【作者】 许继芳；

【导师】 钱振明；

【作者基本信息】 苏州大学 ， 行政管理， 2003， 硕士

【摘要】 本文主要探讨了地方利益对地方执行中央政策的影响及对策问题。文章选取苏州市政府执行中央制定的义务教育政策为典型个案，以西方学者史密斯关于政策执行的“过程模式”和公共选择理论为分析工具，通过对苏州市的常住人口子女与流动人口子女接受义务教育的现状进行对比分析，国家的义务教育政策在上述不同的群体的实施上存在着极大的偏差。在我们看来，导致这种政策执行偏差的最主要的因素是地方利益。地方政府出于自身利益的考虑在执行中央政策时产生了价值选择的差异，造成了地方政府有时歪曲执行中央政策，要保证中央政策在地方有效执行，中央政府必须具有与地方政府进行博弈的意识，同时加强中央政府的政治权威，健全中央政府对地方政府的行政监督机制，理顺政策执行体制，以增强地方政策执行的“造血”功能，建立政策执行的创新机制，健全财政转移支付制度。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper mainly probed into the influence of local-government interest on implementation of Central-Government Policy and its responsive strategy. The author chose Suzhou government’s implementing National Compulsory Educational Policy, formulated by central-government, as a typical case, by the analysis approach of Wester Scholar, Smith’s "Course Model" of policy implementation and "Public Choice Theory", by comparative analysis of existing situation in which the offsprings of Suzhou’s residents and the descendants of migrate population receive education differently, and drew a conclusion that a great difference exists hi implementing National Compulsory Educational Policy between the two groups of people.In our eyes, the primary cause for improper policy implementation amounts to local-government interest. Out of interest, local government, at times, distorts the Central-Government Policy, in turn, value-choice difference will appear. The central-government should have a good sense of game theory, meanwhile, strengthen its political authority, perfect its administrative supervisory mechanism to local-government, regulate policy implementation system to ensure that the Central-Government Policy be implemented efficiently, to enhance the function on hematopoiecis of local government, to establish the innovation mechanism of policy implementation, to sound the system of financial transfer payment.更多还原