公司僵局及其救济

【作者】 杨德森；

【导师】 孙非亚；

【作者基本信息】 东北财经大学 ， 经济法学， 2005， 硕士

【摘要】 本文将研究视角聚焦于出现在封闭公司中的公司僵局问题。公司僵局问题是建立在资本多数决基础之上的现代公司制度设计遭遇公司闭锁性特征后所产生的独特问题。它具体表现为拥有对等权力的一些股东之间或董事之间发生矛盾、互不妥协，致使股东(大)会或者董事会由于对方的拒绝参加而无法有效召集，或无法通过任何决议，最终导致公司的一切决策和管理机制都陷于瘫痪，公司资产流失、业务受到实质性伤害，股东的合法利益受到重大损害的状况。 目前国外对公司僵局问题已经有丰富的研究成果和实务经验，但我国在此方面的研究和实践却远远落后。本文意在丰富我国公司法理论在此方面的研究成果，为司法机关处理此类问题提供思路。鉴于此，本文运用逻辑分析、规范研究和比较的方法，对公司僵局问题进行了一番比较深入的探究。 本文中，作者从公司僵局在现实生活中的实际案例谈起，论及公司僵局的概念、特征、类型、危害性，并在详细分析公司僵局形成的内因、外因的基础上，提出解决公司僵局的法理基础在于股东之间应负有类似于合伙人之间的信托义务，法律对少数股东享有的财务上和管理上的合理期待利益应予以保护，在强制性的结构性或者分配性规则使股东的合理期待利益落空时，就由法院引入信义性规则来填补法律漏洞。只要法院认为在封闭公司中的少数股东有合理的财务上或者管理上的期待利益，提起诉讼的少数股东的合理期待利益就不能被漠视。 作者根据自己对本文论及问题根源和本质的理解，并结合国外解决公司僵局问题的成功经验以及我国立法和司法实践的现状，对公司法中如何设计解决公司僵局问题的法律制度做出种种设想。作者认为公司僵局的解决应存在事先预防和事后救济两种方式。事先预防既可以通过在股东协议或公司章程中加入防止和解决公司僵局的相关规定来实现，也可以通过规定一个较短的经营期限来实现。事后救济的方式则包括，调解、仲裁、调解—仲裁，任命管理人或临时接管人、临时董事，容许股东退出公司，赋予股东请求公司解散的诉权，以及将产生僵局的公司转化为一人公司或独资企业等。更多还原

【Abstract】 This article focuses on the deadlock question in the close corporation. The deadlock results in the unique conflict between the designing of corporate governance based on the majority-capital-devide principle and the enclosure characteristic of the close corporation. It is reflected by those phenomena: one party of shareholders or directors who own equity right or power with the others can’t compromise, then the meetings of shareholders or directors can’t be held because of the absence of the other party, so any resolution can’t be made, finally the governance of corporate is paralyzed, the assets of the company lose, the business of the company is destroyed, the legal right and benefit is deeply hurt.Nowadays there are plenty of researching results and related experience as to the deadlock in other countries. But we still do not get start to research, and our legal experience is far behind those of the developed countries. The purpose of the article is to enrich the researching works and provide a train of thoughts for judges to deal with those deadlocks. Whereas this article make a deep research on the deadlock issue by a logical, rule-study and comparing means.In this article the author gives some examples of deadlock in the reality as a beginning. Then he discusses the concept, characteristics, type, harm of deadlock. After analyzing the inner and outer reasons of the deadlock, he believes that the jurisprudent base for dissolving the deadlock is to make shareholders under the obligations of trust like that between partners, and the reasonable expected benefit on finance and/or management for minority shareholders shall be protected by the law. When the structural or distributive rules do not work to protect those benefit said above, the judges shall fix the hole in the law by introducing the fiduciary rules. On condition that the judge believe the minority shareholders own reasonable expected benefit on finance and/or management, those benefit of the plaintiff shareholders shall not be ignored.The author makes some imagination for the designing the system of the更多还原