【作者】 曾若冰；

【导师】 赵锡斌；

【作者基本信息】 武汉大学 ， 国民经济学， 2004， 硕士

【摘要】 我国国有企业改革的方向是建立现代企业制度。同其它所有权与经营权相分离的大型企业一样，国有企业也要面对由委托代理所产生的信息不对称、激励不相容和责任不对等的代理风险。此外，由于我国国有企业产权的特殊性，它还要面对诸如委托链条冗长低效、所有者监督的外部性以及政策性负担引起的预算软约束等等众多严重的问题。因此，如何构建一个完整有效的国企监督体系就具有了十分现实和重要的意义。 我们应该借鉴发达国家的治理结构，结合我国的现实情况。通过构建专职的、脱离行政体系的国有资产投资运营部门来加强所有者监督；切实发挥企业监事会、党组织以及职代会的监督作用，从而实现严谨的企业内部监督；同时，充分发挥经理市场、资本市场以及银行的市场选择作用，以建立完善的企业外部监督体系。更多还原

【Abstract】 The direction of the reform of our state-owned enterprise is to set up modern enterprise system. Like other large-scale enterprises of what the power of management separates with the ownership, the state-owned enterprise should face the information asymmetry, incompatible encourage and asymmetric responsibility produced by agency of agreement. In addition, because the property right of state-owned enterprise of our country has its particularity, it faces numerous serious problems such as tediously long and poor efficient commission chain, externalities of the owner’s supervises, soft budget constraint caused by policy burden and so on. Therefore, how to structure one intact and effective supervision system of state-owned enterprises has very realistic and important meaning.We should draw lessons from the administration structure of the developed country and combine the reality of our country. We can strengthen owner’s supervision through structuring an independent investment system of state-run assets, which break away from administration. We should give play to the supervision function of board of supervisors of enterprises, Party organization and congress of workers and staff conscientiously in order to realize rigorous supervises inside enterprises. We should give full play to manager’s market, capital market and banks’ choose function, in order to set up the perfect external supervision system of enterprises.更多还原