论控股股东权利规制

【作者】 罗峥；

【导师】 陈晓红；

【作者基本信息】 中南大学 ， 工商管理， 2007， 硕士

【摘要】 我国多数上市公司股权结构存在着一个问题,即国有股“一股独大”,国家在大多数上市公司中拥有高度集中的股权。这样的股权结构固然保证了国有股的控制地位,但国有股比重过高的情况是有悖于市场经济的基本原则,它决定了我国公司治理结构基础的不合理,出现了一系列控制股东利用自身特殊地位损害其它中小股东的利益问题。当前,如何规制控制股东的权利已成为我国一项紧迫而又重要的课题,而国有上市公司中所有者虚位及股权分置问题是任何一个发达市场经济国家不曾遇到的难题。中国的这种特殊国情决定了其与西方国家公司治理中的委托代理为核心的理论有着实践性差异。本文以中国国有上市公司的治理实践为背景,论文从比较法的角度具体分析三种不同模式下控股股东权利规制的不同立法例,在此基础上明确我国特殊国情下不同于上述模式下面临的特殊具体问题一所有者虚位及股权分置问题。由于“国有上市公司中所有者到位”是一个伪命题,则只有对股权进行分置改革,实行全流通和国有股减持。并运用托宾的Q值理论,对控股股东及法人股东控股区间进行了实证的分析,计算出了控股股东的最佳持股比例与累计持股区间。文章此举在于以量化方式探究限制控制权的可能与现实,以实证分析结果为基础,作者认为即使在股权分置改革完成后,在国有股减持短期内无法完全实现的情况下,应适度支持其他法人股东适度增加持股比例,适度减少国有股比例,并以此确定大股东表决权的区间。从外围结构上对控制股东进行规制后其全部运行内容将集中于董事会上,由于所有权虚位导致的控制股东责、权、利不清晰,作者重新构建一种以董事长全面负责制的公司内部组织关系模型,并对该模型进行绩效分析。文章并选择我国公司实践中最为典型和普遍的几种控股股东义务--公平交易义务、竞业禁止义务、控制权转让中的义务、信息公开义务进行规制和完善,力图对国有上市公司控制股东构建一个相对完善的规制体系。更多还原

【Abstract】 There is a problem at structure of stock ownership in most of quoted company in our country that state-owned shares is a only most large shares all of shares,our country hold most of high centralized stock ownership.That structure of stock ownership no doubt guarantee the driver’s seat of state-owned shares,but the instance of exorbitant proportion of state-owned shares operate against the basic principles of market economy,so it decides inconsequence in company father configuration foundation, it came forth a series of problem that controlling shareholders damage Medium and Small Shareholders’s benefit. Currently, how to regulate controlling shareholders’s droit has being a hot and significant subject,moreover the problem of owners phantom and nontradable shares is anyone developed market economy country never falling across puzzle. This special situation of a country of China decides this practical diversity with theory of Principal-agent as the core in west country company governance.This dissertation is the background of father practice of ChinaState-owned Listed Company, concretely analyse different legislationexamples under the three distinct mode controlling shareholders rightregulation with comparative method angle,and on the basis nails downespecial idiographic issue other than so you say mode on the situationof our country—the problem of owners phantom and nontradableshares. As a result of "the presence of owners in the state-owned listedcompanies" is a False Proposition , so none but carry through Equitydivision reform,put into practice full currency and reduction ofstate-owned shares.And bringing to bear Tobin’s Q Value Theory carry through demonstrational analysis of holding shares interval of controlling shareholders and corporate shareholder,figure out topgallant share proportion of controlling shareholders and accumulated holding shares interval.This disquisition delve likelihood and reality of limited control rights by the mode of quantization, based on demonstration analysis, author consider that on the condition of reduction of state-owned shares incapable completeness realization in a short time, should moderately sustain other corporate shareholder moderately increase proportion of stock ownership, moderately reduce proportion of state-owned shares,and so ascertain interval of large shareholders voting rights.All circulated content should fasten on board of directors after carried through rulation of cntrolling sareholders from periphery structure, because owners phantom make for not legibility of controlling shareholders’s duty、right、behalf,author rebuilds a sort of model of company interior structure relation of boar chairman comprehensive services, and puts up performance analysis for this modle. And this dissertation putes up regulation and c improvement by choosing several kinds of best representative and universal controlling shareholders’s duty—the duty of fair exchange、the duty of prohibition of competition、the duty of corporate control transfer、the duty of information publicity, force diagram to construct one of relatively perfect regulation system to controlling shareholders of state-owned listed companies.更多还原