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基于激励相容理论的我国商业银行监管模式研究

A Study on the Supervision Model over Commercial Banks in China under the Compatible Incentive Theory

【作者】 李平女

【导师】 吕德宏;

【作者基本信息】 西北农林科技大学 , 金融学, 2008, 硕士

【摘要】 金融是现代经济的神经中枢,金融业的运营状况关系到整个社会经济的运行。而银行业在金融业中又居于非常重要的地位,是一个国家金融体系的核心和主体。保证商业银行能够安全、高效、稳健地运行,是每个国家经济健康运行的基本条件。随着世界经济全球化的不断发展,商业银行监管的内涵和外延均发生了很大变化。正式加入世贸组织后,我国经济与全球经济的融合将进入新的阶段,我国金融市场将逐渐融入全球经济一体化体系当中。商业银行监管就是对商业银行的监督与管理。《有效银行监管的核心原则》认为,监管的目标是保持金融体系的稳定性和信心,以降低存款人和金融体系的风险。激励相容的银行监管,实质是在银行监管中更多地引入市场化机制。在激励相容的监管理念下,银行监管不是替代而正是市场运行规则的维护者,以此引导监管对象的经营行为,使监管目标的实现,转变成监管对象作为理性经济人在市场运行规则下的自觉行动。针对我国商业银行监管的背景、现状、存在问题及发展趋势,本文在明确商业银行激励相容监管模式基本理论的基础上,充分认识激励相容理论在银行业监管及发展中的重要性,从而研究如何在我国商业银行监管中构建激励相容性监管模式。论文共分6章:第一章导论。对本文的选题背景、选题目的和意义、国内外研究动态、研究思路和方法以及本文的可能创新之处进行了简要分析。第二章理论基础。界定了激励相容理论的内涵,从激励相容理论的提出、基本概念、产生与发展等几方面阐述了激励相容理论的主要内容,并对激励相容理论的运用条件进行了分析。第三章国外银行业监管模式的主要形式及特点。对美国、德国和英国三国的银行业监管模式进行了比较研究,并得出可借鉴的经验。第四章我国商业银行监管模式现状。分别从我国银行业的监管机构、监管模式的主要内容、基本特点及发展趋势研究了我国银行业监管模式现状。第五章激励相容理论下我国银行业监管现有模式分析。我国银行业监管存在着诸多内部与外部问题,本章通过在激励相容理论下对银行监管的成本-收益分析,提出改进我国银行业监管模式的必要性。第六章我国商业银行激励相容监管模式构建。从构建的思路、内容、保障制度以及监管人员各方面给出了建议。

【Abstract】 Finance is the center of the modern economy, the financial sector operations related to the operation of the socio-economic status. The banking sector plays a very important position in the financial industry; the commercial banks involved in extensive business activities of the national economy and social life in all aspects, and are a core of a country’s financial system. To make sure the commercial banks runs efficiently and robust is the basic conditions of every country.With the globalization of the world economy developing, commercial banking’connotation and extension have changed. After the formal accession to the WTO, China’s economic integration with the global economy will enter a new stage, China’s financial market will be gradually integrated into the global system of economic integration.Commercial banking supervision of commercial banks is the supervision and management. "The core principles of Effective Banking Supervision" thinks that the goal is to maintain supervision of the financial system’s stability and confidence, deposits and to reduce the risk of the financial system. In the incentive-compatible regulatory philosophy, banking supervision is not a substitute for the operation of the market and the rules of the defenders, to guide the regulatory targets conduct of operations, to monitor the realization of the objectives, targets of regulation into the economy as a rational person in the operation of the market rules The conscious action by Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan as saying that the so-called incentive regulation should be compatible with and guide, not contrary to investors and the bank manager to maximize profit target of regulation.China’s commercial banks against the background of regulation, the status quo, problems and trends, the paper in clear control of commercial banks incentive compatibility mode basic theory on the basis of full understanding of incentive compatibility theory in banking supervision and the importance of the development, Research on how to monitor commercial banks in China Construction incentive compatibility regulatory approach. This paper is divided into six chapters:Chapter I: Introduction. The choice of this background, purpose and significance of topics, domestic and international research developments, ideas and methods of research and innovation in this paper the possibility of a brief analysis.Chapter II: Theoretical basis. Make out the incentive compatibility of the content, from the incentive compatibility of the proposed theory, basic concepts, produce and development on several aspects of the incentive compatibility of the main content and incentive compatibility of the conditions of use.Chapter III: Foreign banking model and features of the main form. The United States, Germany and Britain, who’s banking supervisory models, were studied and that can draw on the experience.Chapter V: Incentive compatibility of China’s banking industry under the supervision of the existing mode of analysis. China’s banking supervision there are numerous internal and external problems, this chapter through the incentive compatibility of the banks under the supervision of the cost-benefit analysis, to improve our mode of the need for banking supervision.Chapter VI: Model building. From the construction of the ideas, content, security system and supervisory staff are given all the recommendations.

  • 【分类号】F832.1
  • 【被引频次】5
  • 【下载频次】696
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