【作者】 邱伟华；

【导师】 戴达远；

【作者基本信息】 江西财经大学 ， 政治经济学， 2004， 硕士

【摘要】 1978年国有企业改革之初的着眼点仅仅在于提高国有企业的经营效率和经济效益，这也是当时国家经济发展的需要。从1978年至今二十多年，国有企业改革的思路可以分为两个阶段，1993年以前国有企业改革以向企业放权为主，希望能够通过增加企业的自主权来搞好搞活国有企业。改革的焦点集中在国家和企业的关系上，改革的措施就是放权加上让利。这样的改革实质是让企业的管理人员跟国家分享剩余索取权，而没有在根本上涉及国有资产的产权问题。1993年以后，国有企业改革转变了过去放权让利的改革思路，着力于制度创新。根据1994年开始实行的《公司法》，大量的国有企业都进行了公司制改造，在公司制的改造过程中实行股权多元化，并改革国有资产管理体制，使国家作为国有企业所有者的行为接近商业化的私人所有者的行为。然而在政府的层面，所谓的政企分开问题自八十年代以来就一直没有解决。国家和企业之间如何划分权利，一直没有清晰的界限，经过公司制改革后的国有企业，仍然脱离不了国家所有者的干预。十年的国有企业公司制改革，实际上在政企分开、改变国家所有者行为这个环节上没有取得成功。在企业的层面上，大多数企业都实行了公司制，但是因为政府层面的改革没有到位，国家行使所有者职能的方式其实没有根本改变，这就又导致改制后的一个普遍问题，即在几乎所有经过公司制改革后的国有企业中，公司治理非常薄弱。这使得国有企业原有的内部人控制与经理腐败问题，以及新产生的不同股东之间的利益冲突难以解决。本文认为上述国家所有权下的政企难分与公司治理薄弱是国有企业公司制改革中存在的两大最严重问题。解决这两大问题的关键在于按照现代公司法律制度的要求来改造国有企业。文中笔者将论述设立国有资产代表人制度，确保出资人到位是国有企业公司制改革成功的第一步。由于国有资产的公有产权性质，在国有股份占多数的情况下难以建立有效的公司治理，所以在大多数国有企业建立起了公司制后，国有产权可以逐步退出，而非公有的资本则可以进入。股权多元化应采用外部型和退出型的方式。在最终实现股权的多元化后，国有资本与进入的非国有资本就能够形成不同所有制资本之间进行产权平等对话的机制。一旦有了这种产权平等对话的机制，国有资本“所有者虚位”和“所有权行政化”问题可以得到有效的矫正，如此才能谈得上建立一套合理的公司治理结构。很多关于国有企业公司化改造后如何解决公司治理的研究，都集中在公司中两权分离的关系与其制衡以及外部环境对公司治理的影响上，对如何确保公司的股东之间的平等对话机制，维护全体股东的合法权益则很少涉及。以我国公司治理的实践来看，控股股东形成的“董事会一人化”状态及委托权与代理权的合一是客观存在的现象。对代理权的监督仅解决了经理人员的道德风险，但股东之间，尤其是控股股东对中小股东权益的损害是难以实现有效公司治理的最大障碍。事实上，中国公司治理的首要问题是解决股东权作为权利主体的平等问题。正如中国证监会在《上市公司治理准则》中将公司治理的目标定位于股东权保护一样，股东权的治理才是中国公司治理的本质问题。所以国有企业公司化改造后的第二步就是要进一步修改公司法，完善行使公司控制权的内部机制，并引入股东诉讼和公司人格否认制度，增强公司法的可操作性与可诉性。强有力的外部法律约束可以规范公司股东的行为，这对形成有效的公司治理至关重要。更多还原

【Abstract】 China’s SOE reform started in 1978. Its primary aim was to improve management efficiency and economic profit in the state-owned enterprises. From 1978 to the present, the history of SOE reform can be divided into two stages. Before the year of 1993 the state expected to invigorate the state-owned enterprises by expanding their rights in decision-making and increasing their profit share. Most reform measures focused on how to adjust the relationship between the state and the state-owned enterprises while the state’s property rights could remain untouched. And as a subsequent result of these policies the enterprise staff gained some rights of residual control from the state and shared its residual claim. After the year of 1993, the state changed its SOE reform policies from residual control and profit sharing to institutional innovation. According to the " company law " implemented in 1994 a large number of state-owned enterprises were corporatized in order to make the enterprise and the state "separated". The state became a shareholder of the enterprises once owned by it and many other non-state shareholders were introduced under the notion of "equity pluralism". Although the state has corpratized the SOEs it does not behave like a real shareholder and the problem of separation between the state and enterprises is still not solved. Actually China’s SOE corporate reform in late 1990s has not succeeded at all. The mechanism of corporate governance is very weak in most SOEs because the state has not changed its way of behaviors. Insider control and managers corruption still remain very serious. And the conflict between different shareholders arose as a new problem, which makes the current SOE reform much more complicated.The above-mentioned predicament in China’s SOE reform are deeply rooted in the nature of SOEs’ public property rights which makes it difficult to solve their innate principal-agent problem. In the thesis the author would advocate the establishment of state-owned asset representative system as the first crucial step to make the mechanism of corporate governance feasible in SOEs. Then the state should progressively decrease its share in most SOEs by selling its own equity or accommodating exterior non-state investors. Unless the equity structure is diversified and equity balance achieved healthy corporate governance cannot be set up in a state-owned enterprise.In recent years many academic researches on SOE corporate governance assumethat principal-agent cost and external market conditions would be the key issues to improve SOEs’ performance in the future. However the prevalence of dominant shareholders’ scandals suggests that power balance among shareholders rather than any other issue should be the top one. The author believes that those unchecked power assumed by dominant shareholders is becoming the greatest hindrance to China’s further SOE reform. Just as China’s Securities Regulatory Committee said, the prime goal in corporate governance is to protect minor shareholders and outside debtors. So in order to enhance SOEs’ corporate governance it is necessary to revise the 1994 company law, which has many defects in term of shareholder protection. The mechanism of internal control needs improvement. Shareholder lawsuit should be established and the principle of piercing the veil of corporate personality ought to be applied in legal practices. Strong restraints from the law may exert great influence on dominant shareholders’ behaviors. And this is very crucial to build healthy corporate governance in China’s state-owned enterprises.更多还原