【作者】 曾庆磊；

【导师】 刘景园；

【作者基本信息】 北京工业大学 ， 结构工程， 2004， 硕士

【摘要】 摘 要博弈论已经成为现代微观经济学中的核心理论和主要的研究方法，是目前经济学研究的前沿方向，对博弈论的研究已经经历了快速发展的阶段，其理论也在不断深入和完善，但是在建筑工程领域中，还没有得到广泛的应用。本文根据建筑行业的特点，将博弈论的思想引入到建筑行业，运用博弈论的思想和方法解释和分析目前建筑行业中出现的一些现象。在整个建筑工程实施过程中，参与者比较多，本文重点选择了利益关系最为密切，在建筑工程实施过程中最重要的两个参与者——建设单位和施工单位之间可能出现的不同的博弈过程，进行了分析和研究，用博弈模型模拟了现实中建筑工程不同的实施过程情况，以及建设单位同施工单位不同的关系，对可能出现的一些问题，如工程款问题、履行合同问题等，从理论上提出一些解决方法和思路。本文根据不同的假设条件、不同的信息结构、不同的行动顺序，运用三种博弈模型，即完全信息静态博弈、以完全信息动态博弈为阶段博弈的重复博弈、以不完全信息动态博弈为阶段博弈的重复博弈，对建设单位同施工单位之间的关系进行了博弈研究。论文中分析，一次博弈情况下，如果在建设单位和施工单位之间没有约束性的协议，双方会进入“囚徒困境”，对双方都不是理想的结果。为了防止双方进入低效率的“囚徒困境”，就必须加强双方的合作，加强建设行政主管部门的强制管理，或是改变建设单位和施工单位在博弈过程中的支付结构，使双方进入“强制合作”。如果双方进行重复博弈，存在完全信息和不完全信息两种状况。在这两种状况中，由于信息结构不同，博弈均衡和博弈结果也不同。在完全信息的无限次重复博弈中，博弈双方也可以进入“合作”，能够使博弈双方走入“囚徒困境”。在不完全信息的无限次重复博弈中，信息成为掌握主动权的关键，施工单位可以借助信息上的优势，在博弈中得到更多的利益。通过对建设单位和施工单位之间的博弈分析，能够为建筑工程参与者提供合 I<WP=5>北京工业大学工学硕士学位论文理的思路和方法来实现建筑工程的顺利进行，为建设单位和施工单位选择经营策略和建设行政主管部门制定政策和法规提供分析方法和参考依据，从而实现各方的有效合作。更多还原

【Abstract】 Game Theory has already become the central theory and primaryresearch method of modern microeconomics. It has also been in theforefront of research in economics. Research into Game Theory hasexperienced a rapid stage development, and its theory has been continuallyevaluated and perfected. But it has not been widely used in the engineeringfield. In accordance with the characteristic of the construction industry，this thesis uses Game Theory’s ideas and methods to explain some currentphenomena in the construction industry. During the execution of a building’s engineering，there are manyparticipats. This thesis analyses and studies the games that might beplayed between the project owner and the construction enterprise, andsimulates different architectural engineering execution conditions anddifferent relationships between the project owner and the constructionenterprise. At the same time, this thesis comes up with some theoreficalmethods and ideas to solve existent problems. According to differentpostulated conditions、different information structures and differentof the orders action, this thesis studies the games between the projectowner and the construction enterprise under three conditions, these are:static games with complete information, repeated games with completeinformation, and repeated games with incomplete information. As a result of analyzing this thesis，if there is no restrictiveagreement between project owner and construction enterprise, they wouldenter into a " prisoners’ dilemma" in a single game. This result is notgood for either side. In order to avoid entering into the "prisoner’sdilemma”, players must strengthen their co-operation and thegovernment’s management of the construction industry, or change thepayoff in games to cause players to enter into forced cooperation. If both III<WP=7>北京工业大学工学硕士学位论文players are in repeated games, there are two conditions: completeinformation and incomplete information. Because these two status differin information structure ， outcomes and payoffs are different. Ininfinitely repeated games of complete information, both players of gamescan also enter into cooperation and get out of the "prisoner’s dilemma”.In infinitely repeated games of incomplete information, informationbecomes the key to controlling initiative. Construction enterprises couldobtain more benefit depending on the dominance of information. Through the analysis of games between the project owner and theconstruction enterprise, this thesis supplies a rational concept andmethod to accelerate successful construction engineering, and providesan analysis method and the reference frame for the project owner and theconstruction enterprise to select their business strategies and forgovernment to institute policies and laws. The result of this strdy isthat players are able to cooperate effectively.更多还原