【作者】 易申波；

【导师】 邓生庆；

【作者基本信息】 四川大学 ， 行政管理， 2003， 硕士

【摘要】 随着我国改革开放的深化，社会主义现代化建设取得巨大成就，但许多重大的社会问题也进一步凸现，其中腐败问题乃是其中最严重的问题之一。尤其是最近几年，腐败似乎有越演越烈的趋势。腐败给国家和社会带来严重的危害。 本文第一章首先从腐败的界定入手，分析腐败的经济、社会和政治后果。然后，探讨了产生腐败的直接原因和间接原因。文章认为，社会资源的稀缺性与公共权力的客观存在为腐败提供了客观条件，是腐败产生的间接原因；另一方面，各方面的制度缺陷滋生腐败，是腐败产生和泛滥的直接原因。后者主要表现在：第一，公共权力过于宽泛且集中，政府对经济活动干预过度；第二，分配制度缺陷刺激腐败的发生；第三，不完善的监督机制不能有效抑制腐败的发生。文章的主体部分，即第二、三、四章分别针对以上三方面的原因论述相应的制度反腐措施。 第二章从分析政府与市场的关系入手，论述制度反腐的基本措施之一：建构适度政府，压缩腐败空间。第一节分析认为，政府与市场作为资源配置方式均有其自身的缺点，主要表现在政府失灵和市场失灵，二者的共同根源在于个体理性与集体理性的矛盾。处理政府与市场的关系应该以用足市场、慎求政府为原则。政府的活动范围不应超出市场失灵的范围。第二节在上一节的基础上分析适度政府的内涵、职能和评价体系。最后，本章较为简单地分析了建构适度政府的一个关键问题：行政审批制度改革。 第三章论述制度反腐的基本措施之二：改革公务员薪酬制度，降低腐败动机。本章首先通过对高薪养廉的利弊分析，提出目前高薪养廉暂时不适宜中国国情，但另一方面，政府公务员的合法收入偏低也是一个不争的事实。因此，文章认为，在公务员薪酬制度方面应该以“以薪养廉、以傣养能”为原则。此外，因为在目前的理论和实践中人们大多只着眼于公务员的在职收入，而未考虑其退休以后的收入问题。本章提出一种设想，即通过对廉洁的公务员实行退休奖励，以一种较高的预期收入引导公务员的行为，提高政府官员从事腐败的机会成本，从而降低其腐败动机。这可称为公务员廉洁退休奖励制度，该制度的创立，可参照新加坡实施的中央公积金制度。 第四章论述制度反腐的基本措施之三，即完善监督机制，建构责任政府。本章从监督机制划分为体制内和体制外两大类分别进行分析，分析指出各监督机制的问题。责任政府作为现代民主政治的一种基本理念和一种对政府公共行政进行民主控制的制度安排，应该是我们今后的努力方向。因此，本文最后分析了责任政府的内涵、责任体系、评价和制度安排。更多还原

【Abstract】 At the same time when China’s socialistic modernization construction is making great achievements, many problems also come into appearance with the?deepening of the reform and opening. Among the problems, corruption is one of the most serious ones. Especially, in the recent years, corruption seems to become more and more serious. Corruption brings great harm to the country and the society.Starting with the definition of corruption, the first chapter analyzes the economic, social and political hazards caused by corruption, and then discusses the direct and indirect causes of corruption. The article thinks that, the scarcity of social resources and the existence of public right provide corruption with the basic conditions, and these are the indirect causes of corruption; in the other hand, as the direct causes, institutional defects help the generation and overflow of corruption. The latter is mainly embodied in the following aspects: firstly, the public right is too wide and concentrated, and the government steps in economic activities too much; secondly, the defects of distribution system stimulate the occurrence of corruption; thirdly, the imperfect supervision system can’t effectively prevent corruption from taking place. Therefore, Chapters 2, 3 and 4, respectively raise the corresponding countermeasures against the three causes.Chapter 2 firstly probes into the relation between government and market, and based on this basic theoretical analysis puts forward the corresponding institutional arrangement: building a moderate government to compress the space of corruption.The first section writes that, as two main resource allocation mechanisms, government and market both have their own shortcomings, namely government failure and market failure. Further analysis shows that the common cause of government failure and market failure lies in the contradiction between individual rationality and collective rationality. So we shall hold the principle of "taking full advantage of the market and carefully turning to the government" to handle the relation between the two. And the range of government’s activities shall not exceed the range of market failure. Based on section 1, the second section looks into the meaning, functions and assessment system of a moderate government. Finally, the third section simply analyzes one of the critical aspects for building a moderate government, that is, reform of administrative examination and approval system.Aiming at the second institutional cause of corruption as analyzed in Chapter 1, the third chapter brings forward another basic countermeasure: reforming public servant’s salary and reward system to reduce their motivations for corruption. This chapter firstly discusses the advantages and disadvantages of "keeping clean by high salary", and points out that currently this system is not suitable for China. But on the other hand, it is an undoubted fact that the public servants’ legal incomes in the government are relatively low. Therefore, the author thinks that in this aspect, the principle of "keeping clean by proper salary and attracting talents by good pay" shall be insisted. Additionally, currently most the people only pay attention to the on-job incomes of public servants. So this article raises a new assumption that is to reward the honest and clean servants upon retirement, so as to lead their behaviors by using relatively high expected income, increase the opportunity costs of corruption, and reduce the officers’ motivations for corruption. This may be called Retirement Reward for Honest and Clean Public Servants. To build this system, we can refer to Singapore’s Central Public Accumulation System.As the last chapter of this article, Chapter 4 is mainly focused on another countermeasure, namely improving supervision mechanism and building a responsible government. This chapter divides supervision patterns into two classes:in-system ones and out-system ones, and respectively points out their problems. As a basic idea of modern democratic politics an更多还原