【作者】 马东；

【导师】 王秋华；

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 ， 工商管理， 2004， 硕士

【摘要】 我国集体企业资金来源和投资渠道较为复杂，大多数企业创办初期没有与举办单位或出资职工明晰投资、借款和扶持关系，企业资产归属不清。集体资产长期处于没有明确的所有者代表的状况，不利于形成有效的激励机制和约束机制，也不利于建立灵活的资本吸纳与流动机制。所以，明晰产权成了集体企业的首要任务。但是，在现有的政策法律环境下，将集体资产量化到每个人头上是不可能的，那么将集体资产退出企业，不失为明智的做法，于是，MBO就成为众多民营企业的选择，四通集团就是其中之一。同时作者考虑到我国目前在国退民进的改革实践，MBO必将对市场经济条件下的中国民营企业产生深远的影响，具有一定的理论意义和现实意义，相应地对整个国民经济的发展也将产生积极的促进作用。本文以MBO的基本操作流程为基础，对当前在理论上和实践中都有一定影响的管理者收购问题进行了系统的研究和实证分析，全文从以下几个方面展开：首先，作者对四通集团的产权状况进行了深入的分析。从1992年开始，段永基发动四通集团，实施以股份化、集团化、<WP=62>产业化、国际化为中心的“二次创业”总战略。集团化、产业化、国际化这三个目标相继实现，但二次创业的核心“股份化”却没有实现。在这一时期，四通集团陷入了大动荡之中，先后出现了组织危机、文化危机、人才危机和经营危机四大危机。实际上，这四大危机的根源还在于制度危机。1994年，四通集团董事会下决心解决所有者缺位问题，但直到1997年，四通集团的股份制改革仍然没有取得实质性的进展。在整整两年的时间里，围绕着“内部人分存量资产”的思路，四通集团一次又一次的努力均告失败。在现有员工如何分配现有资产上，四通集团遇到了三个无法克服的障碍：政策障碍、历史障碍和文化障碍。 其次，作者从理论上对管理层收购问题进行了深入的分析。在对管理层收购问题的基本理论介绍的过程中，结合前文对于四通集团基本问题的分析，侧重于对管理层收购操作流程进行了较为详细的阐述。基本理论分析方面，作者使用委托代理理论对MBO的适用性进行了简单的分析。管理层收购使企业的所有者和经营者重新合为一体，从而解决了信息不对称问题和两者的效用函数不一致的问题，最终解决委托代理问题。在对管理者收购理论作简要的分析基础上，作者运用利益相关<WP=63>者模型对管理层收购的参与者进行了逐一论述，明晰了利益相关者之间的利益关系和责任所在。同时对管理层收购方案的设计原则、收购方式、收购程序及收购过程中的融资安排做了详细的论述。作者希望操作层面的相关知识介绍能够给中国改革进程中的企业家们提供一点借鉴。国内对于管理层收购本身可以说早已经达成共识。目前，大家关注的是管理层收购的实际操作问题，正是基于这样一种考虑，本文作者几乎倾进全文对管理层收购的操作流程做了系统的论述。再次，作者运用上述理论，结合四通集团的实际问题，对四通集团的整个管理层收购方案进行了较为全面的阐述。方案的具体操作分为三步：第一步，重组改制，设立“职工持股会”，掌握新设立的北京四通投资有限公司的控股权。北京四通投资有限公司通过融资购买原四通集团的电子、电工、系统集成等主要资产和业务。第二步，分期、分批通过私募扩股，逐步购买原四通集团的资产并发展其主营业务。第三步，寻求在国内或国外上市，成为公众公司。然后，侧重考察了管理层收购后的四通集团的状况，从业务重组、管理模式的改进、人力资本的确认等方面分析了收购后阶段的实际效果。最后，作者对四通集团的案例进行了简要的评价，四通集团的管理层收购是一<WP=64>起比较典型的以MBO方式进行的企业重组，虽然在有些方面并不是非常成功的，但至少它为解决我国普遍存在的民营企业产权不清问题，提供了极为现实的思路。最后，作者对实施管理层收购的意义及发展中应该配套解决的问题，提出了一些建设性的意见和建议。同时指出虽然管理层收购在我国有着较好的发展前景，但是目前阶段由于法律、制度等方面的障碍，在我国大范围的推广还存在一定的难度和不确定性。正是基于这样的考虑，财政部曾经一度叫停管理层收购，但随着企业改革的不断深入，管理者收购必将日渐走向成熟，同时随着管理者收购的实践的不断进行及政策法规的相继完善，管理者收购也必将以其规范的运作在我国的市场经济发展过程中发挥更大的作用。更多还原

【Abstract】 It is relatively complex of the mode of financing and investment channels of the collective enterprises of our country, and at the preliminary stage of establishment, the most enterprises failed to clarify the investment, loan and support relation with the conducting unit and/or staff investors, which has resulted in such a confusion of the enterprise asset ownership. Owing to the circumstance that collective asset has not a firmed owner representative for a long period, it is unfavorable to form any effective stimulating mechanism and controlling system, and it is also harmful to establish a flexible capital absorbing and flowing mechanism. Therefore, it is becoming the most important task to clarify the property right of collective enterprises. However, under existing policy and legal environment, it is impossible to quantize the collective asset to everyone, so to quit the collective asset from the enterprise is sensible practice. In this way, MBO becomes the option of numerous civil managed enterprises, and Sitong Group is an example among those enterprises. Simultaneously, regarding the state currently performed reform practice of the state withdrawing and civil advancing in the field of economy, the author holds that MBO must have certain theoretical significance and realistic significance, and it is bound to generate a profound influence on the Chinese civil managed enterprises under the market economic condition, and correspondently, it also will produce active promoting affect on the development of entire <WP=66>national economy. Taking the basic operating process of MBO as foundation, system research and positive analysis are adopted in this paper concerning the manager purchase matter that has certain influence theoretically and realistically. The full text is described according to the following aspects: Firstly, the author has carried out thorough analysis on the condition of property right of Sitong Group. From 1992, Duan Yongji has aroused Sitong Group to start the general strategy of “Second undertaking founding” centralizing on joint-stock system, group formation, industrialization and internationalization. Then, the group formation, industrialization and internationalization have been realized one after another, but the joint-stock system as the core of the “Second undertaking founding” has not been enforced. During this period, Sitong Group was beset with severe upheaval. The four major crises have happened in succession, namely, organization crisis, culture crisis, talent crisis and operation crisis. Actually, the source of the four major crises still resulted from system crisis. In 1994, the board of directors of Sitong group determined to solve the owner vacancy problem, but to 1997, the joint-stock system reform did not acquire any realistic progress. During the whole two years, focusing on the idea of “to allocate the stock asset among internal staff”, the every effort of Sitong Group had ended in failures. Regarding how to distribute the existing asset among existing employees, Sitong Group had been hit with three <WP=67>insolvable obstacles that were policy obstacle, historical obstacle and cultural obstacle.Secondly, the author has made further analysis on the administrative-level purchasing problem theoretically. In the course of introducing the basic theory on the administrative-level purchasing problem, combining the former analysis concerning the fundamental problems of Sitong Group, the author has stressed to interpret the operation process of the administrative-level purchasing in detail. With respect to the basic theoretical analysis, the author has applied the agency by agreement theory to analyze the serviceability of MBO straightforwardly, that is the administrative-level purchasing re-combines the owner and the manager of enterprise into one unit, and which has solved the problems of information asymmetry and the effectiveness function unconformity between them, then solved the problem of agency by agreement eventually. Based on the brief analys更多还原