风险投资中的委托代理及其制度化研究

【作者】 黄利红；

【导师】 胡石明；

【作者基本信息】 中南大学 ， 技术经济及管理， 2003， 硕士

【摘要】 风险投资的运作中，由于从投资者到风险企业间存在着风险投资机构，就产生双重委托代理关系：投资者与风险投资机构之间的委托代理关系和风险投资机构与风险企业之间的委托代理关系。这相对于投资者直接向风险企业投资的委托代理链增加了，并且由于信息不对称，在风险投资运作过程中就产生了委托代理问题：逆向选择和道德风险问题。而克服这些问题就应做出一些制度安排以减轻信息不对称的程度。 文章从风险投资的运作特点入手，以信息经济学的基本原理为指导，采用规范性的分析方法，深入地分析了在信息不对称条件下，风险投资双重代理关系中存在的委托代理问题。在此基础上设计出一套有效的激励和约束机制来减轻信息不对称的程度，从而达到有效克服委托代理问题、降低委托代理风险和提高风险投资运行效率的目的。最后结合我国现阶段风险投资发展的实际情况，从委托代理关系的角度，对发展和完善我国风险投资的微观运行机制提出一些设想。更多还原

【Abstract】 In the process of venture investment operation, existence of risk investment organization between the investor and the venture enterprise brings two principal-agent relationship .One is between the investor and the venture investment organization; another is between the venture investment organization and the venture enterprise. So, the agent-chain is increased by contrast with direct investment of the investor, and with the information asymmetry, the principal-agent problems, adverse selection and moral hazard come out. In order to settle these problems, some system arrangements are needed to alleviate information asymmetry.Beginning with the operation characteristic of the venture investment, this paper deeply analyzed the principal-agent problems of the two-layer agent relationship with criterion methods under the information asymmetry condition. All the analysis is guided by the basic theory of information economics. After that, a suit of effective prompting and restricting mechanism is worked out to alleviate the extent of information asymmetry, which can resolve principal-agent problems, reduce the principal-agent hazard and improve the operating efficiency of risk investment. Finally, connected with the practice instance of the venture investment development in current stage in our country, some suggestions are given to develop and perfect the microcosmic working mechanism from the side of the principal-agent relationship.更多还原