我国上市公司内部监督机构研究

【作者】 马华学；

【导师】 张国平；

【作者基本信息】 南京师范大学 ， 民商法学， 2007， 硕士

【摘要】 作为企业进化的最高组织形态，现代上市公司所有权与经营权分离的特点避免了公司财产的原始提供者对公司运营的控制，提高了公司的决策效率，降低了公司的决策成本，但同时也导致了产权分享的不一致，即董事会拥有决策权，股东大会承担决策的后果，这就使得权力滥用成为可能，而内部监督成为必需。现实中，以“一股独大”为特征的中国资本市场造就了强势的董事会，在这种情况下，公司经营管理层的权力几乎是无边界的，然而，我国上市公司内部的专门监督机构——监事会从未在真正意义上实现“主动存在”的自我价值唤醒，近些年引进的独立董事制度在实践中也与证监会的预期相差甚远，这在极大程度上制约了中国企业群体性竞争力的进一步提升。因此，参考域外立法在同一领域的成功实践，并结合中国实际情况，对我国上市公司内部的权力秩序进行重构，以加强对上市公司的内部监督，具有重要的意义。本文首先对外国公司内部监督机构立法模式进行介绍及评述，并得出对我国上市公司内部监督机构模式选择的启示；其次对我国上市公司内部监督机构的现状及其失灵原因进行深入分析，剖析了我国现阶段在上市公司内部监督机构方面的立法不足和实践冲突，探讨了中国上市公司目前普遍存在的股东大会、董事会、监事会三者“权力层次倒挂”的现象，并明确指出，这一倒挂现象就是我国上市公司内部监督机制普遍瘫痪或半瘫痪的本因；最后根据制度变迁的路径依赖原理和中国现阶段公司治理环境的实际情况，提出了完善我国上市公司内部监督机构的法律对策，并对监事会和独立董事进行关系定位与协调。更多还原

【Abstract】 As the highest form of enterprise organizations, the separation of ownership and management character of modern listed companies can avoid the control of the company’s operations by the original providers of the company’s property, it also can improve the efficiency of the company’s decisions and reduce the costs of making decisions, but it leads to an inconsistent share of property rights, that means the board of directors has the power of making its own decisions, while the shareholders have to bear the consequences of their decisions, which makes the abuse of power possible and the internal supervision necessary.In reality, China’s capital market creates a strong board under the dorminance of powerful shareholder. In such circumstances, the board of directors and managers enjoy a great power without borders, but the function of board of supervisors is weakened or even reduced to none and the effect of independent directors is not as powerful as it is supposed to be, which obstructs the further improvement of Chinese listed companies. Therefore, based on the successful extraterritorial legislation in the same area and the actual situation in China, the reconstruction of internal power order could strengthen internal supervision of listed companies.Firstly, This paper cites detailed analysis of the extraterritorial models about internal supervision, which is an inspiration to our chosen for the internal supervision organs. Secondly, this paper introduces the current situation of internal supervision mechanism in domestic listed companies and carries out an in-depth analysis of the reasons for failure. We also introduce the shortcomings of legislation and the conflicts in pratice of these organs, then make it clear that there is a phenomenon of "the reversal of power level" of three organs which are general meeting of shareholders, board of directors and board of supervisors in listed companies. The reversal is the major reason of the paralyzed or semi-paralyzed internal supervision system. Finally, according to a path-dependent changes and the actual situation of corporate governance environment in China at the present stage, this paper focuses on how to solve the problems of the internal supervising organs of the domestic listed companies in law, how to arrange the internal supervising functions and improve their coordination between the board of supervisors and independent directors.更多还原