【作者】 彭小娜；

【导师】 张勤生；

【作者基本信息】 中国海洋大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2007， 硕士

【摘要】 自主研发问题已经成为学术界和实业界重点关注的问题。企业的自主研发组织策略是企业技术创新能力和核心竞争能力培育的战略性决策,也是企业竞争的战略焦点。本研究从自主研发组织的系统分析入手,分析了灵捷自主研发组织的内部要素之间的作用影响,及灵捷自主研发对企业的影响。其次,对灵捷自主研发战略进行了研究。利用博弈论方法,构建了高技术企业协作R&D网络的动态博弈模型,分析了企业在完全自主研发、完全合作研发和混合研发模式下的研发投资和收益均衡。最后,对企业灵捷自主研发组织的协作研发网络活动提出了政策性建议。通过以上研究,本文获得了以下研究成果和研究结论。1、对灵捷自主研发组织进行系统分析,主要分析了灵捷自主研发组织的构成要素、内部要素之间的作用影响,及灵捷自主研发对企业的影响。灵捷自主研发对企业的影响主要体现在三个方面:一是战略思考,二是创造知识,三是孵化产品。2、对灵捷自主研发组织进行战略研究,对企业各种研发战略进行分类和比较。企业的研发战略有自主研发、协作研发、一体化兼并和技术引进、二次创新。企业不管选择自主研发、协作研发或是其他研发战略形式,都包含了对学习方式选择的权衡取舍。企业专注自主研发则提高核心竞争力,而企业要想拓展现有知识体系,赶上知识与技术前进的步伐,则需要不断协作研发。企业必须在自主研发和协作研发之间达成一个均衡,以达到整体的研发效应最大。(1)自主研发中的均衡投资随自主研发投资收益系数的增加而减少,随着自主研发能力的增加而增加。(2)协作研发中的均衡投资随协作研发投资收益系数的增加而减少,随着协作研发能力的增加而增加。(3)给出了分离均衡存在的充分必要条件,并推出了研发能力是强类型的企业的自主研发投资小于研发能力是弱类型的企业的协作研发投资的结论。(4)给出了混同均衡存在的充分必要条件,并推出了研发能力是弱类型的企业的协作研发能力大于自主研发能力的结论。(5)以上也表明了自主研发和协作研发的互补性,协作企业数量的增加会提高自主研发和协作研发组织中的投资。也表明在一定的自主研发投入条件下,与自主研发相比协作研发投资的重要程度在增加,因此企业具有更多的协作研发使企业具有更大的竞争优势。3、运用博弈论的方法与思想分析企业协作研发网络形成的博弈过程,在Goyal, Konovalov和Gonzalez构建的混合研发博弈模型的基础上分析了企业协作研发网络的动态博弈模型,分析了各成员在产品市场上的不同决策模式对均衡投资和收益的影响。(1)在对称性投资和分离均衡存在的条件下,将混合研发模式、完全自主研发和完全协作研发模式下的均衡投资水平相比,混合研发模式下的研发投资水平最高。(2)比较均衡条件下的企业利润水平,当企业采取混合研发策略,将研发能力的类型进行随机化,在满足一定的条件时,混合研发模式下企业将协调研发与生产,使市场上所有企业的总体利润最大化,也使单个企业利润最大化。4、在理论与模型研究的基础上,对企业的灵捷自主研发组织进行混合研发模式提出了一些相关的策略建议。特别是从企业的角度,在研发伙伴成员的选择和投资决策方案的设计方面,构建了决策模型对企业协作研发网络决策提供指导。(1)要产生有效的协作,企业间要有合适的技术距离。若企业技术距离太远,虽然不同的技术水平能创造互补和协同的机会,但是高水平方缺乏吸收能力向协作者学习。(2)企业的技术位置是其原有的技术位置和其协作企业的技术位置的加权平均的线性组合。(3)企业的自主研发投资越大或协作研发投资额越小,则企业等收益曲线就会越陡,即边际替代率就会越大。并分析了不同条件下高技术企业研发投资最优组合的情况。(4)如果企业在协作过程中博弈的结果是单位努力程度中核心研发能力的比重远远大于自主研发中的比重,则企业就更倾向于开展自主研发;而博弈的结果是企业在协作中能够节省更多的研发资源,则企业选择协作研发作为自己的技术创新策略。更多还原

