对金融监管者监管的法律问题研究

【作者】 谢珵；

【导师】 高晋康；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 经济法， 2002， 硕士

【摘要】 本文旨在从法学角度探索性研究规范和监督金融监管者监管行为的基本原理和机制，藉此探讨如何建构对我国中央银行监管的法制体系。本文研究有三方面意义。首先，我国目前缺乏对监管者监管的制度，由此产生的风险是我国较隐蔽的金融风险。当前建立对监管者监管的制度是我国防范金融风险、维护金融安全的紧迫任务，也是在建立稳定、高效的金融市场秩序同时实现社会正义的重要课题。研究转型时期和开放经济条件下对监管者监管的目标、途径和法制保障，对我国逐步健全法制规范金融监管主体的监管行为，建立高效、公正的金融监管秩序，从而在未来的金融全球化进程中实现金融可持续发展具有重要的理论意义与实践意义。其次，研究对监管者监管的法理对金融监管法的理论研究有重要意义，可为我国金融立法和司法实践提供相关理论支持。另外，研究对监管者监管的原理与机制，可为经济法关于规范政府干预经济的一般原理提供生动、直接的实证素材。本文力求在上述三方面有所贡献。全文分四章。第一章系统考察金融监管的理论基础并探讨现代金融监管的目标及框架，进而在此基础上提炼和阐释贯穿本文的基本概念“监管行为”和“监管权力”。在西方的政府规制理论中，社会利益说对探讨金融监管的产生根源具有重要理论价值，它揭示了各种规制的产生根源是市场失灵以及政府规制的出发点是维护社会公共利益。金融监管的特殊根源在于金融内在不稳定性，以及金融市场存在严重的外部负效应。为了实现金融监管的各种目标，监管机构通过一系列事前或事后的监管手段来促使金融机构安全、稳健运行。理论上，金融监管权力是一种集立法、执法权能于一体的复合性公权力，监管本身的复杂性和专业技术性则使这种公权力具备显著的自由裁量特征。监管行为是监管权力的动态运作，它本质上是一种公共行政行为，具体包括监管立法行为与监管执法行为。 第二章从经济学、法学、和公共行政学等多学科角度充分论证对<WP=3>监管者监管之必要性，然后选取两个典型的金融监管实例进行分析，以印证对监管者监管之根据。对监管者监管的一般理论依据是：政府的经济规制本身也有其局限性，政府应当遵循客观规律和正当规则进行规制。从法哲学角度分析，对监管者监管可以通过约束监管权力尤其是监管者的自由裁量权，限制监管权力过度扩张以保障金融机构的自主性权利及其发展活力。从公共行政学角度分析：金融监管的低效率在本质上是一种公共行政的低效率，为了促使监管机构提高监管效率，在设定的监管目标下降低监管成本，就必须通过对监管者的监管来形成提高监管效率所必需的外部压力。金融监管实践中出现的有法不依、以行政命令替代依法监管，以及监管者滥用职权等情况都可能导致监管效果背离其目标：监管不是在维护市场秩序，提高市场效率，而是在抑制竞争或保护垄断，最终降低市场效率。我国海南发展银行的倒闭与宁波特大腐败案暴露的监管者腐败就是两个深刻的教训。第三章考察英、美两国对金融监管者监管的制度实践，通过比较分析其制度的共性、差异及原因，寻求可资借鉴的经验。英国《金融服务与市场法》针对一个庞大而又权力集中的监管机构FSA建立了一套具有多重监督制约功能的法律机制以防止其滥用权力，阻碍正当竞争，从而维护稳定的金融监管秩序。在美国三权分立的政治体制下，对监管机构的制约与监督主要有三种途径：总统控制、国会控制、司法审查。英、美两国对监管者监管的法律制度至少存在以下共性：首先，对金融监管机构监管的主体是多元的。其次，都设立了对监管机构进行个案调查的制度，其性质如同议会行政监察专员（Ombudsman）制度。再次，两国的金融市场相当发达，市场利益主体因渴求公平竞争的市场秩序而积极参与对监管者的监督，成为对监管者进行社会监督的主要力量。另外，两国都以法律形式确立了对监管效率进行监督的准则。第四章首先考察我国中央银行——人民银行接受监管的现状及缺陷，继而分析对人民银行监管的目标，然后沿着对监管权力的法律控制以及对人民银行的外部监督两条思路探讨如何健全对人民银行监管的法制体系。目前，人民银行的金融监管主要存在三方面问题：<WP=4>一、监管缺乏法定标准，其后果是无法可依，监管工作被过多的主观随意性支配；二、监管习惯于计划性、行政性的管理模式，监管机制并未真正建立在市场规律的基础上，监管因此而束缚了金融市场机制功能的发挥，也不利于金融市场的培育和金融机构的平等竞争；三、对金融机构的金融创新与违规经营不加区分，对经营范围的限制过多，这样不仅会抑制金融创新，而且也可能导致轻视金融机构的安全性和盈利性。上述问题反映了人民银行在金融监管中面临的三对矛盾：一是监管中行政与法律的矛盾；二是监管机制与市场机制的矛盾；三是金融创新与金融监管的矛盾。这些矛盾既说明了我国金融监管的特殊性，又包含了我国金融监管者也应当接受监管的特殊原因。入世后，如何防止人民银行对不同金融机构的偏私行为，使其在所有金融机构之间保持中立性的监管地位将是亟待解决的问题。对人民银行监管可以在一定程度上促使其依照国际规则公正监管，?更多还原

