【作者】 吴庆红；

【导师】 王宗军；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 企业管理， 2006， 硕士

【摘要】 20世纪80年代之后,英美发达国家的机构投资者迅速崛起,公司股权结构从高度分散转变为相对集中,机构投资者的投资策略也由“保持距离”向“控制导向”转变,从而导致不受监督制约的“伯利-米恩斯”式的“管理人导向型”向越来越受到机构投资者控制与监督的“投资人导向型”转变。德鲁克称之为看不见的革命,也被称为机构股东积极主义的兴起。我国上市公司股权结构不合理,流通股比重低且过度分散。市场法律法规不完善且监管不力,导致上市公司治理问题严重。而我国机构投资者正处于蓬勃发展中,借鉴国外机构投资者参与公司治理的经验,引进我国机构投资者介入公司治理可以弥补国有股退出的空间,优化上市公司股权结构和治理结构,从而实现向公司剩余索取权与控制权合一的投资人导向治理模式转变。本文首先探讨了中国机构投资者作为公司治理监督主体的有效性及必然性,跟着分析了中国机构投资者参与公司治理的内在动因、参与方式。然后使用股数效应模型、公司数效应模型和行为博弈模型进一步从经济学的角度对机构投资者参与公司治理的行为进行分析。接着本文以2001、2002和2003三年2017个沪深机构持股上市公司为研究样本,对机构投资者持股与公司治理绩效之间的相关性进行了实证研究,并结合中国机构投资者参与上市公司治理近五年的案例对机构股东参与公司治理绩效进行案例分析。实证研究表明,机构投资持股比例与公司绩效之间存在着显著的正相关关系,机构投资者持股比例高的公司具有更好的经营绩效。而机构投资者通过“用手投票”和“关系投资”介入公司治理的个案也充分说明机构股东积极主义在监督控股股东和管理层侵害中小股东利益的行为的有效性。本文最后提出了中国机构投资者提升上市公司治理绩效的相关对策。更多还原

【Abstract】 After 1980’s, the institutional investors of developed countries developed faster and faster. The ownership structure of listed companies has changed from dispersal into relative concentration. The investment strategy of institutional shareholder also changed from‘arms length’into‘control-oriented’. Consequently, this change induced the uncontrolled‘Berle-Means’administrator leading type convert into investors leading type controlled by institutional shareholders. It was called by Drunker as an‘unseen revolution’, also called as institutional shareholder activism rising. The ownership structure of Chinese listed company is irrational: lower proportion of circulating shares and lonely state-owned shares. The market law and code is fault. Both of this bring serious problem on the corporate governance. Institutional investors of our country are in a flourish development lately. Using the experience of foreign institutional shareholders involving in corporate governance for reference, we suggest that the market introduces the institutional investor to make up the space of reduction of state-owned shares. And thus it can optimize equity structure and improve operating performance of the listed company. Sequentially, it will make the conversion into the investors leading governance pattern which residual income power and control power are syncretic come true.This paper first discussed the supervision effectiveness of institutional investor in corporate governance of Chinese listed companies, then analyzed the inherent reason, exertion manner of Chinese institutional investors participating in corporate governance. Then from the economical point, we use shares effect model, company numbers effect model and behavior game model to make further study on institutional shareholders activism behavior. After that, this paper examines the relativity of institutional shareholdings and the corporate performance through an empirical study on data of 2017 institutional holding listed companies from 2001～2003. The empirical study indicates that there is a positive and significant correlation between the proportion of institutional investor shareholdings and corporate governance performance. Moreover, combing with cases of institutional investor exerting shareholder activism in later five years, we carry out a further exemplification on the effectiveness of Chinese institutional shareholder participating in corporate governance. The cases of institutional investor exerting activism by‘vote with hand’and‘relationship investment’explain fully the effective of institutional shareholder activism in monitoring control shareholder and administrators infracting the interest of middle-small shareholders. The final section brings out corresponding countermeasures of institutional investor improving corporate governance performance.更多还原