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我国政府信用的经济学思考

Economic Thinking on Government Credit

【作者】 毛黎青

【导师】 高福来;

【作者基本信息】 首都经济贸易大学 , 政治经济学, 2006, 硕士

【摘要】 信用是人类社会交往的一种道德规范,是现代文明的重要标志。从广义的角度讲,信用是指人们在社会经济生活中能够履行契约义务而取得的信任。信用的主体是多种多样的,包括政府信用、企业信用、团体信用以及个人信用,这些主体之间的信用关系的总和构成了社会信用体系,其中政府信用处于社会信用体系的核心地位。政府信用,简言之,即政府对公众在委托契约中赋予的期待和信任的责任感及其回应。其核心就是公众对政府的信任和政府对公众的信用。政府信用具有信用主体的特殊性、信用双方的不对称性、信用影响的社会性和扩散性、信用的刚性等特征,政府信用的重要性在于:政府信用是社会主义市场经济体制建立和完善的保证,是中国加入WTO、遵守WTO规则的必然要求,是一种重要的行政资源,是建立完善社会信用体系的必要前提和价值导向,也是政治文明建设和依法治国的内在要求。但是现阶段在我国转型时期,政府信用出现了不少问题值得深思,表现在政府行使职权时“三位”(越位、缺位、错位)现象严重、政策缺乏稳定性与连续性、政府行为缺乏公开性,透明度不高、政府公务员存在滥用职权的现象,信用意识不高、维护市场秩序方面缺乏公平公正,地方保护主义严重等,究其原因,从世界各国的普遍性看,有组织制度的低层次和低效率、信息非对称、博弈论中的成本收益取舍等因素,从我国现阶段的特殊性国情看,有政府信用范围的“超边”与政府信用能力的“有限”、政府自利性的扩大化、干部考核选任机制的不合理与政府官员行为的偏差、政府信用责任机制的缺失与政府行为“自控力”的不足、社会信用管理制度缺失与信用环境运营能力不足等与因素,针对这些导致政府信用缺失的原因,主要从内环境和外环境制度创新入手,加强和提升我国的政府信用。 本文以马克思理论为指导,按照“提出问题、分析问题、解决问题”的思路来布局全文。本文的创新之处在于:有别于以往多数重视信用道德教化或者从政治学、行政学、法学角度探讨行政规范政府行为、立法自律政府行为,而是采用一般性与特殊性相结合的分析方法,运用制度经济学的信息不对称理论、博弈理论深刻地剖析了当前我国政府信用缺失的制度成因,比较系统完善地提出了当前我国政府信用建设的思路和途径,具有一定的现实性和可操作性。

【Abstract】 Credibility is a kind of ethic rule in our society and is a very important symbol of modern civilization. In the board teams, credibility means the trust to implement agreements and duties in our social and economic life. Thus, there are a lot of bearers for the credibility, including government credibility, enterprise credibility, organization credibility and individual credibility, etc. The relation among all these bearers of credibility forms the social credit system. Among them, the credit of government is taking the core position and it is the base, playing a key role. Government credit, in short, refers to responsibility & response to hope from people in entitlement agreement. Its core is public confidence in the government and the governments of the public credit. Government credibility has the following characteristics: particularity, of credit bearer, asymmetry of bearers, big social impact, and rigidity of credit. Therefore the importance of government credibility is: it’s the guarantee for establish and improve the socialist market mechanism and the requirement of entering WTO and obeying WTO rule and important administrative resource, it’s the necessity to build and develop social credit and also internal requirement of political culture construction. However, at the present stage of transition, there happens some negative phenomena that when the government plat its functions, over going of position, lack of position and standing at wrong position;the government makes and implements policy in an unregulated way;lack of opening to public in government behavior, public servant abusing authority, can not take justice in maintaining market system and serious regional protectionism. From the common angle of all countries in the world, the reasons are as follows: origination system inefficiency, the lack of match in information between government and the public and cost-benefit choosing in game theory. From uniqueness of the present situation in our country, the reasons are as follows: the overrunning of government’s credit capability, the extension of government’s own benefit, cadre selecting system unfairness & departure in government officer’s action, lack of government credit responsibility system and self-controlling in government, social credit managing system imperfection etc. Against all these happening of the lack of government creditability,this paper mainly focuses on system creation in internal environment and external environment so as to improve government credibility.Under the guidance of Marxist theory, the thesis is organized according to the principle of "raising the problem, analyzing the problems and solving the problem" The innovation of this paper is that deferring from thinking from the angle of science of politics, public administration, law, it combines general analytical methods with particular analytical method, using information economy theory and game theory to deeply find out the root resulting in government credit problem, it puts the thoughts and approached of institution innovation about constructing government credit comparative perfectly, and these institution innovation is realistic and operational to some extent.

  • 【分类号】F203
  • 【被引频次】4
  • 【下载频次】581
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