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会计契约的经济后果观

Review on Economic Effect of Accounting Contract

【作者】 李小明

【导师】 谢获宝;

【作者基本信息】 武汉大学 , 会计学, 2004, 硕士

【副题名】剩余索取权之争

【摘要】 剩余索取权属于企业理论的重要研究领域。现代企业理论认为企业所有权是剩余索取权和剩余控制权的统一体。但是剩余索取权应该赋予谁,每位参与者又应该被赋予多少,在理论和现实中并无一个固定的模式,而事实上这一切都体现在企业或明或暗的契约之中。所以从契约角度来探讨剩余索取权的问题就抓住了研究的核心。 在剩余索取权的契约安排中,有两个核心问题需要解决:一是剩余索取权的计量,一是剩余索取权的分配。计量是会计系统的核心,并生成企业的财务会计信息。在会计技术一定的情况下,会计契约直接决定了会计信息的产出,而会计信息是剩余索取权分配阶段的重要依据,所以会计契约具有经济后果性。本文以此为出发点,来研究剩余索取权领域会计契约是如何演进发展的。 首先本文从法学和经济学角度对契约进行了解读,在此基础上提出了会计契约的含义,把会计规则和会计规则制定权的安排统称为会计契约,并用实证会计理论的三大著名假说分析认为会计契约具备经济后果。为了探寻会计契约在企业缔结的本源,又进一步研究了要素使用权交易契约,并认为其是企业一切契约的起点。 要素所有者投入要素的目标就是让要素增值,所以要素使用权交易契约的核心内容之一就是明确要素的增值如何在要素所有者之间分配,但是要素增值(即企业剩余)是不确定的,因此,有关如何安排剩余索取权的契约就成为整个企业契约体系的核心内容。剩余索取权契约包括非会计契约和会计契约。本文在剩余索取权视角下,探讨了会计契约的构成和演进。会计契约包括通用会计准则的制定、剩余会计规则的制定、会计信息披露规则的制定、审计规则的制定四个层次。这四个层次环环相扣,充分展现了各利益阶层对有关制定权的博弈。为了探寻会计契约的演进规则,本文抓住剩余索取权这个切入点,运用企业历史演进的分析方法,探讨了在古典资本主义企业、合伙制企业、债权人介入的业主型企业、股份公司等企业模式下,剩余索取权如何分配,与之相关的会计契约又如何安排。在历史分析的基础上,本文建立了相应的模型,论证了非财务资本所有者在企业剩余索取权的分配博弈中话语权逐步增强,并且这种制度安排增进了企业效率,改善了企业参与人的效用。 最后,本文认为目前我国出现的各种会计信息失真问题的深层原因在于产权制度的安排不当,从产权的另一个层面讲就是公司治理结构不合理。因此结合剩余索取权分配的讨论,提出了会计契约的系统治理框架。一种合理的公司治理结构可以产生良性的会计契约系统,从而可以在“造血功能”上解决会计信息失真等问题。

【Abstract】 Claim to firm’s residue is an important research field of enterprise theory. The enterprise owner’s right is thought as integrate of claim to residue and control right to residue, but who will endowed claim to residue and how much percent he can share in, which is not a fixed model. In fact all of that is reflected in all kinds of firm’s contracts, so the core of research is based on claim to residue.The contract for arranging claim to residue is composed of two core subcontracts. One subcontract is the contract for arranging the sharing of claim to residue, the other is the contract for arranging the rights of determining rules concerning how to measure firm’s residue. The measurement is the core of accounting system, and we can get reach of the financial information. Given the rule of measurement, the accounting contracts should determine the putout of accounting information. Accounting information is the important basis in the sharing phase of claim to residue, so accounting contracts have effect on economic benefits. As a result, we have on research on the development in from the view of the claim to residue.At first we explain the concept of the contract on law science and economics, then I give the definition of the accounting contract and think it includes accounting rule and the arranging of the formulation about the accounting rule. In order to look for the origin of the accounting contract, I make a deep research on the contracts of original element input, which are the beginning contracts in a firm.The element’s owners pursue the added value of elements, so the core content of element contracts is how the added value is shared in the element’s owners. While the residue (i.e., added value) is uncertain in the future, so the arranging of claim to residue is the center of the system of the firm’s contracts. The contracts of claim to residue include general contracts and accounting contracts, moreover, the accounting contracts include general accounting standard, the choice of firm’s accounting policies, the exposure regulation of accounting information and auditing rule. In the action of formulation accounting, the benefit classes carry on the game. For pursuing thedevelopment rule of accounting contracts, we adopt the historic analysis to observe the arranging of sharing in claim to residue and the development of the related accounting contracts in owner’s firm, co-operation firm, stock company, etc. Besides, I set up a model to certify that the Utility can make progress if the claim to residue is reasonable arranged.At last, I think the false accounting information is caused by unreasonable property regime. In another word, perfect corporation governance can putout a good accounting contract.

  • 【网络出版投稿人】 武汉大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2004年 04期
  • 【分类号】F230
  • 【被引频次】3
  • 【下载频次】415
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