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我国高风险中小金融机构市场退出问题研究

A Probe into the Market Withdrawal Issue of the High-risk Small and Medium Financial Institutions in China

【作者】 吴志刚

【导师】 萧松华;

【作者基本信息】 暨南大学 , 金融学, 2003, 硕士

【摘要】 对典型案例的剖析表明,我国高风险中小金融机构市场退出没有制度化的规范,退出模式选择的随意性较大,增加了决策成本、协调成本和清算成本,成本的分担也没有理顺。研究分析还显示,市场化的收购要比行政主导的收购成本要低、要优;在我国,行政关闭模式要比破产总体成本要小;高风险中小金融机构早退出比迟退出所花成本要少。 在实践中,我国逐步形成了以地方政府最终承担中小金融机构市场退出主要成本的做法,并以地方财政向中央银行借入再贷款来作为市场退出资金来源,这实际是形成了一种隐形的、完全保护的、非制度性安排和极易形成道德风险的存款保险办法。但是,地方政府财力薄弱而拖欠归还中央银行专项再借款,使金融机构市场退出成本“货币化”的倾向十分明显。作者赞成多方共同分担金融机构市场退出成本,建立有宽限期的限额赔付存款保险制度,在实施限额赔付之前仍对储蓄存款全额赔付。此外,本文提出了在金融业完全实现市场化之前,地方财政按地方金融机构存款或资产规模一定比例在预算内划拨资金补充存款保险基金,这种构想既要求地方财政承担部分金融机构市场退出成本,又考虑了其现实的财力状况。地方政府以存款保险机构为载体,参与对地方金融机构的日常监控和风险处置,使其在防范、化解地方金融风险上的责任和权利相对应。

【Abstract】 The analysis of the typical cases shows that, there are not systematic standards for the market withdrawal of the high-risk small and medium financial institutions in China. The selection of withdrawal pattern has displayed the randomness, which increase the decision cost, coordination cost and liquidation cost; in the meantime, the share of cost has been streamlined. The analysis further displays that, the cost of the market-oriented merger is much lower and optimized when compared with the administration-guided one. In China, the administrative closedown pattern features comparatively low overall cost in comparison with bankruptcy; the high-risk small and medium financial institutions will bear lower cost through early withdrawal then through late withdrawal.In the actual practice, China has gradually established the means that the local governments finally bear the main cost for the market withdrawal of small and medium financial institutions, and resort to the obtain of reloans from the central bank through the local fiscal departments as the main funding resources for the market withdrawal. In fact, it is the formation of invisible, completely protected, non-institutional arrangement and can easily lead to the deposits insurance methods involving moral risks. However, because of the weak financial strength, the local governments often defer the repayment of the special reloans to the central bank and further cause the obvious "monetization" trend of the withdrawal cost of the financial institutions. The author supports the opinion that the withdrawal cost of the financial institutions should be shared by multiple parties, the deposits repayment insurance system with certain extension should be established, and savings should be fully repaid before the limited repayment system is implemented, In addition, in this essay, the author puts forward the conceive that before the financial industry realizes perform marketization, the local fiscal departments should allocate some funding from the budget funds to make up the deposits insurance funds, according to the amount of the deposits or the scale of assets of the local financial institutions. Such conceive not only requests the local governments to bear some part of the market withdrawal cost of the financial institutions, but also takes into consideration of the actual financial conditions of the local governments. The local governments may use the deposits insurance organizations as the carriers to participate in the general supervision and risks disposition of the local financial institutions, and match the obligations and rights in the prevention and dissolve the local financial risks.

  • 【网络出版投稿人】 暨南大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2004年 04期
  • 【分类号】F832.3
  • 【被引频次】1
  • 【下载频次】223
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