村委会选举中国家的角色、成本和收益

【作者】 李学迎；

【导师】 马广海；

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 ， 社会学， 2005， 硕士

【摘要】 本文采取个案研究的研究方法、以社会交换理论为基本理论框架来研究村委会选举问题。把村委会选举中各个参与主体的社会互动过程看作是他们追求报酬、视自身的成本和收益而进行的社会交换过程。村委会选举的参与主体主要包括国家政权(又包括国家高层政权和基层政权)、农村精英和普通选民。每个参与主体的成本与收益都不可能脱离开他在该项参与中所表现的角色特征即社会地位的外在动态表现,故本文首先描述了村委会选举的参与主体之一——国家的角色特征。通过调查发现:国家政权在村委会选举中一直处于(集“立法者”、“执法者”、“监督者”于一身的)强势主导地位,而且在本届村委会选举中,国家进一步加强了自己的主导地位。国家主导地位的加强表现在以下几个方面:一是强调党对本届村委会选举的领导并将做好本届村委会选举工作与贯彻党的十六届四中全会精神紧密联系在一起;二是在县级层次国家政权,由组织部具体负责本届村委会选举工作;三是“两委兼职”、“一肩挑”成为本届村委会选举中国家政权所要把握的硬性指标,选举结果也达到了国家政权的预期;四是在未经各个参与主体达成共识的前提下,国家政权单方面将选举日期提前,但并未有引起其他参与主体的异议甚至察觉。按照社会交换理论的观点,国家主导村委会选举肯定是为了获得一定的报酬(这也符合“谁主导,谁受益”的原则),当然要获取报酬也必定付出一定的代价。已经有学者研究了国家政权参与村委会选举的成本与收益,但是既有的分析由于缺乏有力的理论指导而没能对成本与收益进行全面深入的分析。本文认为国家参与村委会选举的成本除了学者们所强调的经济成本、政治成本(其中政治成本指乡镇基层政权的权威由于村委会选举而受到来自乡村社会合法及不合法的挑战)外,还有布劳一直所强调的并且认为最重要的社会交换的成本——时间;本文认为国家政权参与村委会选举的收益除了学者们所强调的经济收益、政治收益(主要指民主化进程)外,还有社会赞同、权威合法化、社会稳定、社会团结等,高层国家政权还可以获得基层的服从而基层之所以服从就在于能从服从中获得足够的酬赏;最后,本文指出村委会选举所造成的政治成本的主要承担者更多还原

【Abstract】 This thesis adopts the research method of the case study, using the social exchange theories as the basic theory frame to study the problem of villager commission election. Regarding the social interactive process between the participants in the villager commission election as the process of social exchange, every participant pursues reward and pays much attention to the cost and income. The participants in the villager commission election mainly include the state (including the high political power and grass-roots political power), the village elites and common voters. The cost and income of each participant can’t have nothing to do with the participant’s role (namely the outside dynamic state performance of the social status), so this article describes the role of state in the villager commission election first .Through investigation, I find that our state (the national political power)has been in predominant position(incorporating the strong points of " legislator"、 "role enforcing the law"、 "supervisor" in its whole body) in the villager commission election, and in current villager commission election, the state has further strengthened its predominant position. The performance of state’s strengthening its predominant position is as folio wings: One is to emphasize that the Communist Party of China should lead the current villager commission election; Secondly, in political power of the county class, the Organization Department of the Communist Party of China is in charge of the current villager commission election; Thirdly, an important rigid election index is that each member of the two commissions should hold two posts (one post is in the villager commission and the other is in the village party branch commission of the Communist Party of China), and the election result also attains the expectation of the state; Fourthly ,our state advanced the date of the current election unilaterally without reaching consensus with other participants, which didn’t cause other participants’ objection and even realization. According to the standpoint of the social exchange theories, the cause of the state’s leading villager commission election is to acquire a certain reward (this also matches the principle of who predominates, who benefits"), and those who benefit also need to pay a certain cost certainly. Some scholars have studied the cost and income of the state’s participating in the villager commission election, but their analyses are not complete and thorough because of lacking the emollient theories to guide their study. This article views that thestate’s costs in the villager commission election include time which in Peter M. Blau’s opinion is the most important cost in addition to the economic costs, political costs (the main political cost is that the authority of the grass-roots political power will descend as a result of facing the legal and illegal challenge from country society caused by the villager commission election) that the above-mentioned scholars have emphasized; This article argues that the state’s incomes in the villager commission election include social approval, authority legalization, social stability, social unity in addition to the economic incomes, political incomes( only referring to democratization progress) that the above-mentioned scholars have emphasized; the high political power can also acquire obedience from the grass-roots political power ,and the reason for the grass-roots political power to obey is that it can acquire enough reward from the obedience; Finally, this thesis points out that the grass-roots political power which undertakes the political cost caused by the villager commission election has a variety of ways to prevent its authority from descending, and we can suppose that the grass-roots political power acquires its income in those ways. Those ways include emphasizing that the village party branch commissions are the leading nucleus of the villages, promoting that each member of the two commissions should hold two posts (one post is in the villager commission and the other is in the village party branch commission of the Communist Party of China), holding the power of controlling the village cadre’s wages tightly, seizing the village cadre’s "small plaits"(mistakes), etc. Among them, promoting that each member of the two commissions should hold two posts (one post is in the villager commission and the other is in the village party branch commission of the Communist Party of China) is "one stone many birds" measures. After studying the costs and incomes of the state’s participating in the villager commission election, we can discover that the incomes that the state acquires is considerable, because the state still has acquired many other social rewards on condition that it has made enough compensation for its political costs.更多还原