论同行业内企业数目是多少,企业都应该积极应诉,应诉比不应诉好。③通过对进口国和出口国在完全信息竞争中的Cournot-Nash均衡、不完全信息竞争中的cournot-Bayesian-Nash均衡和不完全信息条件下引入反倾销机制的Nash均衡进行假设求解,得到三个推论,根据推论总结出了“如果出口方产品具有比较成本优势则出口方不应采取倾销策略”的结论,若被对方指控为倾销,那么我方一定要积极应诉。④在企业已被裁定为倾销的情况下,文中指出虽然大多数被诉企业不愿意因为付出沉重的经济代价而最终进行司法诉讼,但为了维护国家和企业自身的长远利益,企业应该牺牲当前利益进行最终司法诉讼。更多还原

【Abstract】 Anti-dumping is one of the legitimate rights which WTO entrust to the import country for considerable self-protection. In recent years, the enterprises of our country suffer again and again western countries dumping accusations. In fact, anti-dumping already seriously affected the healthy development of the export trade of our country. China has become the biggest victimized country . Since the enterprises of our country lacks understanding for dumping and anti-dumping knowledge, lacks experience in anti-dumping lawsuit. We often lose a lawsuit. It not only make enterprise self have suffered serious pecuniary loss, and have harmed the image of our country in international trading field.Combing theory with practice , qualitative research with quantitative research, the modern game theory with the traditional Chinese game thought, this paper applies game theory to interpret how we fight against European Union(EU) when they take the initiative in anti-dumping toward us. This paper makes realistic sense on economics and strong sense on practice.This paper tries to make game theory to analyze the anti-dumping problems we encountered. In order to make deeper research on it, I focus this question in China and EU. The primary coverage goes as follows. In foreword, there is an introduction of the current situation of anti-dumping between China and EU and the meaning of this essay’s research. In the first , I mainly talked about the charging organization of anti-dumping investigation in EU and about the procedure of administrative investigation ,the procedure of administrative censor and the procedure of litigation of anti-dumping in EU.And I also made a gambling analysis of trade protection on anti-dumping. In the second, I discussed the economic effect on dumping about exporting and importing countries from positive aspect and negative aspect. In the third, I make two models. One is about anti-dumping litigation. The other is about respondent anti-dumping of two corporations spreading into "n" corporations. In the forth ,applying the method of game theory ,the paper establishes the static and dynamic anti-dumping game models between China and EU. In the fifth , a game model of a corporation participating judicial proceedings was made. In the last, combining with the comparing analysis in the chapter 3,chapter 4 and the chapter 5, I pointed out where our anti-dumping laws needed to perfect further. Then gathering the conclusions and suggestions , I profound many constructive suggestions to our country .I have come to the conclusions as below based on the essay. Firstly, there’s a conclusion that the probability of the corporation taking part in litigation and the amount of the same product’s corporations were in reverse proportion. Secondly, there’s an anlysis that the probability of failure to respond to litigation of every corporation would be increasing with the same more corporations. Thirdly,I made tests of hypothesis and drew three conclusions through establishing the static and dynamic anti-dumping game models between China and EU. Based on the conclusions I summarized the dumping strategy wouldn’t be adopted in labor-intensive industries provided with obviously comparative advantage. The last conclusion is that though many sued corporations won’t like to apply for final judicial proceedings because of the large expense they should sacrifice current benefits to execute judicial proceedings for the protecting the benefits of our country and themselves.更多还原