【作者】 赵玉双；

【导师】 李军；

【作者基本信息】 西南交通大学 ， 产业经济学， 2004， 硕士

【摘要】 第三方物流被称为企业的“第三利润源”，对优化资源配置、提高经济运作效率具有重要意义。虽然我国的物流业已经进入快速发展的时期，但是第三方物流合作仍停留在一个较低的水平上，其中第三方物流合同管理水平较低是造成物流合作不能顺利进行的一个重要原因。论文针对这个问题对合作的制约因素、合同管理、契约激励机制设计以及合作决策进行了论证和分析。 首先，论文分析了市场发展水平、非对称信息以及法律、信用环境等宏观因素对我国第三方物流发展的制约，阐述了如何克服这些不利影响、建立一个利于第三方物流发展的环境。 其次，文章重点对第三方物流合作中的服务定价方式(报酬函数)进行了深入的分析。在事先假定的前提下，根据市场机制和价格机制，引入了行业的平均值作为服务定价的基本标准，对报酬中的惩罚函数进行了考察；并以博弈论为基础，应用委托-代理理论以及机制设计理论分析了第三方物流合作中激励约束机制的建立和双方的博弈过程，分析了参与约束和激励相容约束在合作中对需求方、第三方物流服务供应商的效用以及合作整体效用的影响；完成上述分析之后，论文依据重复博弈原理，分析了合作双方在长期合作中的博弈过程及均衡状态，阐述了根据环境条件的变化，对合同进行不断的优化和调整的必要性和方法。分析结果证明，只有建立起同时满足参与约束和激励相容约束的契约，双方才能实现合作的均衡。在合作的均衡状态下，第三方受到有效约束，得到正常利润，需求方得到所需水平的服务，合作整体效用达到假设条件下的最大值，双方之间的关系是稳定的。 最后，论文从需求方的角度出发，对第三方物流合作的决策过程做了简要的介绍，并且强调了决策以及合作中经常出现的问题。更多还原

【Abstract】 The Third Party Logistics (3PL or TPL) plays a significant role in the optimization of resources allocation and the enhancement of the economic operation as "the third source of profit". Although logistics industry in China has enter a period of rapid development, the level of third party cooperation is low, and the inefficient management of the 3PL contract is one of the most important causes.In this paper we deal with the problem of incentive-restriction mechanism design and the validity of the contract management and other factors, which influence the success or failure of the cooperation.First, such influential factors as the level of industry development, asymmetry information, and the disadvantageous law system and credit circumstance are enumerated. Then some suggestions are put forward to overcome the forenamed handicaps and optimize the 3PL cooperation.Afterwards, the paying- function in the cooperation is analyzed. Under the hypotheses set beforehand, the paper takes the average value of the industry as paying criterion base on the market and price mechanism. The punishing function is introduced in this stage too. Then the Principal -Agent mode of the 3PL cooperation is set up, and the building of Incentive -Restriction mechanism(including Participation Constraint and Incentive-Compatibility Constraint) and its influence on the utilities of both sides and the whole are proved. After that the equilibrium and adjustment of the contract in long-term cooperation is discussed with the application of Repeated-Gaming theory. It’s proved that with such mechanism, the demander achieves his business goal and optimal profit, and the service supplier receives his expectation of revenue. At the same time, the integral utility reaches the maximum.Finally, the paper makes a brief introduction of the decision-making process of outsourcing and also the contracting and implements phases from the standpoint ofthe service demander. Besides, in this part, the author emphasizes the details which the demander should pay great intention to.更多还原