【作者】 任建春；

【导师】 杜莉；

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 ， 金融学， 2004， 硕士

【摘要】 自从1999年四通集团实行管理层收购以来，管理层收购逐渐成为我国理论界和实务界研究的热点问题，这一趋势在2003达到高潮，以致于有不少人士认为2003年是管理层收购的元年。本文运用理论分析和实证分析相结合的方法对这一问题进行了系统的分析。 本文共分五个部分： 在开篇的第一部分，本文首先给出了管理层收购以及几个和其密切相关的概念的定义并指出了管理层收购的特征。接下来本文对西方有关管理层收购的理论进行了文献回顾。西方关于管理层收购的解释大概可以分为四个假说：财富转移说、代理成本说、防御剥夺说和企业家精神说。财富转移说认为管理层收购并不产生收益，其收益只是对其他利益主体的利益剥夺，这种说法并没有得到实证的证实；代理成本说认为管理层收购收益来源于代理成本的降低；防御剥夺说认为管理层收购之所以发生是因为：管理层对其管理的企业资源具有依赖性，其利益容易被资本所有者剥夺，为了防止其利益被剥夺，管理层就有动力把企业收归己有；企业家精神说则针对近年来管理层收购频频发生在高科技企业的现象进行了理论反思，认为管理层收购发生的原因是企业管理层的企业家精神在其作为打工者的时候受到压抑，管理层收购收益产生的原因是企业的企业家精神的再生。第一部分的最后，本文对中国关于管理层收购研究的现状进行了分析，指出中国目前的管理层收购和西方的管理层收购有很大的不同，西方的研究结论不一定适用于中国，因此有必要用中国的数据对西方的结论进行重新检验。 本文的第二部分和第三部分是管理层收购的实务部分。第二部分介绍了管理层收购的一般程序，第三部分介绍了捆扰我国管理层收购实务界的若干问题重点问题，并指出了相应的解决方法。管理层收购的一般程序应包括MBO策划、MBO执行和后MBO整三个阶段。捆扰我国管理层收购主要有四个难点问题：政策风险、收购主体、定价和融资问题。由于我国的管理层主要涉及到国有资产转让这一敏感问题，因此绝大多数都需要到国有资产管理部门进行审批。许多管理层收购一到了审批阶段就不能自己控制。绕开审批途径主要有司法拍卖和委托其他企业代为收购。收购主体也就是个收购平台问题。鉴于管理层收购的司法风险很大，合适的收购平台成了规避风险的重要手段。尤其是大多数的MBO都是自买自卖，这个问题引发了不小的道德风险。目前比较可行的解决方法是引入竞价机制，变管理层一方收购为多方竞标。融资问题是管理层收购成败的关键所在。我国的管理层收购的融资渠道非常少，但目前的情况正在改善。 本文的第四部分是实证分析。这一部分是对西方有关管理层收购的结论的检验。实证的目的是验证我国目前已进行了MBO的上市公司的绩效是否有了实质的提高。本文首先进行了样本的筛选。筛选的依据有两个：1、能在公开渠道找到财务资料的上市公司；2、已经完成了管理层收购的且完成后已有至少一个完整的会计年度。符合上述标准的公司一共11家。然后按照经典的财务分析范例，本文选择了获利能力、<WP=36>经营能力和发展能力三个大类指标进行了比较分析。三大类指标又细化为销售净利率、净资产收益率、应收账款周转率、存货周转率、主营业务收入增长率、净资产增长率和税后利润增长率7个小指标。依据11家样本公司公开公布的财务报表，笔者分别按年份对上述7个指标进行了计算，然后进行了MBO前后的对比分析。分析的结果和西方的结果很不相同，大多数实施MBO的样本公司并没有促使业绩提升，至少短期看来如此。接下来笔者分析了结论差异的原因。本文的最后是结论和建议部分。在这一部分里，笔者首先对实证结论进行了一个简单的总结，然后对我国目前的管理层收购提出了自己的政策建议。这些建议主要是：1、加强MBO的国有资产竞拍机制的运用，必要时上升到法律的高度；2、加强立法，使MBO有法可依，规范MBO行为；3、加强MBO过程中的监督工作，防止产生道德风险；4、防止新一轮的内部人控制；5、加强MBO活动中信息披露的透明度。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since “Si Tong Group” succeeded in MBO in 1999, MBO has been growing up to the focus question of the study in the theory and real affair circle of our china. This trend reached a climax in 2003, and many personages think 2003 is the starting-year of MBO. This text carries on systematic analysis to this question with the method of the theory-analyses and demonstration-analyses.The full text consists of five chapters.In Chapter 1, the author gives several definitions of MBO and the other concepts, which are closely related to MBO, and points out the characteristics of MBO at first. The following content is the review to the western theories about MBO. The western explanations to the MBO can be probably divided into four kinds: Wealth shift theory, cost of agency theory, defense theory and the spirit of entrepreneurship theory. Wealth shift theory thinks the MBO doesn’t produce income, but just deprives the other benefit owners, and this theory has not gotten the confirmation of the real example. Cost of agency theory points out that the source of MBO’s benefit is the declination of the cost of agency. Defense theory thinks the reason why MBO can take place in the companies is the following causes: the managers have dependences on enterprises’ resource of their management, their interests are easy to be deprived by the capital owner, In order to prevent its interests from being deprived, the managers have motive force to take back the enterprise and own it by themselves. The spirit of entrepreneurship theory rethinks MBO, considering the phenomenon that MBO often took place in the high-technology companies recently. It thinks the reason why MBO happens is that the spirit of entrepreneurship of the managers was constrained when they worked as temporary laborers. The regeneration of the spirit of entrepreneurship gives the reason why the income increased. The last part of chapter 1 is the analysis to the actuality of the study in MBO in china. And the author points out that there is very heavy different between china’s MBO at present and western MBO. The research conclusion in the west might not be suitable for China, so it is necessary to examine again with the Chinese actual data. Chapter2 and chapter3 of this text are the real affair part of MBO.Chapter2 mainly introduces the general procedure of MBO. Chapter3 mainly introduces several key problems of MBO, which are disturbing our real affair persons at present, and also points out the corresponding solution in the author’s way. The general procure of MBO mainly is divided into 3 steps: plan, carrying-out, <WP=38>and coordination. Four key problems are disturbing the managers who are willing to take MBO: policy risk, the subject of purchase, price and finance support. Because MBO of our country involve state-run assets and it’s a sensitive problem, So the overwhelming majority needs going to the administrative department of state-run assets to examine and approve. A lot of cases of MBO can’t be controlled by managers once reaching stage of examining and approving. The way to get around approving are mainly justice auction or to trust other enterprises to buy. Seeing MBO is very risky, the suitable purchase platform becomes the important means to evade risk. Especially most cases are managers buy the assets from themselves, which has caused large moral risk. The more feasible solution to this problem at present is introducing competitive price mechanism, turning single-buy into biding-up. The financial question is so important that it can decide MBO’s success or failure. There are very few financing channels to MBO in our china, but the situation is improving.The fourth part of this text is demonstration-analyses. In this part, the author checks up the western relevant result of MBO. The purpose of checking-up is to verify whether the achievement of public corporation was improved after MBO in china. The author firstly chooses the sample of public corporation. The standards of choosing sample are: 1.the public corporation, the financial reports of wh更多还原