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经理股票期权:美国的经验和中国的实践
【作者】 吴锋;
【导师】 傅红春;
【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 , 西方经济学, 2003, 硕士
【摘要】 现代企业制度要解决的主要问题之一就是激励问题,即在制度上协调员工、经营者、所有者之间的目标不一致和利益冲突,并最终解决企业发展的根本动力。而激励问题的核心是对公司经理的激励,因为经理人员的稀缺性、创新性等特点,使得现代企业中的经理作用越来越重要。 经营者的激励问题,历来是企业改革的重点与难点。我国目前的经理人薪酬结构相对单一,大部分公司实行的是以工资、奖金为主体的传统薪酬制度,这种薪酬制度不仅缺乏激励功能,而且还可能诱导经理人员行为短期化。为了重塑经理人长期激励机制,从根本上改变经理人不思进取的心态,提高企业的综合素质,在目前的年薪收入激励机制效果不明显而又难以在短期内根本改变的情况下,有必要引入经理人股票期权制度。 诞生于美国的经理人股票期权计划作为一种长期激励制度,在过去的20多年里对美国的经济产生了巨大的激励效果。经理人股票期权(ESO)是指公司授予经理人一种权利,允许他们在约定的期限内按某一预定价格购买本公司股票。在购买股票以前,股票期权不会给经理人带来任何的现金收益。在执行期权后,经理人的股票期权收益就体现为行权价格与行权日市价之间的差额。通过实施经理人股票期权制度,能将企业的长期利益与经理人的个人利益结合起来,促使经营者更加关注企业的长远发展,从而可以妥善地解决经营者激励不足的难题,有效防止经理人短期行为的出现。本文首先从经济学角度的分析入手,为我国经理股票期权的实施提供理论上坚实的基础;其次由于经理股票期权的设计是一个精巧、复杂的过程,必须在结合企业实际情况的基础上,借鉴现有的理论和经验(尤其是美国)进一步完善我国的经理股票期权的引进实施。 全文分为四章,主要内容如下: <WP=4> 第一章主要是对经理股票期权的概念、特点以及其激励原理进行了介绍。经理股票期权最大的作用是按照企业发展成果对经营者进行激励,具有长期性,使经营者的个人利益与企业的长期发展更紧密地结合在一起,促使经营者的经营行为长期化。这种手段的核心在于:通过将经理改造成为公司资产的所有者即股东,使经理的利益与公司股票价格进而使公司的利润和股东价值挂钩,在经理努力追求自身价值最大化的同时,也可以确保企业价值以及其他股东价值的最大化。经理股票期权具有三个特点:权利与非义务、预期收益、收益和风险并存,这样的特点使得经理股票期权能够运用到企业的长期激励中去。经理股票期权的作用机理是:经理人员的个人能力和努力程度等主观因素决定了他对公司的贡献;贡献影响了公司的长期业绩;公司的长期业绩通过资本市场上的股票价格反映出来;股价的涨落决定了经理人员报酬的高低。努力程度、业绩、股价、报酬四者之间的相关程度越高,激励机制的效果越好,股票期权制度通过一整套精巧的环节来实现制度设计的目的。第二章是本文的理论依据,也是实行经理股票期权激励的经济学基础。任何一种制度的引进,都需要有理论的支撑和实践的支持。在这里,笔者结合委托-代理理论、团队生产理论、契约理论以及人力资本理论,详细地分析了经理股票期权是如何实现上述理论的思想的。现代企业理论的发展促进了企业激励机制的制度化,研究发现,企业不是一个完备契约的有机组合。一方面,由于企业最终产出品是不可分的,每个成员的个人贡献不可能精确地进行分解和观测,因此,不可能按照每个人的真实贡献去支付报酬。这样就导致了“团队生产”方式中“搭便车”偷懒问题。另一方面,由于所有权和经营权的分离,现代企业内部广泛存在着委托-代理关系。由于交易成本的存在、合约的不完全性、信息不充分以及股东和经营者的利益并不完全一致,所有者和经营者之间存在着信息不对称的问题,因此存在着各种逆向选择和道德风险,产生代理人损害委托人利益的问题。经过几十年的<WP=5>理论创新和实践探索表明:剩余控制权与剩余索取权对等是最佳的企业治理机制,能达到最优的激励绩效。经理股票期权可以实现剩余控制权和剩余索取权的统一,解决上述企业激励不足的问题。第三章对美国的经理股票期权实施情况进行了详细的介绍。1952年,美国税率攀升到92%,企业主管们的现金薪金被税收“吃掉”大部分。当时,著名的辉瑞(PFIZER)制药公司也发现,在高额的累进所得税制度下,它的高级管理人员将不得不拿出薪金的一大部分来支付个人所得税。出于避税的目的,辉瑞公司决定以股票期权的方式来支付公司所有雇员的薪酬,使其可以自主选择在未来某个较为有利的时期内兑现其应得的收益,以降低收入中应纳税部分。这是世界上第一次将股票期权引入到企业高层主管人员的薪酬中去。上世纪90年代以来,经理股票期权在美国出现了超常规的发展,90%以上的公司引入了经理股票期权制度来对经理人员进行激励。同时美国的经理股票期权制度也是不断的发展变化之中的,本章首先介绍了美国股票期权发展的历史演进,并对演进进行了总结,分析了经理股票期权制度所应当具备的一些环境条件;然后详细的介绍了美国经理股票期权的管理与运用;最后对美国股票期权实施过程中所产生的问题进行了
【Abstract】 One of the key problems that modern enterprises want to resolve is the incentive problem,namely, harmonize the benefits conflicting and the target inconformity between the employee,the executive and the owner, and finally solve the basic motive force of enterprise’s development.But the core of the problem is to encourage the manager, because the manager’s rareness and innovative characteristics make the manager’s function more and more important.The executive incentive problem has always been the focal and difficult point of the enterprise reform. Most companies implement traditional salary systems which mainly use wages and bonus.This kind of salary system not only lacks encouragement function but also may lead executive’s short-term behavior.In order to reshape the manager’s long-term incentive system, it is necessary to introduce the executive stock option system in present condition.As a long-term incentive system,the ESO has produced enormous encouragement to the economy of