集装箱班轮运输战略联盟博弈研究

【作者】 张艳奎；

【导师】 赵刚；

【作者基本信息】 上海海事大学 ， 交通运输规划与管理， 2004， 硕士

【摘要】 面对激烈的市场竞争，近年来集装箱班轮公司纷纷组成战略联盟。船公司通过船舶、码头共享，提高设施设备的利用率，减少对集装箱运输设施设备的投资，从而降低投资和经营的风险，获得规模经济效益；同时扩大联盟成员航线覆盖范围、增加发船密度，从而为托运人提供更为优质而又可靠的运输服务，增强了自身的竞争力。竞争与合作贯穿于班轮联盟自始至终，促使联盟集团间纵横捭阖不断地进行重组。因此，联盟集团是不稳定的，对合作产生的价值分配，不但会影响联盟效率，甚至直接影响联盟是否继续存在。关于利益分配，传统经济学研究不多且其着眼点主要在于资源的有效配置及所依赖的市场价格机制，个体层面分析仅仅是在价格机制支配下的理性人的成本与收益比较。 博弈论是研究各理性决策个体在其行为直接发生相互作用时如何决策以及决策均衡问题。依据参与人是否达成具有约束力协议可分为合作博弈和非合作博弈。实践证明，博弈论成为研究和解决市场条件下的竞争合作问题的有效分析工具。 本文研究目的是通过运用博弈理论解释战略联盟的合理性，探讨班轮运输联盟收益如何在成员间进行分配，为战略联盟实践提供理论依据。班轮运输联盟成员从联盟中获取的利益往往与自身预期的利益有出入，因而许多成员会认为自身为联盟做的贡献大于自己从联盟获取的利益。因此他们会怀疑战略联盟的有效性，甚至会选择退出联盟。作者希望通过运用博弈理论分析，能够使联盟各方对联盟收益分配预期更为理性化，从而降低联盟的不稳定性。 本文阐述了班轮运输合作与联盟的沿革和发展现状，并且概括介绍了本文应用的博弈理论及相关经济学原理。应用非合作博弈理论“古诺模型”解释了战略联盟的合理性，并对合理性做进一步探讨；应用合作博弈理论讨价还价博弈(轮流出价讨价还价子博弈均衡)分析单个联盟成员间利益分配纳什均衡，应用“夏普里值”计算方法分析复杂联盟的利益分配问题；最后分析了联盟的不稳定性并提出风险防范措施。研究方法采用定性和定量相结合，注重理论联系实际。更多还原

【Abstract】 Confronted with fierce competition for markets, strategic alliances have recently been formed’ in succession among container lines’. Through sharing ships and docks, lines’ have succeeded in raising utilization ration of equipments, reducing investment in equipment of container transportation, so that the risks of investment and management have been reduced, and large-scaled economic returns have been acquired. Meanwhile, through expanding the extent of shipping services covering, intensifying the frequency of services, lines provide better service for shipper and strengthen their own competitive power. Lines alliance is permeated with competition and cooperation from beginning to end, which impels alliance’s group to realign. Therefore, alliance’s group is unstable. The distribution of value through cooperation may not only affect working efficiency, but also directly influence the existence of the alliance. With regard to the distribution of profits, traditional economics put less emphasis and also focused on the effective distribution of resources and price system. At the same time, the analysis of enterprise was confined to the contrast between cost and profit of rational humans subjected to price system.Game theory studies the decision and its equilibrium. According to whether the binding agreement is achieved, the theory can be divided into co-operative game theory and non-co-operative game theory. Practices have proved that game theory has become an effective tool of analyzing and solving competitive and co-operative problems.This paper aims to explain the rationality of strategic alliance with the help of game theory, discuss how to distribute the profit of lines’ alliance among the members and provide theoretic basis for strategic alliance practice. There is always some discrepancy between the profit got from the alliance and the expected profit, so many members may think what they get from the alliance does not tally with what they have done for the alliance, which makes them doubt the effectiveness and1even choose to withdraw from the alliance. This paper intends to make use of game theory to analyze problems so as to make the members of the alliance have a more reasonable expectation for the distribution of profits and therefore reduce the instability of the alliance.This paper expounds the past and current situations -of lines’ cooperation and alliance, and gives a general explanation of game theory and relevant economic principles. For example, this paper explains the reasonability of strategic alliance by using non-co-operative game theory, i.e. Cournot duopoly model. In the end, this paper analyzes the instability of the alliance and proposes methods to take strict precautions.Zhang Yankui(Communication & transportationplanning & management) Directed by professor & Dr. Zhao Gang更多还原