规范我国上市公司管理层收购行为研究

【作者】 贺凌燕；

【导师】 葛正良；

【作者基本信息】 华东师范大学 ， 政治经济学， 2004， 硕士

【摘要】 纵观现代经济发展史，一个突出的现象就是大型企业的发展途径常常采取了并购的方式。而真正具有现代意义的我国上市公司并购的出现，则是国有企业改革的深化及我国证券市场发展的结果，越来越多的企业在改革与发展过程中走向资本市场，迈上了以市场为依托的产权改革和制度创新之路。管理层收购作为我国21世纪初的一种并购模式，不仅是建立企业内部有效的激励约束机制、改善企业经营状况的一项有效措施，而且是国有股退出控股地位，促进国有经济战略性调整的一个有效途径。然而，有关资料显示，我国前期实施的一些管理层收购产生了许多问题，目前已被暂停推行。因此，规范我国上市公司管理层收购行为，对将来重新推行该项举措具有较为现实的意义。论文的主要内容如下： 第一章主要是对管理层收购理论和实践的介绍。在介绍了三种代表性的理论，即代理成本理论、激励机制理论和人力资本理论后，描述了MBO的特征、参与者以及实施方式，最后对管理层收购在美国等发达国家以及东欧、俄罗斯等转型经济国家的运作进行了分析。 第二章分析了管理层收购的意义。指出管理层收购行为是企业的一种创新形式，对健全法人治理结构、优化上市公司产权结构、建立长效激励机制都有积极的作用。 第三章以18家上市公司为样本，阐述了我国上市公司管理层收购的基本情况、首先说明了我国上市公司管理层收购的动因和特点；其次，通过数据对18家上市公司实施MBO后的表现进行了分析，得出这些公司都有着良好的基本面的结论；接着经过对比分析，指出我国公司和美国公司的管理层收购存在着很大差异；最后结合案例，探讨了我国上市公司实施MBO后所存在的主要问题。 第四章针对我国上市公司管理层收购存在的主要问题，提出了规范管理层收购行为的合理化建议。首先要端正管理层收购动机；其次是制定、完善相应的法律、法规和制度；第三是引入市场化定价机制；第四，建议把发展私募基金作为解决我国MBO融资问题的主要途径之一；最后，笔者从宇通客车这个具体的案例分析入手，来探讨该公司日益显露的财务风险。指出了只有尽快建立风险预警机制，才可能大幅提高管理层收购的成功率，并且可避免由财务风险所引发的财务危机。更多还原

【Abstract】 In the evolution of modern economy, it is dawn on us that the huge-scale enterprises normally developed by right of M&A. In effect, the actual modern-style M&A deals for listed enterprises of our country took place when the government deepened the enterprises’ reform and promote the security market. More and more enterprises entered into the capital market with the reform and development, searching out a new way to reshuffle the equity and innovate the system. MBO was regarded as a kind of merger mode of the beginning of 21 st century in our country, there will be wide market prospects in driving the property right system reform of Chinese enterprises and optimize the corporate governance structure. The main content of this paper is the following:Chapter 1 is the introduction to the theory and practice of MBO mainly. Having introducing three kinds of representative theory: agency costs theory, incentive mechanism theory and the manpower capital theory, it describes the characteristic, participant and implementing way of MBO . In the last, this paper tries to analyze MBO in the developed country such as U.S.A as well as the MBO that happened in the east Europe , the economic-transition countries .Chapter 2 have analyzed the meaning of MBO . It is pointed out to us that the behavior of MBO is a kind of enterprises’ system innovation form. Moreover, MBO will contribute to perfect corporate governance structure, optimize the structure of property right of listed company and set up long incentive mechanism.Regarding 18 listed companies as samples, Chapter 3 has explained the basic situation of MBO of Chinese listed company. Firstly, the author have explained the reason and characteristic of MBO; Secondly, using the data to analyze the behavior after MBO in 18 listed companies, it is concluded that these companies are good; The following part demonstrates that great differences are existed comparing with MBO between our company and U.S.A.; finally, the author have discussed serious problems in existence after MBO in our listed company .In Chapter 4, in view of the main problem that are existed after MBO in our listed company , several suggestion have been proposed . Should correct motive of MBO at first; Second, corresponding law, regulation and system should be made and perfected; Third , to introduce the market-oriented pricing mechanism; Fourth, private fund is regarded as one of the mains way to solve the financing problem of Chinese MBO ; In the end, the author analyzes the financial risk thatwill be able to produce after MBO.更多还原