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公司法修改后股东出资制度的问题及对策研究

The Question of Shareholder Invests System and the Countermeasure Research after the Company Law Revises

【作者】 雷雪梅

【导师】 姜德鑫;

【作者基本信息】 新疆财经大学 , 经济法, 2007, 硕士

【摘要】 公司资本是现代公司构成的基本要素,公司资本的充实与否直接影响着公司的生产经营以及股东和债权人利益的实现。股东出资是公司资本充实的前提条件。股东出资不仅是一个单纯的资本充实行为,它还表现为一整套有序相连的出资制度,包括出资形式、最低资本额、资本缴纳三个方面的内容。本于对公司立法公平、效率价值取向的推崇,新公司法对股东出资制度的内容作了革新性的规定。出资制度的变革降低了公司设立的门槛,极大的调动了投资者的热情,有利于资本的灵活运用,因而备受人们的推崇。然而任何制度都具有双面性,新公司法中灵活便捷的出资制度为股东出资和公司设立大开方便之门,也使得股东出资制度自身带有的问题被放大,诱使股东利用灵活的出资制度违反出资义务甚至从中谋取不当利益,进而损害公司、其他股东和债权人的合法权益。由于新《公司法》放宽了股东的出资形式,具有财产价值并可以依法转让的无形财产都可以成为股东出资的对象。但无形财产出资,其价值的确定和评估往往得不到真实和公平的反映,特别是股权价值受多重因素的影响,其出资问题更为复杂;分期缴纳制度的施行使得股东的实缴资本权能被扩大,在出资期限内股东间的权利可能会产生冲突;最低资本额的降低很大程度上成为畸形母子公司的催化剂。针对股权出资问题,本文认为应当以股权的价值确定和评估为核心设定相关保障机制,确保股权的公正、合法转让。针对分期缴纳中实缴资本权能扩大引发的股东权利冲突现象,本文认为应当以表决权的排除、累积投票表决制度、股东质询权的确立、股东权利量化的新标准等作为救济制度。针对最低资本金数额降低诱发畸形母子公司问题,本文认为必须对我国母子公司人格否认制度进行完善以加强对债权人利益的保护。

【Abstract】 The company capital is the basic essential factor, which the modern company constitutes, the company capital enrichment or not directly is affecting company’s production management as well as the shareholder and the creditor benefit realization. The shareholder investment is the prerequisite, which the company capital enriches. The shareholder invests not only is a pure capital enrichment behavior, its also performance is an entire set has the foreword connected investment system, including the investment form, the lowest capital volume, the capital pays three aspects the contents. This to legislate fairly to the company, the efficiency value orientation esteem, and the fledgling firm law invested the system content to the shareholder to make the innovation stipulation.The investment system transformation reduced the threshold, which the company sets up, the enormous reassignment investor’s enthusiasm, has been advantageous to the capital nimble utilization, and thus prepares people’s esteem. However any system all has two-sided, in the fledgling firm law the nimble convenient investment system sets up for the shareholder investment and the company opens the flood gates, also causes the shareholder to invest the question which system oneself has to enlarge, lures the shareholder to use the nimble investment system to violate the investment duty even seeks does not work as the benefit, then harm company, other shareholders and creditor’s legitimate rights and interests.Because was new "Company Law" to relax shareholder’s investment form, has the non- visible property which the property value and was allowed legally to transfer all to be allowed to become the object which the shareholder invested. But the non visible property investment, its value determination and the appraisal often cannot obtain real and the fair reflection, the stockholder’s rights value the multiple factor influence, its investment question is been specially more complex; pays the system the execution to cause the shareholder by stages the reality to give the capital power to expand, right between shareholder’s possibly can have the conflict in the investment deadline; The lowest capital volume reduces in the very great degree to become the abnormal mother and child company the catalyst.In view of the stockholder’s rights investment question, this article thought must take the stockholder’s rights value determination and the appraisal as the core hypothesis correlation safeguard mechanism, guarantees the stockholder’s rights to be fair, the legitimate transfer. In view of pays by stages really gives the capital power expansion initiation the shareholder right conflict phenomenon, this article thought must remove, the accumulation voting by ballot system, the shareholder by the right to vote interpellators the power these abolishment, the shareholder right quantification new standard and so on takes the relief system. Reduces in view of the lowest capital amount induces the abnormal mother and child company question, this article to think must carry on the consummation to our country mother and child company personality denial system to strengthen to the creditor benefit protection.

  • 【分类号】D922.291.91
  • 【被引频次】3
  • 【下载频次】427
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