【Abstract】 In a perspective of law，this thesis attempts to explore the fundamental principles and mechanisms of the standardization and supervision of supervisory action taken by the financial supervisors, and to discuss the establishment of a legal system which is necessary to supervise the supervisory action of the central bank of China, the People’s Bank of China (PBC).The contribution of this thesis are as follows: first, the study of the objectives, the approaches, and the legal environment of supervising the supervisory action of PBC in a background of economic transition and open economy contributes the creation of a highly-efficient and fair supervisory order, which is of vital importance to the accomplishment of financial sustainable development at the age of financial globalization. Second, the demonstration of the fundamental principles of supervising the supervisors may provide specific knowledge for the legislation and application of financial law. Third, much more positive evidence can be obtained which develops the general theory with regard to regulation of governmental action upon economic regulation.This thesis consists of four chapters. In the first chapter, the author reviews the theories on which the financial supervision is based, discusses the objectives and framework of modern financial supervision, and interprets two essential categories, namely, supervisory power and supervisory action. Theoretically, supervisory power as a kind of public power enjoys both legislative and executive functions. It is due to the complication and specialization of financial supervision that the supervisory power is characterized by much more discretion.<WP=7>In the second chapter, the author elaborates the justifications for supervising the financial supervisors from various aspects. In terms of jurisprudence, the supervisory power, especially the supervisory discretion can be constrained, and the rights of the financial institutions be maintained if the financial supervisors are supervised. Furthermore, in terms of public administration, the low efficiency tendency of financial supervisors may be offset in a certain degree, and the efficiency be improved if there are adequate pressure made by supervision. The closedown of Hainan Development Bank in 1998 and the scandal of supervisory official in Ningbo City in 1999 confirm the reason of these claims.In the third chapter, the author makes a comparative research between the U.K and the U.S.A upon the legal institutions ensuring the effectiveness of supervising the financial supervisors. Both countries share many similarities as well as differences in terms of supervising financial supervisors. The most significant enlightenment obtained through this comparative research is that the philosophy of "control of power with power", which has been proved reasonable and effective, shall be introduced and applied to the practice of innovating upon China’s legal institutions in the financial filed with consideration for China’s national conditions. Therefore, financial supervisors’ supervisory power ought to be restrained by the law while enjoying the authority to supervise.In the fourth chapter, the author reflects the contemporary situation of China’s financial supervision, indicates the fact that the supervision which PBC and its staff accept is insufficient, and then explores the objectives and mechanisms that control the supervisory power and supervise PBC at the levels of state and society. At present, there are three<WP=8>dialectical contradictions for PBC’s supervision of financial institutions, providing the specific justifications for supervising PBC and its staff. After China’s entry into WTO, the neutrality of PBC as one of China’s supervisory agencies ought to be guaranteed through PBC’s acceptance of sufficient supervision. The author suggests three approaches available of supervising PBC and its staff: defining the extent of supervisory power by rules, making the supervisory action subjective to specific procedures, and distrib更多还原