中国企业并购的经济学分析

【作者】 朱国祥；

【导师】 郭德；

【作者基本信息】 西北工业大学 ， 西方经济学， 2003， 硕士

【摘要】 本文研究的是中国企业并购的经济学分析。通过对中国企业并购的研究，运用古典经济学、制度经济学、法律经济学、产业组织经济学等的一些工具和方法，以规范研究与实证研究相结合，初步搭建了经济学分析我国企业并购的总体框架。 本文首先提出了本文有关企业并购的含义；采用当今经济学界普遍认同的横向并购、纵向并购、混合并购的划分为基础进行划分；对古典学派的规模经济理论、制度学派的交易费用理论以及对混合并购的一些理论进行评述。 对中国企业并购的动因的分析。首先分析了我国企业并购现阶段的特点。对企业并购的动因进行效率分析，运用古典经济学的分析工具，三种不同的并购类型进行效率分析，本文认为增进效率的并购应该得到鼓励的；提出了中国企业并购的动因；并提出了我国企业并购的阶段划分理论假设，认为我国企业并购分为四个阶段，我国正处于企业并购的第二阶段。 在对有关企业并购的观点进行总结和评述上，讨论企业是否存在并购的终极边界；建立了一个简单的基于社会平均效率的企业并购边界模型，运用成本——收益模型对这一模型进行阐述提出了企业并购的条件；通过实证分析，得出我国的企业规模和效率成正相关关系；认为我国企业并购的边界是动态的边界，而无真正意义上的长期边界。 基于并购可能带来的垄断，才是政府介入并购的理由。在并购与垄断的分析中，从全局的高度出发，提出了垄断并不完全是不利的，垄断也会带来宏观政策目标的实现，就业和经济增长；本文提出了通过政府介入并购对总收益的影响来判断政府是否应该介入企业并购；在企业并购过程中，政府的作用应该主要体现在法律上。 通过对美国历史上并购理论的发展，笔者认为我国政府在规制并购时采用了多种方式并存的方式；认为我国并购立法的核心是反垄断，认为我国政府反垄断职责重点应指向以下方面：反对垄断高价，消除不合理的社会财富分配格局；提出当前政府必需解决的两个问题来规制并购过程中的垄断现象。 从加入世贸组织对我国企业并购的影响入手，认为政府必须对外资并购进行规制；实行非国民待遇；借鉴国外对外资并购的限制，提出了认为适合我国的外资并购的反垄断法的具体规定；对当前企业分拆提出了疑义，认为企业的分拆只是次优的选择，而不是最优的选择。 本文的研究对于企业并购理论和我国企业并购实践有积极理论规范作用和现实意义。更多还原

【Abstract】 This thesis, with the tools and methods borrowing from Classical Economics, Systematic Economics, Law & Economics, etc., is devoted to the economic analysis of Chinese enterprises’ M&A (Merger and Acquisition), tending to advance the theoretical research of M&A and to accelerate the standardization of Chinese enterprises’ practice of M&A.In the very beginning, the paper introduces the definition of M&A, the commonly accepted classification of M&A, which includes horizontal M&A, vertical M&A and mixed M&A. Then follows the critics towards the Scale Economy Theory of Classical Economics, Transaction Cost Theory of Systematic Economics and some mixed M&A theories.For the research into the motivity of Chinese M&A, the paper first put forward the features of contemporary M&A in China. After looking into the efficiency in three different M&A model with tools employing from Classical Economics, the paper encourages the M&A model which enhance efficiency. By examining the motivity of Chinese M&A, this paper also bring forward the supposition marking M&A into four phases.In the summarization and description of related viewpoint about M&A, this thesis presents a question, that is whether there is ultimate in M&A, builds up a simple boundary M&A model with the consideration of social average efficiency, illustrates the conditions of M&A based on cost-income model, concludes the positivecorrelation between enterprise’s scale and efficiency and that the boundary of Chinese M&A is dynamic, but not an actual boundary.The only excuse for government’s interference is that M&A may causes monopoly. For the analysis of M&A and monopoly, in a macro-level, monopoly is not absolutely irrational, because it also does help to bring macro-goal into realization, high employment rate and economy’s development. In this sense, the paper suggests that government’s interference into M&A depends on its influence towards general benefit, income; and the fulfillment of government’s functions should mostly turn to laws.Reviewing the historical development of M&A theories in America, the paper believes standardizing M&A in China may adopt multiple methods and then compare their effects. The core of legislation is anti-monopoly against monopoly unreasonable price, against unbalanced fortune distribution.Chinese entrance of WTO influences our domestic M&A, thus, to limit foreign M&A in China is important, and Non-National Treatment might be sensible. Referring the limitation of foreign M&A in other countries, the paper offers some detailed clauses for Chinese to-be Anti-Monopoly Act. For the popular division in Chinese enterprises, the thesis expresses its skeptical suspicion: this might not be the best way.更多还原