【Abstract】 Independent R&D has gotten to be the research field of both industry and academia. Organizing strategies for enterprise independent R&D are the strategic decision making of technology innovation and core competence, the focus of enterprise competition. This thesis attempts to start with systematic analysis on independent R&D organization, analyses the factors of agile independent R&D organization, the influences of the inner factors involved agile independent R&D organization, and the affects to the enterprises. Then the thesis studies the strategy on agile independent R&D organization, use game theory to build dynamical game model of enterprise cooperative R&D networks, and analyses the equilibrium of R&D investment and benefits of enterprise under different conditions of complete independent R&D, complete cooperative R&D and mixed-R&D-mode. Finally, some tactic suggestions are put forward for the activities of enterprises agile independent R&D organization.Through the researches about mentioned, some new results and conclusion to be acquired are as follows.1、On the basis of systematic analysis on independent R&D organization, the thesis analyses the factors of agile independent R&D organization, the influences of the inner factors involved, and the affects to the enterprises. Agile independent R&D organization supplies the thought of strategies, knowledge creation and hatching products.2、By studying the strategy on agile independent R&D organization, the enterprise R&D strategies are categorized and analyzed. R&D strategy includes independent R&D, cooperative R&D, integration merger R&D and technology purchased. Enterprises concentrate their attentions to promote the core competence, and take measures of cooperative R&D to catch up with advancement of sci-tech. Enterprises must balance independent R&D and cooperative R&D to make R&D effect.(1) The equilibrium of investment in the independent R&D will reduce with the increasing of the coefficient of investment benefit, increase with the increasing of the ability of independent R&D.(2) The equilibrium of investment in the cooperative R&D will reduce with the increasing of the coefficient of investment benefit, increase with the increasing of the ability of cooperative R&D.(3) We give the sufficient condition and necessary condition of separating equilibrium, and deduct that independent R&D investment of enterprises with strong ability of R&D is less than cooperative R&D investment of enterprises with weak ability of R&D.(4) We give the sufficient condition and necessary condition of pooling equilibrium, and deduct that cooperative R&D investment of enterprises with weak ability of R&D is more than independent R&D ability.(5) The above demonstrates the complementary of the independent R&D and cooperative R&D, the increase of the number of the cooperative organizations will increase the investment of the independent R&D and cooperative R&D organizations. It also demonstrates that in certain conditions of independent R&D investment, the importance of the invest of the cooperative R&D will increase compare with the independent R&D. Therefore it will be more beneficial for the competition advantage of the company who have more cooperative R&D organizations.3、The thesis uses game theory to analyse the process of enterprise cooperative R&D networks. Based on dynamical game model of mixed R&D built by Goyal, Konovalov and Gonzalez, the thesis analyses game model of enterprise cooperative R&D networks and the equilibrium of R&D investment and benefits of enterprise under different conditions of complete independent R&D, complete cooperative R&D and mixed-R&D-mode.(1) In term of symmetry investment and separate balanced, the thesis compares the equilibrium of investment under different conditions of complete independent R&D, complete cooperative R&D and mixed-R&D-mode, investment of mixed-R&D-mode is the most.(2) Compared the benefit of enterprises, when enterprises take mixed-R&D-mode, we randomize the types of R&D ability. When meeting certain conditions, mix-R&D-mode is good for production, makes all enterprises on the market maximize profit, so does the single enterprise.4、On the basis of the research of theory and model, we put forward some tactic suggestions for the activities of enterprises agile independent R&D organization. From the angle of enterprises, enterprises with mixed-R&D-mode should make the overall and intact decision scheme in such aspects as choosing partner members and investment decision design.(1) In order to effective cooperation, enterprises need suitable technique distance. If the distance is too far, the high level enterprise is lack of absorption ability, although different technology levels can create the chances of complementary and cooperation.(2) The technology position of enterprises is weight average linear combination of original enterprise position and cooperative enterprise position.(3) More independent investment or less cooperative investment makes the consumption indifferent curve steeper, that is, the marginal substitute rate higher. At the same time we analyse optimal combination of the high-tec enterprises R&D invest in different conditions.(4) If equilibrium is that the percentage of core R&D capability is far more than that of independent R&D, enterprises will prefer to independent R&D; if equilibrium is that enterprises can save more R&D resources when cooperative R&D, enterprises will choose cooperative R&D as their technique creative strategies.更多还原