【作者】 郑晓旭；

【导师】 潘爱玲；

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 ， 会计学， 2008， 硕士

【摘要】 传统大小股东代理问题的研究多是停留在公司直接股东层面,研究直接控股股东对上市公司的利益侵害。本文选用2005-2006年沪深两市A股上市公司的数据为研究样本,通过对控制链层层追溯,找出上市公司真正的控股股东——终极控制人,运用T检验、多元线性回归等统计方法,较为全面研究了终极控制人特征与公司价值关系并根据检验结果提出相应的政策建议,揭开控股股东“掏空”上市公司更为深层的原因,为防止终极控制人侵害、加强中小投资者保护提供更多依据。本文对终极控制人特征的研究主要着眼于与终极控制人有关的四大特征——现金流权、控制权、两权分离度及控制人性质。研究结果发现我国目前终极股东的现金流权和控制权都比较集中,但现金流权和控制权还是呈现出较大的分离程度。在对终极控制人特征对公司价值影响的研究中,本文首先检验了现金流权对公司价值的影响,研究结果表明现金流权与公司价值呈正相关关系,终极控制人拥有的现金流权越大,公司价值越高。然后本文又检验了终极控制人的控制权对公司价值的影响,检验结果表明终极控制人的控制权与公司价值呈非线性关系,公司价值随控制权的增大先下降后上升然后再下降,拐点为26.32%和67.60%。当公司终极控制人的控制权低于26.32%时,终极控制人的控制权越大,公司价值越低;当公司终极控制人的控制权在26.32%至67.60%时,终极控制人的控制权越大,公司价值越大;当公司终极控制人的控制权大于67.60%时,终极控制人的控制权与公司价值又重新呈现负相关关系。上市公司的现金流权和控制权对公司价值的影响呈现出不同的特征,为了找出差异的原因进一步研究真正影响公司价值的终极控制人特征,本文进一步研究两权分离程度对公司价值的影响。研究结果表明上市公司的两权分离度与公司价值负相关,两权分离程度越大,公司价值越小。两权分离程度对公司价值的影响也解释了终极控制人的控制权与公司价值的非线性关系。为了更完整的解释研究影响公司价值的终极控制人的特征,本文又研究了终极控制人的性质、两权分离程度及公司价值的关系,结果发现,国有终极控制公司价值并不显著低于非国有控制公司,不能简单的判断国有产权和非国有产权控制的公司哪个会有更高效率。进一步研究发现非国有终极控制公司的两权分离度大于国有终极控制公司,非国有终极控制人更倾向于构建复杂金字塔结构或交叉持股等方式对上市公司进行控制,在这种效应作用下导致两种公司价值差异比较模糊。本文的最终研究结果表明,最深层次影响公司价值的终极控制人特征是两权分离程度,两权分离程度决定了终极控制人侵害中小股东等外部人利益的动机和能力。更多还原

【Abstract】 Traditional research on agency problem of controlling shareholders concentrates on the direct controlling shareholders. They study the harming of the direct controlling shareholders to the listed company. This paper selects the data of listed company of Hu-Shen stock market in 2005-2006 as sample, finds the real controller-the ultimate controller by tracing the control chain, adopts T-test and multiple linear regression, studies the relationship between the characteristics of ultimate controller and the firm value in various aspects and provides the corresponding measures according to the test result in order to provide more basis for preventing the tunneling of the ultimate controllers and protecting the minority shareholders.This paper studies four characteristics of ultimate controller-cash flow rights, control rights, the separation of two rights and the nature of the ultimate controller. First we test the effect of the cash flow rights on the firm value. The result shows that the cash flow rights are positive to the firm value. The more the cash flow rights owned by the ultimate controller, the more the firm value and vice versa. Second this paper test the effect of the control rights on the firm value. The result shows that the relationship between the control rights and the firm value is none-linear: a converse N shape. The inflexions are 26.32% and 67.60%. When the control rights below 26.32%, the control rights is negative to the firm value; when the control right between 26.32% and 67.60%, the control rights is positive to the firm value; when the control rights excess 67.60%, the control rights is negative to the firm value again. The cash flow rights and the control rights show different effect characteristics. In order to find the further reason, we go on to study the separation of two rights. The result shows that the separation of two rights is negatively related to the firm value. This explains the non-linear relationship between control rights and firm value. In order to completely research on the ultimate controller’s characteristics, this paper studies the nature of the ultimate controller and the firm value. It shows that firm of state-ultimate owned company is not lower than the non-state owned company significantly. We can’t say which one is more efficient between the state-ultimate controlled and non-state ultimate controlled company. The non-state ultimate controllers prefer to establish the complex pyramid structure to control the listed company. The non-state ultimate controllers are more active and more efficient. Two effects lead the difference of the firm value of the stated owned and the non-state owned ambiguous. The separation of two rights decides the motivation and ability to invading the minority shareholders.更多还原