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国企经营者激励机制的探讨

【作者】 肖文兴

【导师】 袁乐平;

【作者基本信息】 中南大学 , 工商管理, 2003, 硕士

【摘要】 在我国传统计划经济体制下,国有企业经营者并没有受到足够的重视,经营者的价值并没有被真正“发现”,经营者的才能并没有得到充分发挥;直到今天,这个问题在国有企业也还远未根本解决。从某种意义上讲,国有企业“经营者”的价值实际上被认为基本等同于行政官员的价值,只对经营者进行“行政激励”容易导致其晚期蜕变。 重要的是建立健全激励机制和约束机制。通过适当的机制,使经营者的付出得到合理的回报,同时使经营者在市场约束和制度约束中既不可碌碌无为,又不能追求额外的隐性或显性的收入,让确有能力有贡献的一部分人先富起来。最大的激励就是最大的约束。 实行年薪制有利于建立现代企业制度,有利于激发经营者的工作热情、促进企业家市场的形成、造就企业家队伍,有利于强化约束机制、制约经营者的贪污腐败行为,还有利于保护出资者的利益。实行股票期权制能使委托人和代理人的目标达到最大限度的一致,能减轻公司日常支付现金的负担、节省大量运营资金、有利于公司的财务运作,还能避免公司人才流失、吸引更多的优秀人才。 由于年薪制容易导致短期行为,且经营者一次现金收入过高引起社会不公平心理加剧;而实施股票期权制,经营者一次又拿不出足够的现金购买股份,而且,只能在上市公司实施。本文设计了年薪制+股票期权制的激励新模式,吸取了两者的优点,避免了两者的不足。 本文通过调查、查找资料,对国企经营者的激励机制进行了认真探讨,提出了一些有价值的建议和方案。

【Abstract】 In China’s traditional planned economic system, the managers of state-owned enterprises were not held with a sufficient importance, their values were not really "discovered", and their talents were not fully exploited. To date, it is still an outstanding issue in the state-owned enterprises. In some sense, the value of "managers" in state-owned enterprises is regarded nearly the same as that of the government officials. With only the "administrative incentive", the managers are apt to decay in their later period of term.It is important to establish and consummate the incentive mechanism and binding mechanism. Under an appropriate mechanism, the managers can be reasonably rewarded, and at the same time they are prevented from incompetent performance and pursuing the extra latent and apparent incomes under the market and regulation restrictions. Those who have extraordinary abilities can make a fortune first. The strongest incentive is also the strongest restriction.To carry out the annual salary system is good for building up the modern enterprises’ system and inspiring the enthusiasm of managers, It will also promote the forming of entrepreneurs’market and bringing up more skillful entrepreneurs, This system will strengthen the restrain system, impose restrictions on managers’ corruption and degeneration and protect the investors’interests.Under the stock options system the targets of clients and agents will be identical to the highest level, It can cut the cost of companies’daily payment and save large amounts of capital, Besides ,it’s good for the company’s financial work and avoiding brain drain and even attract more excellent talents as well.The annual salary system is liable to short-term behaviors, and the social mentality of injustice will be intensified when the managersreceive too high cash income at one time. While under the stock options system, managers are usually unable to collect enough cash to purchase the stock shares, and this practice can only be conducted in public stock companies. A new incentive mode - annual salary plus stock options is designed, in which the advantages of the above two systems are adopted and the disadvantages are eliminated.Through investigations and literature studies, this thesis thoroughly analyzed the incentive mechanism for the managers in state-owned enterprises, and proposed some valuable suggestions and schemes.

  • 【网络出版投稿人】 中南大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2003年 03期
  • 【分类号】F272.91
  • 【被引频次】1
  • 【下载频次】226
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