研发竞争的实物期权评价模型研究

【作者】 郑智；

【导师】 朱正萱；

【作者基本信息】 南京理工大学 ， 产业经济学， 2004， 硕士

【摘要】 本文主要运用实物期权分析方法对研发竞争的评价模型进行研究。期望本文的研究能使研发项目的评价更加科学和准确，同时能对我国研发投资的管理和决策起到一定的借鉴作用。 论文首先对研发项目和实物期权的基础理论及研发项目的实物期权分析框架进行了回顾；其次对研发竞争的市场结构和模型进行了构思，并得出研发竞争模型的分析可以以单个公司的最优投资规则为依据；再次就单个公司在收益不确定条件下研发项目的最优投资时机进行了模型分析；然后对研发竞争的合作投资与非合作投资均衡进行了讨论；其中，合作投资有两种模式：序列投资模式和同时投资模式；根据期权价值的参数值，非合作归结为两种均衡：领先者—跟随者均衡和合作投资均衡，通过比较得出非合作行为是缺乏效率的。最后对本文进行了总结和展望。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper considers the appraisal model of R&D competition under real options approach. The author expects the appraisal of the R&D project to be more scientific and accurate, and expects the research of this text can play a certain reference positive role to the management and decision of the R&D investment.First, it looks back the basic theory of R&D and real options and analysis system. Second, it analyzes the market structure and the model of R&D competition, and concludes that the analysis of R&D competition model can be based on the optimal investment rule for a single firm. Third, it studies optimal investment timing of R&D project with uncertain return. Fourth, it analyzes the model of R&D competition, including cooperative benchmark and non-cooperative equilibrium. R&D cooperation includes two investment patterns: sequential investment pattern and simultaneous investment pattern. Depending on parameter values, R&D non-cooperation has two type of equilibrium: leader-follower equilibrium and joint-investment equilibrium. By comparing the cooperative and non-cooperation solution the inefficiency of non-cooperation behavior can ready be seen. At last, it is the part of conclusion and prospect of this paper.更多还原