【作者】 王欢；

【导师】 彭真明；

【作者基本信息】 华中师范大学 ， 民商法学， 2008， 硕士

【摘要】 非合意收购,基于其无需得到被收购公司合作的特点,不仅牵涉关系人之间重大利益的转移(至少包括双方公司的股东与经营者之间),而且触及公司治理的基本问题(如董事会/股东会权责划分与董事职责等),因此可谓是现代公司法学最复杂与最具争议的议题之一。自从上世纪60年代非合意收购在美国兴起以来,各国学界关于此制度的争议就从未停止过。而在市场经济处于高速发展阶段的中国,关于非合意收购的立法却处于几乎空白的状态,与之相对应的反收购的规制措施更是难觅踪迹。由此可见,对国外的立法进行借鉴,进而结合我国实际情况,制定一套切实可行的制度,是十分必要的,也是十分需要的。本文除引言和结语外,共分为四大部分:第一部分是对非合意收购制度进行的法律界定,旨在介绍该制度的发展背景和存在价值,用以说明为何要研究该制度以及其最后的发展方向。非合意收购中,收购者未能获得目标公司董事会的支持,甚至目标公司董事会会采取一定的反收购措施,故而收购者经常绕过目标公司董事会直接向目标公司的股东发出收购要约。非合意收购通常发生在要约收购中,具有对抗性,风险性和对象的固定性等特点。该制度除了具有所有收购行为所共同具有的优点外,还具有其独特的积极作用:更换目标公司的经营团队,以提升公司价值,间接达到对目标公司管理层进行监管的效果。因此自从19世纪末开始出现,在世界范围内愈演愈烈,中国也即将迎来非合意收购的浪潮。第二部分是对世界各国(地区)相关法律制度的比较考察。通过对英国、美国、欧盟、德国、韩国、日本、我国香港和台湾地区在要约收购和反收购措施方面的立法比较,不难发现,关于非合意收购制度目前存在两大模式即英国与美国模式,其他国家(地区)的制度均为模仿两者之一并加以改良创新的结果。但就实践效果而言,英美的证券市场最为发达,而其余各国(地区)稍逊一筹。在对比了其余各国(地区)的借鉴经过和实践过程后,文章得出如下结论:没有所谓的最佳模式,只有在模仿和借鉴的基础上,找到最适应自己国情的模式,达到最好的实践效果和最繁荣的证券市场;在全球化收购浪潮的大背景下,立法者必须迅速做出反应,提前制定相应的法律制度,以应对非合意收购对市场的影响。第三部分重点分析了我国非合意收购的立法现状和立法缺陷。首先,文章介绍了我国现存的非合意收购的法律框架,包括《公司法》、《证券法》以及《上市公司收购管理办法》的相关章节条文。其中,《公司法》在董事义务等方面,《证券法》第四章在上市公司收购的操作框架方面做出原则性规定,而《办法》则为两部法律的补充和细化。其次,文章指出,现行的立法模式存在诸多问题:目前的法律体系不完整,规范的效力层次太低,相关内容衔接不够,强制要约收购方式的义务性太强,部分要约收购制度的价值定位和功能发挥有待完善,协议收购的发展前景不明,要约收购豁免内容不具有操作性,上市公司及其董事在收购过程中信息披露的范围太窄等。第四部分重点提出了完善我国非合意收购立法的构想。考虑到非合意收购巨大的市场作用,对该制度的基本态度应是积极鼓励和支持的。立法者必须考虑到我国的国情及未来可能的发展态势,努力提高非合意收购的效率,强调程序的正义性。具体而言,完善的内容包括:设定强制要约义务,提高强制要约的触发点,赋予收购人强制购买股份的权利,限制收购人再次购买公司股份,防止控股股东在反收购过程中滥用权力,确立董事诚信义务,发挥公司的自主性和公司章程的自治性进行反收购,完善上市公司及其董事信息披露的内容,把握适度监管原则,坚持司法有限介入,丰富非合意收购整体法律体系的内容。更多还原

【Abstract】 The hostile takeover, which does not need the cooperation from the target company, is a mode of takeover relative to friendly takeover. As one of the most complicated and disputing themes of modern corporation law, it not only concerns momentous interest’s transfer between stakeholders, at least between shareholders and managers from both companies, but also deals with the foundation of company administration, such as the rights and responsibilities between directorate and shareholders meeting, and director’s responsibilities. When the first hostile takeover occurred in America in 1960s, argument from all over the world never stops, but we could hardly see any rule about it or anti-takeover in China, where the market economy develops with high speed. That means, it is necessary to compare with foreign legislations, combine them and our facts, then establish a feasible system of our own.The thesis consists of four parts except introduction and concluding remarks. In the first part, the thesis reveals the hostile takeover’s developing background and value by jurisprudential analysis, in order to explain the reasons why we should do researches on it and which kind of system it would be at last. In a typical hostile acquisition, the bidder does not win the support from directorate in target company, sometimes the latter even takes some anti-takeover measures, so the former usually sends his offer directly to the shareholders and avoids directorate. The hostile takeover often occurs in tender offer, and it is full of antagonism, risk and aptotic target. Except the advantages of all kinds of takeovers, it has some special positive functions: change the manager team in target company, upgrade the company’s value, and supervise the managers indirectly at last. So from the end of 19th century when it occurred, it becomes a wave all over the world, which will also arrive in China soon.In the second part, the thesis compares correlative legal systems from other countries or areas. After reviewing the legislations of tender offer and anti-takeover measures from Britain, America, the European Union, Germany, Korea, Japan, and Hongkong and Taiwan of China, we could find some facts: there are only two takeover modes, which are the British Mode and the American Mode, and the others are the results of imitation and innovation of them. But concerning the practice effect, the security markets in Britain and America develop better than any other countries. After learning the processes of imitation and innovation from other countries, we could come to the conclusions: there does not exist so-called the best mode but does exist the most suited mode to our fact on the base of imitation and innovation, so as to achieve the best practice effect and the most flourishing security market; under the background of global takeover wave, lawmakers should response immediately and do something relevant ahead of time, so as to deal with the impact in our market from the hostile takeover.In the third part, the thesis analyses the existing legislation and its limitation about the hostile takeover in our country. Firstly, the thesis introduces the existing legislation frame in our country, including the "Corporation Law", the "Security Law", and the "Administration of the Takeover of Listed Companies Procedures". Some principles about director’s responsibilities occur in the "Corporation Law", some principles about operating measures in company takeover occur in the "Security Law", chapter 4, and the other supplements occur in the "Procedures". Secondly, the thesis points out that our existing legislation has many limitations: the existing legislation is not perfect; the rules’ level is too low; the correlative regulations are not consistent with the others; the manner of mandatory offer has many rules about responsibility; the value orientation and function exertion of partial offer system needs perfection; the future of agreement takeover is not clear; the remission in tender offer does not fit to practice; the listed company and its directors do not disclose enough information in the course of takeover.In the fourth part, the thesis put forward some measures to improve the hostile takeover system in our country. We should encourage and support it, considering its huge market effect. The lawmakers should take our facts and potential future into account, improve its efficiency and emphasize procedure justice. In detail, the measures of perfection includes: establish regulations of mandatory offer; advance the threshold of mandatory offer; grant the mandatory share- purchased right to bidders; restrict bidders to purchase company’s shares again; prevent controlling stakes from abusing their rights during the course of anti-takeover; establish the director’s responsibility of good faith; exert the company’s independence and the company charter’s autonomy to carry out anti-takeover; perfect the information disclosure system of listed companies and their directors; persevere in the principle of moderate supervision and management; perfect the legal system of hostile takeover.更多还原