【作者】 杨英；

【导师】 刘金全；

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 ， 工商管理， 2004， 硕士

【摘要】 信息在市场结构和市场功能等方面发挥着重要作用。但是信息的搜寻是有成本的，因此人们对现实中的经济信息难以完全了解，具有完全信息的市场是不可能存在的。由于市场信息的不完全，市场参与者不可能同时拥有所有有用的信息，主要表现为信息不对称与市场的不确定性。资本市场是典型的信息非对称市场。在资本市场上，交易双方是借款人与放款人。借款人是资金的使用者，对于借入资金的投资项目、收益与风险、贷款的偿还概率等方面有较多地了解。放款人只是资金的提供者，并不直接参与资金的使用，因此对资金的使用情况不可能与借款人有同样的了解。这样，在相关信息的占有方面，借款人处于优势地位，放款人处于劣势地位。双方之间实质上是掌握信息较多的代理人通过合同或其他经济关系与掌握信息较少的委托人之间的博弈关系。博弈的主要表现是掌握信息较多的一方隐瞒信息。发生在契约签订前的隐瞒信息行为叫逆向选择，发生在契约签订后的隐瞒信息行为叫道德风险。对于信贷市场来说，借方与贷方信息不对称，是互为博弈的对象。利率的提高使那些有良好资信的厂商不再申请贷款，而那些资信度低、乐于从事风险投资的厂商会继续申请贷款，<WP=58>这些厂商的还款可能性较低，反而导致银行的收益下降。银行在与厂商博弈的过程中，不只是依靠利率去制约厂商，而是通过数量限制的办法，即通过信贷配给来约束厂商。企业经营的资金环境对于企业发展战略和竞争能力的形成是至关重要的。与大企业相比，中小企业由于企业治理结构不健全，对外财务信息披露不规范，信誉积累不足等原因在融资过程中信息不对称的现象较严重。中小企业在我国的经济发展过程中发挥了重要作用，但融得的资金与其作用相比却是很不相称的。我国中小企业的显著特点是过于依赖内部融资，据世界银行所属的国际金融公司的调查，我国私营公司的发展资金，绝大部分来自于业主资本和内部留存收益，近年来一直保持在50-60%以上，而公司债券和外部股权融资等直接融资则不到1%，银行贷款大约在20%左右。而美国中小企业的资金来源中，业主资本大约占30%左右，股权融资占到18%，金融机构贷款占到42%。这反映了我国当前以商业银行为主导的金融体系的低效率。对于如何解决中小企业融资难问题是一个重要的理论和实践问题。本文分为四章，第一章介绍了资本市场有效性假说并分析了资本市场不完全现象的原因和表现形式；第二章分析了由于资本市场中交易双方信息不对称导致的不合作博弈和非理性投<WP=59>资行为；第三章通过模型具体说明了资本市场信贷配给产生的原因、传导渠道，解释了为什么中小企业在融资过程中会遇到信贷配给；第四章通过案例分析并结合上述模型，提出了解决我国中小企业融资问题的一些对策和建议。要想解决中小企业融资难问题，需要企业、各级政府、金融部门及全社会的共同努力，才能达到。因此我们提出以下一些建议：1.企业应进行股份制改造，健全治理结构。通过加强内部管理和技术创新提高企业自身的能力，增强产品在市场上的竞争力，树立投资者对企业的信心。提高企业的财务透明度，增加企业的信用水平。2.创新直接融资方式，建立专门为中小企业服务的资本市场，发展投资基金，拓宽中小企业的融资渠道。有效发挥创业板市场的作用。3.完善间接融资体系，鼓励面向中小企业的多种金融机构发展，拓展中小企业的融资租赁、保险等多种融资形式的发展。在健全制度的前提下，放宽民营银行在市场准入方面的管制，允许私人涉足金融服务行业。4.积极发挥政府的作用，制定相关的企业扶植政策，实施相应的中小企业融资担保制度。信息不对称;信贷配给;中小企业;融资更多还原

【Abstract】 Information plays an important role in market structure and market function. But it is not free to acquire information, so people can hardly know all of economic information completely in reality. It is impossible that there is a market having complete information. The participants can’t have all useful information at the same time because of incomplete information in a market, which shows information asymmetry and market uncertainty.Capital market which have the borrower and the accommodator is a typically market of information asymmetry. The borrower who is the user of the capital knows much more than the accommodator about the item of investment, income and risk from investment and the possibility of paying back. The accommodator is only the provider of the capital and can’t use it directly. Thus, in respect of having relevance information, the borrower is superior to the accommodator. In essence, the relationship between them is to play a game by contract or other economic restrain like agent and client. As a result, the person who knows more information hides the fact. <WP=61>It is called counter selection when there is a behavior of concealing information before signing a contract and called moral risk after signing a contract.As far as credit market is concerned, the borrower and the accommodator play a game because of information asymmetry. The firms that have good credit can no longer apply for loans when the rate rises, but those having bad credit or fond of risk investment will continue to apply for loans. The less possibility of paying back will result in the decrease of the bank’s income. In course of a game between the bank and the firm, the bank takes measures of quantity constraint ─ that is credit rationing rather than raising rate to restrict firms.The capital environment of running a company is of utmost importance to the formation of a company’s developing strategy and competitive edge. Compared with big firms, the phenomena of information asymmetry in financing are serious to small & medium firms because of imperfect administrative structure, financial information unclear to the public and absence of credit accumulation. <WP=62>Small & medium firms play very important roles in course of economy development in China. But their financing status cannot match with it. The remarkable character of small & medium firms in our country is too dependent on internal accumulated capital. According to the research of international finance company subordinate to the World Bank, the developing capital of non-stated companies in our country mostly come from the owner’s capital and internal income reserved, above 50-60% in recent years, while direct financing from bonds and shares is less than 1%, and about 20% from bank loans. But in America, the capital comes from the owner about 30%, shares about 18% and loans from finance institutions about 42%. This reflects that the current finance system in our country that the commercial bank stands a dominant position is ineffective. How to overcome the difficulties of small & medium firms financing is an important theoretical and practical problem. This paper is divided into four chapters. The first chapter introduces efficient market hypothesis and analyzes the reasons and manifestation of incomplete capital market. In <WP=63>the second chapter we analyze that owing to information asymmetry in the capital market, both sides of transaction play a game without corporation result in unreasoning investment. In the third chapter we explain the reasons of credit rationing and conduction channels through specific models and interpret why small & medium firms encounter credit rationing in course of financing. In the fourth chapter we put forward some reasonable and valuable countermeasures and suggestions by analyzing the case and combining the model above-mentioned.In order to solve the problem of small & medium firms financing, we need joint efforts from the company, governments at different levels, financial departments and whole society. So we pu更多还原