【作者】 邓江峰；

【导师】 张平；

【作者基本信息】 武汉大学 ， 产业经济学， 2004， 硕士

【摘要】 近年来，公司治理改革已经成为一个普遍关注的焦点问题，公司治理因而成为现代经济学一个重要的研究领域。目前的研究主要是在委托—代理问题框架内展开的，对于转轨中的中国的具体情况而言，这一框架具有较强的现实解释力。公司治理被中国政府视为“建立现代企业制度”的核心内容。目前公司治理成为政策重点并取得了丰富的成果，既反映了中国在市场制度建设方面已经取得重大进展，也说明了政府对转变企业行为的重视。 上市公司是中国经济的重要组成部分，因为它集中了大量的国有大中型骨干企业和行业内龙头企业。出于为国有企业脱贫解困的制度设计使得中国上市公司形成了畸形的股权结构，国有股份比重过大，产权主体又“缺位”，没有对国有资产的约束和监督机制，势必形成内部人控制，难以形成有效的公司治理结构。这也是中国上市公司一系列问题和诸多矛盾的根源所在。可以说，上市公司能够形成有效的公司治理，直接关系到中国资本市场能否健康、有序、规范地发展。系统研究中国上市公司的治理结构，具有重要的理论意义和现实意义。 机构投资者是当今资本市场一个比较活跃的市场主体。我们注意到，机构投资者已不再局限于传统的依靠股票和证券买卖差价的盈利模式，而是开始通过改善上市公司治理，进而提升公司的业绩和核心竞争力来获取收益。相应地，机构投资者在现代金融体系中的功能和作用也得到了扩展。20世纪90年代，以机构投资者为主的公司治理运动蓬勃兴起，其中以美国的机构投资者为代表。他们在介入上市公司治理的机制、方式、策略等方面给我们提供了许多有益的借鉴，也为建立完善的中国上市公司治理机制提供了一种全新的视角。 本文分为四章，第一章回顾了公司治理问题的产生，阐释了公司治理的内涵和内容，为其后的研究提供了必要的理论准备。第二章研究的是机构投资者介入上市公司治理的机制与绩效，回答的是什么因素促使机构投资者介入上市公司治理，这一行动能取得什么样的效果的问题。第三章描绘了中国机构投资者介入上市公司治理的现状，提出了中国机构投资者亟需解决的内部和外部问题。第四章从制度改进和机构投资者的培育两方面提出了促进中国机构投资者介入上市公司治理的对策。同时对中国上市公司也提出了有针对性的策略建议。 本文着重研究的是如果促进中国机构投资者积极参与上市公司的外部治理。中国机构投资者的“积极股东行为”，是完善中国上市公司治理、提高资本市场运作效率、提高经济增长能力的一条崭新途径。更多还原

【Abstract】 In recent years, the reform on corporate governance has become a focus problem attracting widespread concern. Therefore, corporate governance has turned an important researching field of modern Economics. The present studies are mainly beginning within the framework of Entrustment-Agency problem. As the concrete conditions of China in transition are concerned, this framework has fairly strong power of explanation. The corporate governance is regarded as the core content of "Establishing the Modern Enterprise Institution"by China’s government. Currently, corporate governance has become the emphasis of policy and the researches have achieved rich fruits , which reflects the important developments China has made in the construction of market system and the importance that government has attached to changing enterprise conducts.Listed companies is the important constituent part of China’s economy, for it has gathered a great deal of large and medium-sized backbone enterprises which are state-owned and leading companies in specific industries. The design on institutions aiming at saving the state-owned enterprises from difficult situation has caused the abnormal stock-equity structure of listed companies. The state-owned stockshare accouting a excessive proportion,the property subject being not in its position, the lack of constraining and monitoring mechanism upon state-owned assets and the problem of "insider control" have made it difficult for listed companies to form effective corporate governance. It is the origin of a series of contradictions and problems of china’s listed companies. Whether can listed companies form effective corporate governance has a direct relation to the healthy, orderly, canonical development of China’s capital market. Therefore, a systematic study on the corporate governance of China’s listed companies may make plenty of theoretical and practical implications.Institutional investors is a active group in modem capital market. We notice that institutional investors are not confined to the traditional profit-making model depending on the gap between the buying price and selling price of the stocks and bonds. On the contrary, they begin to seek profits by means of elevating the achievements and core competence of corporation through improving the corporate governance. Correspondingly, the function and effect of institutional investors in modern finance system has been greatlyexpanded. In 1990’s, the upsurge in corporate governance sponsored by institutional investors, with institutional investors in America as their stellar presentatives, is in the making, it has rendered us many profitable references in aspects of the mechanism, the ways and the tactics when intervening in the corporate governance of listed companies. Meanwhile, it has also provided us a totally new angle of view to establish perfect corporate governance of China’s listed companies.This paper is grouped into four chapters. Chapter 1 reviews the formation of the problem of corporate governance and expounds the connotation and content of corporate governance ,laying necessary theoretical preparations for subsequent study. Chapter 2 makes a study of the mechanism and performance of institutional investors’ intervening in the corporate governance, answering such questions as which factors will incentive institutional investors to intervening in the corporate governance of listed companies and what effect has this conduct achieved. Chapter 3 depicts the current situation when China’s institutional investors intervening in the corporate governance of listed companies, posing the internal and external problems imperative for China’s institutional investors to solve. Chapter 4 sets forth countermeasures about how to motivate China’s institutional investors to intervening in the corporate governance of listed companies as well as suggestions of tactics to China’s listed companies.The corporate governance of listed companies is one of the hot issues of China’s capital market. This paper studies emphatically on how to motivate更多还原