【作者】 吕彦彬；

【导师】 王秀清；

【作者基本信息】 中国农业大学 ， 产业经济学， 2003， 硕士

【摘要】 随着经济发展和产业结构的调整，越来越多的土地从农业用途转变为非农业用途，其中征用农民集体的土地是主要的途径。由于土地征用补偿标准是由政府制定的，不能够反映土地资源的希缺程度，过低的征地补偿费导致国有土地的出让价格和征地补偿之间存在着巨大的利差，有关利益主体对土地收益展开了激烈的追逐，他们从各自的利益出发不仅损害了农民的利益而且也加速了土地的非农化。 在落后地区，农民是一个弱势群体，他们的非农劳动技能较差，尤其落后地区的非农就业机会比较少，他们一旦失去土地就面临着失业的危险。因此能否合理分配土地收益不仅影响土地市场的运转，而且也涉及到一个地区的稳定。 通过自己的实际调查，本论文主要从以下几个方面展开论述。首先，介绍有关征地的政策法规。任何经济行为都是在一定的交易规则下进行的，土地交易行为也不例外，我国的土地市场是一个政府高度垄断的市场，政府要求土地交易要严格按照法律进行，因此这些法律规定就是土地交易的规则。其次，根据自己取得的调查数据，严格测算在土地征用出让过程中的土地收益在有关利益集团之间的分配比例。再次，分析形成客观土地收益分配格局的原因。在这里，笔者将从两个方面来说明问题，一是从有关利益集团在交易过程中的行为趋向方面，另一个是从土地市场高度垄断的角度来说明问题。接下来要探讨是土地收益的合理分配问题。由于我国征地补偿是法律规定的，不能反映土地的希缺程度，所以这里主要讨论征地的合理补偿。最后，在以上分析的基础上，笔者得出以下结论： 1、在征用耕地并出让的整个过程中，农民利益集团得到了土地收益的32％，县级政府利益集团得到土地收益的52％，县级以上政府利益集团得到土地收益的15％；征用非耕地并出让的整个过程中，农民利益集团得到了土地收益的26％，县级政府利益集团得到土地收益的67％，县级以上政府利益集团得到土地收益的7％。 2、制度安排对土地收益的分配有很大影响。 3、法律对农民土地的过分限制，削弱了农民财产受益权。 4、农村土地产权主体不清削弱了农民谈判的能力，从而使得农民获得的土地收益份额偏低。 5、国有土地有偿使用费起不到应有的作用。 提出的建议有： 1、组建国有土地资产管理公司，改变现在政企不分的状况。 2、严格区分盈利性用地和非赢利性用地。 3、变国有土地有偿使用费为企业所得税。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the development of economy and the adjustment of industrial structure, more and more land change from farmland to non-farmland. Among all the ways, it is the primary way to expropriate peasant collective-owned land. Since the standard of compensation is made by the government, it can not reflect the scarcity of land. The compensation for expropriated land is too low, and leads to a big gap between the remise price of state-owned land and the expropriation compensation to the peasant Concerned interest groups pursue the land benefit from their self-interest angles. The behavior of concerned interest groups not only hurts the peasant benefits, but also speeds up the farming land transfer to be non-farming land.In undeveloped areas, the peasant is an inferior group. If they lose their land, they will face unemployed risk because of their poor non-farming skills and the infrequent employment chances. So how to distribute the land benefit not only will influence the operating efficiency of land market, but also the stability of one area. This paper bases on the analysis of the land benefit distribution in She county, explaining how local government deals with the contradiction between the development of economy and the indemnity for living standard of peasant whose land has been expropriated. The paper tries to explain why macro policy of central government can not control the speed of non-farming uses of the farming land. On this foundation, it gives some policy suggestion for improving the market operating efficiency. The text includes six chapters.The first chapter: preface. This part primarily includes study scope of this paper; the research findings domestic and abroad that is related to the land expropriation and the structure of this paper.The second chapter: the policy of land expropriation in She county. This part primarily includes the social background of the land expropriation policy creation, and the detailed content of the land expropriation policy in she county.The third chapter: benefit distribution of land expropriation in She county. This part mainly consists of the land resource status of She county, the character of land market, and benefit distribution of land in the process of land expropriation and land remise.The fourth chapter: the reason for the benefit distribution of land expropriation. In this part, I analyze the reason for the benefit distribution of land expropriation in two ways: The first is the collective behavior of the involved interest groups; the second is the economic reason.The fifth chapter: discussion about the rationality of the land benefit distribution. In this part, I want to explain the reasonable standard of expropriation compensation, unreasonableness of land compensation in She county, and the carry-over problem of land expropriation.The sixth chapter: conclusion and suggestion. Based on the above analysis, I get the main conclusions as followed:1. In the market of farmland expropriation and remise, the peasant interest group get 32% land benefits; the county government interest group get 52% land benefits; the upward county government interest group get 15% land benefits. In the market of non-farmland expropriation and remise, thepeasants group get 26% land benefits; the county government interest group get 67%; the upward county government interest group get 7% land benefits.2. The land system has a great impact on the distribution of land benefit.3. That the collective land is confined excessively by the law weakens the estate benefit right of peasant.4. The main body of the Country land property right is not clear, which weakens the negotiation ability of peasants so that the peasant interest group gets less land benefits.5. The fee of using state-owned land do not have the function it should have.The suggestions I give are as follows:1 .Found state-owned estate managing corporation to change the status without a clear line between the functions of the government and enterprises.2. Distinguish severely pr更多还原