【作者】 熊风华；

【导师】 苏素；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 技术经济及管理， 2003， 硕士

【摘要】 知识经济时代，高新技术产业已成为经济发展的核心和第一支柱，高新技术产业的发展决定着经济的发展。作为高新技术企业发展推进器的风险投资更受到世人的青睐。充分调动风险投资家与创业家的积极性，发挥他们的潜力是风险投资成功的关键，这就需要一个合理的治理结构。论文在分析风险投资基本要素及其运作机制的基础上，采用博弈论和委托代理理论的方法对风险投资的融资阶段与投资阶段的治理结构进行了深入的分析研究。风险投资融资阶段，风险资金的来源决定了风险投资机构的组织形式，并进一步影响到风险基金的运作。论文对风险投资机构的两种主要的组织形式——公司制和有限合伙制进行了对比研究，深入分析了有限合伙制的主要制度安排，指出有限合伙制的报酬体系、风险投资家承担无限责任、基金的有限生命周期等机制的设计，有效的筛选了风险投资家并降低了代理成本。风险投资投资阶段，通过对投资中投资工具的选择、分阶段投资与基于业绩的价值重估以及风险企业控制权的分配等制度安排的研究，指出：一、投资工具的选择是风险投资契约的核心，在很大程度决定了风险投资家与创业家之间的委托代理关系。风险投资投资工具中，可转换优先股投资结合了普通股投资与债权投资的优点，较好的实现了收益分配与风险的匹配；二、分阶段投资与基于业绩的价值重估是在一定条件下风险投资家与创业家之间的理性选择的结果，它不仅有效的激励了业绩良好的创业家、惩罚了业绩不佳的创业家，还排除了质量低下的项目；三、风险企业的控制权对于创业家是有价值的，由于企业发展的不确定性，风险投资家一般要求与其股权不成比例的控制权，不确定性越大，信息不对称程度越高，风险投资家要求更多的控制权。而创业家则通过更好的融资，从不对称信息获取更多的好处以及承担更少的风险来弥补失去的更多的控制权。论文还对风险投资的治理结构进行了实证分析，并对金蝶与海扶两个不同背景公司的融资过程与相应的制度安排进行了案例研究，有力的支持了论文的主要结论。更多还原

【Abstract】 In the era of knowledge-driven economy, high-tech industry has become the most significicant to economy, and the development of high-tech industry is determining the development of economy. Venture capital which is the propeller to the new high-tech enterprise is favored by people. A critical factor of successful venture capital is fully utilizing the ability and intelligence of venture capitalist and that of entrepreneur, Then a rational contract is essential.Based on analysing the element and the operation mechanism of venture capital, the paper deeply analyses the principal-agent problem in financing stage and investment stage of venture capital in game theory. At financing stage of venture capital, the source of venture capital determines the organization of the venture capital institution, then influences the operation of the venture capital fund. The paper compares the company and the limited partnership which is the main forms of the venture capital institution, and analyses the limited partnership deeply on main arrangement. It points out that mechanisms in limited partnership screens risk investor effectively and reduces the agent’s cost, such as the pay for venture capitalist, limited life cycle of fund, venture capitalist bearing unlimited liability, etc.At investment Stage of venture capital, through analysing the arrangement such as the choice of investment tool, staging of investment and estimating Enterprises’ value again based on Enterprise’s achievement, control distribution etc. First, choice of investment tool is the core of agreement, and determines the principal-agent relationship between venture capitalist and entrepreneur to a great extent. Convertible preference stocks combines common stock’s merit with that of credit and matches the income and the risk well.Second, staging of investment and estimating Enterprises’ value again based on Enterprise’s achievement is a bilateral choice under certain conditions. It not only punishes entrepreneur as the failure of venture ,encourages entrepreneur with the good achievement, also gets rid of the venture with low quality.Third, entrepreneur derives benefits from control over the firm. Because of uncertainty of enterprise, venture capitalist demands disproportionately higher control<WP=6>rights than the size of his equity investment. And the greater uncertainty, the higher the information asymmetry degree, venture capitalist demands higher control .The entrepreneur is compensated for a greater loss of control through better terms of financing, ability to extract higher rents from asymmetric information, and improved risk sharing.The thesis has also analyses the real example to the administration structure of venture capital, and analyses Kingdee and Haiku, two typical venture capital backed with different background, about the process they gained venture capital and according institutional arrangements. The finding strongly supports the main conclusion of this thesis.更多还原