内部人控制问题的产生与治理研究

【作者】 李刚；

【导师】 茆训诚； 郝国喜；

【作者基本信息】 上海师范大学 ， 产业经济学， 2003， 硕士

【摘要】 随着企业的规模扩大和生产社会化程度加深，现代企业均采取了有限责任、股份制和两权分离等制度，这使得人力资本特别是经营者人力资本与非人力资本更加有效地结合起来，极大地促进了社会经济的发展。但随之而来的是，由于企业各要素所有者地位的不对称和目标的不一致，则产生了内部人控制问题。事实上，内部人控制问题是现代企业制度所带来的副产品，存在于任何所有制结构下的现代企业之中，随着我国国有企业改革的进一步深化以及非公有制经济的迅速发展，非公有制企业中的内部人控制问题将逐步突现出来。并且，大股东利用其在企业股份比例上的优势来控制企业的经营方向并在实际运营过程中通过损害中小股东利益来取得收益的情况，实际上同样也是内部人控制问题。本论文研究的是由于现代企业制度中企业的产权分属不同的群体所产生的固有矛盾这一层面上而导致的内部人控制问题。研究的领域不仅限于国有企业，还涉及非公有制企业，研究的对象不仅包括经营者内部控制，还包括大股东内部控制。本论文共分六个部分。首先是绪论部分，介绍了本论文研究的背景、对象、方法，论文的结构框架以及创新之处。第二章是文献概览部分，对与本论文相关的交易费用理论、代理理论、企业目标理论等经典企业理论进行了回顾与分析，同时指出了它们在某些方面上的不足。第三章介绍了现代企业制度的几个重要特征，探讨了产权的定义和内涵、定性与定量，以及企业产权的组成及各产权的归属，分析了企业大股东和经营者成为联合企业家的原因。第四章首先阐述了管理劳动的内容和特点以及财富信号显示机制的缺陷，然后分别系统分析了经营者内部控制问题与大股东内部控制问题的产生原因、基本构成以及所造成的危害，最后论述了“内部人控制”问题是现代企业制度所带来的副产品，其危害要远远小于采用现代企业制度而取得的收益。第五章从企业内部建立有效的激励约束机制和企业外部形成相关的配套机制两个角度提出了解决内部人控制问题的方法及具体措施，并指出了内部人控制问题的防范与治理需要有一个长期而又复杂的历史过程。最后是本论文的结论部分，总结归纳全文，进一步突出本论文的中心论点更多还原

【Abstract】 As the scale of the enterprises expanding and the socialization degree of production deepening, modern enterprises have taken the systems of limited responsibility, joint stock and two rights separating. This combines the human capital especially the operator’s human capital and the inhuman capital more effectively and accelerates the development of the social economics greatly. However, because of the imbalance in the status and the disagreement in the purpose among different factors suppliers, insider control comes into being. In fact, the problem of the insider control is the byproduct of the modern enterprise system, which exits in all the modern enterprises irrespective of the structure of proprietorship. With the further deepening of the reform in the state-own enterprises and the rapid development of the private ownership economics, insider control in private enterprises will protrude progressively. What’s more, it is also insider control that the big shareholder gets gains by damage the small shareholder’s benefit on the base of his large stock portion in the enterprises.This thesis is mainly about the insider control in the view of the enterprise property right owned by different groups in the modern enterprises, concerning both state-own enterprises and private enterprises, and its object concludes both operator inside control and big shareholder inside control.This thesis is divided into six parts. The first is the introduction part, introduces the researching background, object and approach, the structure of the thesis and its creativities. Chapter 2 is the general view of the relative documents, which reviews and analyzes relative classic enterprise theories, and point out some insufficient of them. Chapter 3 introduces the main characters of the modern enterprises, discusses the concept and content of the property right, the composition of the enterprises property rights and their owners, analyses the reason why the big shareholder and the operator become the combined entrepreneur. Chapter 4 firstly explains the contents and characteristics of management labor, the defect of the wealth signal revealing mechanism, then analyses systematically the emerging reason, general composition and damages of both operator inside control and big shareholder inside control, and finally points out that insider control is the byproduct of the modern enterprises system, whose damages is far less than the benefit of the modern enterprises system. Chapter 5 proposes solutions and concrete methods to the insider control problem from the angle of effective encouragement and restriction system in the enterprises and relative coordinate mechanism outside the enterprises, and puts forward that the management and precaution of it is a long and complicated historical process. The last is the conclusion, summarizes the full thesis, and protrudes the main points更多还原