【作者】 郭珊珊；

【导师】 王永海；

【作者基本信息】 武汉大学 ， 会计学， 2004， 硕士

【摘要】 本文以产权、交易和契约为起点，在格罗斯曼(Grossman，S．J．)、哈特(Hart，Oliver)和莫尔(Moore)已经确立的不完全契约分析框架的基础上，分析了契约的不完全性与产权之间的关系。认为企业产权有两种产权，一是完全契约定义的特定产权，二是不完全契约定义的剩余产权，建立在不完全契约基础上的企业剩余产权更能反映企业产权的本质。然后在梳理了资本结构中的重要研究成果的前提下，从会计等式出发，对资本结构契约的具体内容及其功能定位做了阐述，契约耦合度的差异形成了不同的资本结构类型，并影响着企业的产权结构和治理结构。接着根据阿洪(Aghion)和伯尔顿(Bolton)及哈特的控制权配置理论，对资本结构契约的控制权配置进行了分析，由于资本结构契约缔约主体地位与利益要求不一样，使得资本结构具有状态依赖的动态均衡特征。在不同缔约主体行使控制权的状态下，契约的运行效率也会产生差别，进而会影响到企业价值。受此启发，本文提出国企改革的思路，即通过资本结构契约的转换来改善企业资本结构，在分析我国特殊国情的基础上，本文认为将债转股和股转债相结合，是较适合我国现阶段的一种方式。此外，企业的资本结构契约还通过企业外部接管市场影响企业的市场价值、所有权结构、接管的概率、实际接管的价格，通过对证券契约投票权的设计，要解决公司资源潜在控制权并使企业价值最大化。在企业接管和控制权模型的基础上，本文对我国资本结构与产权结构的现状、ST股的控制权转移情况进行了分析，提出了发挥接管市场机制，优化资本结构的政策和建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper analyzes the relation between the incomplete contracts and enterprise property right based on the framewoke of incomplete contracts of Grossman, Hart and Moore. It holds the argument that the property right of enterprise includes two kind of firm property right. One is the special property rights by complete contracts, the other is residual property formulated by the incomplete contract. We consider the residual firm property based on the incomplete contracts can embody the essence of the firm property rights of the firm. Then based on the modern capital structure theory, we discuss the contents and the place and function of capital structure from the accounting equality. The different degree of contractual connection leds to the different kinds of capital structure. All of these factors influence the property right structure and governance structure and value of the firm.According to the theory of the allocation of control rights of Aghion and Bolton and Hart, this paper analyzes the allocation of control rights of capital structure. The capital structure have the contingent charateristic of dynamic equilibrium as a result of different demands and position of various partners in capital structure contracts. So we can conclude that there are two lines of optimizing capital structure. One is to transform from the rights and duties of debtor to those of the stockholders and from indirect forced budget constraints to direct constraints of property rights in stock contracts. The other is to transform from the rights and duties of stockholders to those of debtor. The two lines should be taken together.Otherwise, the capital structure can influence the firm value, property right structure, the price of takeover by firm takeover market, we can design different voting to raise firm value. This paper analyzes the relation between the present capital structure and property right, the control right transformation of ST firm, then puts forward some suggestions and policy to optimize capital structure.更多还原