U.S.A. over the past 20 years.The executive stock option(ESO) means that the company awards a kind of right to a manager, allows him to buy the company’s stock according to a certain pre-arranged price within appointed time.Before buying stocks, the ESO will not bring any cash income to the manager.After carrying out the ESO, the ESO income of the manager reflect the margin between the pre-arranged price and the market price of the stock in the day when the manager carrys out the ESO.The ESO can combine the enterprise’s long-term benefits with the manager’s individual benefits.It can impel the manager to pay more attention to the long-term development of enterprises.This thesis proceeds with analysis of the economics angle at first, <WP=8>offering the solid foundation in the theory for the implementation of ESO.Secondly because the design of ESO is an exquisite, complicated course, it must be on the basis of the existing theory and experience (especially in the U.S.A. ). The whole thesis is divided into four chapters:Chapter One, it mainly introduces the concept,characteristics and incentive principle of the ESO.ESO’s most function is to encourage the manager according to the enterprise development achievement. The core of this kind of means lies in:through transforming the manager into company’s shareholders, combine the manager’s banefits with the campany’s stock price,and then make campany’s profit and shareholder’s value become consistent. The ESO has three characteristics:Right with not duty, prospective earnings, income and risk co-existence, such characteristics makes the ESO apply to the long-term incentive of enterprises. The function mechanism of ESO is:the subjective factors of The manager such as the individual ability and diligent degree,etc. has determined his contribution to the company;It influences the long-term achievement of the company;The long-term achievement of the company is reflected through the stock price on the capital market; The fluctuations of the stock price have determined the level of executive’s income. The higher the relevant degree among diligent degree, accomplishment, stock price, and remunerate,the better the result of the encouraging mechanism, ESO’s purpose is to realize system design through a whole set of exquisite links. Chapter two is a theoretical foundation of this thesis, it is also a economics foundation of implementation of ESO. Here, the writer combines the principal-agent theory, team theory, contract theory and human capital theory, analyzes in detail how these theories are shown in the ESO. <WP=9>The development in modern enterprise theories has promoted enterprise’s incentive mechanism.The research discovers that the enterprise is not a complete contractual combination.On the one hand, because of the impartible of the output, each member’s individual contribution is impossible to be decomposed or observed, therefore, it is impossible to pay the remuneration according to everybody’s true contribution.On the other hand, because of the separation of the operation
【Key words】 Executive Stock Option (ESO); incentive; Human capital; Principal-Agent;
- 【网络出版投稿人】 西南财经大学 【网络出版年期】2004年 04期
- 【分类号】F271
- 【被引频次】4
- 【下载频次】381