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基于经营者人力资本价值的动态激励机制研究

Research on the Dynamic Incentive Mechanism on the Base of the Manager’s Human Capital Value in Firm

【作者】 李红梅

【导师】 刘兵;

【作者基本信息】 河北工业大学 , 技术经济及管理, 2004, 硕士

【摘要】 建立并完善企业经营者激励机制,对促进我国企业进一步改革与发展十分必要和紧迫。准确的测度经营者人力资本,并基于此建立经营者长期动态激励机制,能有效的解决经营者行为短期化问题。 本文在借鉴国外理论和实践经验的基础上,结合我国现阶段具体国情,研究了企业经营者动态激励问题。分析了经营者人力资本特性,并从三个方面即显质评价、潜质评价、情景模拟测试选取指标,建立了经营者人力资本价值评价指标体系,并对评价方法进行了描述;探讨了经营者的人性特点,提出了针对经营者阶层的新的人性假设,即“经济人——自我实现人”假设,在报酬契约设计中引入经营者人力资本价值信息与产出信息,拓展了标准的委托——代理模型,得出了一些有益的结论,并进一步分析了精神性激励与经营者自我实现的关系;由于现实中所有者和经营者的博弈往往是多阶段,且经营者担负着多项任务,因此,本文引入相对业绩比较信息和相对人力资本价值比较信息,将静态的单任务委托——代理模型拓展到动态多任务的情况,考虑了经营者生产性努力和自身人力资本投资努力这两种努力成本之间的相互作用,研究了企业所有者对经营者这两种努力的激励问题,得出了一些有益的结论;对比美国经营者报酬结构分析现阶段我国经营者报酬结构存在的问题,提出了我国企业经营者报酬结构改革的对策建议。最后,在总结全文创新成果的基础上,提出了有待进一步探讨的几个问题。

【Abstract】 Foundation and perfection of mechanism of incentive for managers in firms is very necessary and urgent to promote our firm reforming and development further. Measuring the manager’s human capital value accurately and on the foundation of it building the manager’s long-term dynamic incentive mechanism can solve short-term questions on managers’ behavior.Combining our country’s concrete conditions on the basis of using the foreign theory and practical experience for reference, this paper researches the problem of dynamic incentive for managers in firm. First, it analyses the human capital characteristics of managers, and establishes the assessment invest system for the managers’ human capital value, selecting indexes from three aspects, i.e. .It describes the ways of assessment; it probes into managers’ human nature characteristics and proposes a new human nature hypothesis for managers, i.e. " economy human -self-realization human" hypothesis. Introducing the information of human capital value of managers and output in reward contract designing, it expands the normal principle-agent model and comes to some useful conclusions. It analyses the relation of spirituality incentive and self-fulfillment; because in realism the game of owners and managers is multi-phases and managers take on many tasks, introducing comparative performance information and comparative human capital value information, it expands static single-task principle-agent model to dynamic multi-tasks model. Considering the interaction between managers’ cost of producing effort and human capital investment effort, it researches the incentive problems of owners in firm to two kinds of efforts of managers. It comes to some useful conclusions. Comparing reward structure of American managers, it analyses the reward structure problem of managers in our country, and puts forwards the countermeasure and suggestion on reward structure reform to our country’s managers. Finally, on the base of summing up innovation production of the whole paper, it proposes several problems that await to further be explored.

  • 【分类号】F272
  • 【被引频次】2
  • 【下载频次】187
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