【作者】 刘瑾；

【导师】 丁伟；

【作者基本信息】 华东政法学院 ， 法律， 2003， 硕士

【摘要】 给予发展中国家一定的优惠待遇,其历史可以追溯到 GATT 建立之初。东京回合以后,发展中国家的差别和优惠待遇逐渐作为一种制度予以确立。乌拉圭回合中,发展中国家特殊和差别待遇(以下简称 “差别待遇”)在形式上演化为一个庞杂的体系,相关内容反映在乌拉圭回合最后法律文件的各个协定之中。但是,乌拉圭回合延续了东京回合的发展趋势,“差别待遇”在形式上从一种便利市场准入、维护国际收支平衡的特殊权力演化为以给与发展中国家过渡期和提供技术援助为主要形式的规则体系;在实质上则从一种提供贸易发展机会的机制演变为促使发展中国家加入多边贸易体制并履行义务的手段。乌拉圭回合之后,“差别待遇”由于其功能的变化实际上具有了过渡性和一种象征性。而且,不管是最初的第 18 条还是乌拉圭回合中的“差别待遇”,相关条款的含糊性和所具有的最大努力性始终未能改变。发展中国家和发达国家之间发展的不平衡和“差别待遇”制度与 GATT/WTO 契约性本质之间的冲突,决定了“差别待遇”有名无实的特质。其形式与实质的矛盾反映了发展中国家与发达国家之间的斗争与妥协。中国复关/入世过程中,一些西方发达国家不断制造障碍、抬高门槛,试图通过否认我国发展中国家身份剥夺中国享受差别待遇的权利。为争取应有待遇,维护权利与义务的平衡,我国进行了不懈的努力。然而,由于多方面的原因,我国虽然<WP=4>基本维护了以发展中国家身份加入多边贸易体制的初衷却被迫做出了一些妥协,致使中国在适用“条款”时存在一些法律上的障碍。这些法律障碍主要存在于农业、纺织品等领域,涉及到反倾销、反补贴及保障措施等规则的运用。但是,“差别待遇”本身存在的严重缺陷,部分抵消了我国所作让步带来的不利因素,如果对规则运用得当可以进一步减小其负面影响。本文分为上、中、下三篇。上篇阐述了多边贸易体制下发展中国家特殊和差别待遇的产生、演进及发展趋势;中篇是对 WTO 体制下相关“条款”的解读、评价;下篇阐述了中国加入多边贸易体制的过程中在享受“差别待遇”方面受到的阻碍及为争取应有待遇所作的不懈努力,并探讨了面对这些法律障碍中国应采取的对策。乌拉圭回合中,发展中国家被分为两类:发展中国家和最不发达国家。由于最不发达国家总体上对自由化进程影响很小,一些差别待遇条款免除了其全部实质义务。在篇幅有限的情况下,文章省略了对只适用于最不发达国家的相关条款的讨论。在提到发展中国家时一般不包括最不发达国家。更多还原

【Abstract】 The history of giving some special treatments to the developing country canretrospect to the early age of the GATT. After the Tokyo Round, giving the special andpreferential treatment to developing country set up as a principle. During the UruguayRound, the Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Country Members (S&D)evolved to a complicated system and embodied in the provisions of nearly everyagreements of the Final Act. But during the Uruguay Round, the S&D continued thetrend of the Tokyo Round and developed from a special right which had focused on theprotection of preferential market access and the balance of payment to a systemcharacterized by a wide range of delays, technical assistances, exemptions of certaincommitments etc; while in nature, it evolved from an engine of offering the opportunitiesof trade development to an instrument of involving more developing countries into themultilateral trade regime and fulfill their commitments. All in all, after the UruguayRound, the S&D has a characteristic of transitionalism and symbolism due to its changedfunction. Besides, from the first preferential provision Article 18 to the S&D, theprovisions’ ambiguity and character of best effort has never changed. The imbalances between the developing countries and the developed countries and theconflict of the S&D and the contract nature of the GATT/WTO determined the<WP=6>provisions’ titular in name but not in reality. Although in appearance it evolved into acomplicated system, its symbolic nature is obvious. The inconsistence of the appearanceand the nature reflects the differences and compromises of views of South and North. In the process of China’s entering into the GATT/WTO, many western developedcountries tried to place obstacles in the road in order to lift up the threshold of theentrance so as to deprive China of the right of using the S&D though denying her ofdeveloping country statue. Although China fundamentally realized her intention ofentering into the GATT/WTO as a developing country, she had to concede in certainconditions for several reasons. Consequently China cannot avoid some obstacles whenusing the provisions of the S&D in the fields of Agriculture, Textiles and clothing,safeguards and Anti-dumping etc. Since the deficiencies of the S&D partly offset thenegative aspects of the concession, the bad influence of the consequence can be furtherdiminished provide that China use the rules properly. The paper is divided into three chapters: the first chapter discusses the history of theS&D; the second explains and evaluates the provisions of the S&D; the third relates theobstacles which were placed before China when she insisted her developing countrystatue during the processes of entering into the GATT/WTO and the effort China exertedto safeguard her right. The paper also attempted to give some advice on counter-measurerefer to the obstacles. The developing countries in the Uruguay Round are divided into two categories, that isthe developing countries and the least developed countries (LDCs). Since the latter havea little influence on the liberalizations, the S&D exempts some substantial commitmentsof them. So the paper omits the discussion of the provisions, which only apply to theLDCs. So the developing countries in the paper only refer to those who are not the LDCs.更多还原