【作者】 王平；

【导师】 李宗诚；

【作者基本信息】 苏州大学 ， 农业经济管理， 2003， 硕士

【摘要】 本文运用新制度经济学的分析框架与理论研究了中国农村合作金融制度的变迁，特别是农村信用社的发展历史与现状，指出信用社已经陷入异化和低效率的锁定状态，并揭示了其根本原因：行政干预。内部人控制是锁定状态的直接原因，中国传统文化的非正式制度制约是其深层次原因。这三者相互强化，产生了极强的路径依赖效应。为了打破这个恶性循环，文章提出农村合作金融要摆脱政府主导的管理体制，建立健全的法人治理结构；面临加入WTO带来的挑战，农村合作金融的最终方向是民营化、商业化。现有的基础较好的信用社可改造成农村商业银行。民间合作金融要进一步规范，加强监管。同时，鉴于中国各地经济发展的不平衡性，改革模式不能一刀切，要建立多元化、多层次的农村金融体系。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper adopts theories and frameworks of New Institutional Economics to analyze the institutional vicissitudes of Chinese Rural Cooperative Finance (CRCF), including its historical happenings, development as well as recent reforms, from which we come to a conclusion that CRCF has been locked in an inefficient state and deviated from the normal track. The root of the problems is identified as government interference. The moral hazard and adverse selection of Rural Credit Cooperatives’ managers and informal constraints of Chinese culture interact with government interference so that they build up a vicious circle and finally get self-reinforced. To break it, essentially, government has to exit from the operation management of CRCF. A sound structure of corporate governance has to be established. Last but not least, non-state-owned financial institutions such as Rural Commercial Banks should be encouraged. However, due to the unbalanced development of rural economies, nowadays other financial institutions such as cooperative finance and policy finance should co-exist with commercial banks. Those existent informal finance in rural areas should be further regulated and finally channeled into formal institutions. Thus, a multi-actor, multi-level financial system comes into being in rural China so as to support economic development in that area better.更多还原