我国国有股问题研究

【作者】 王彦斌；

【导师】 陈永生；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 金融学， 2001， 硕士

【摘要】 当前的证券市场存在诸多问题，根源之一就是作为公司股本主要构成的国家股与法人股禁止上市流通。这种历史形成的‘同股不同权’的畸形股权结构，制度上内生中国股市的过度投机，阻碍了上市公司治理结构的改善，加之国有股存量不断积聚，相关矛盾日益突出，实现国有股的上市流通已成为当务之急。然而，庞大的国有股上市必将对股市产生直接或潜在的冲击。赋予国有股流通权实质是国家、法人与公众投资者的利益调整。如何在兼顾各方利益的基础上，顺利实现国有股的并轨流通是问题解决的关键。本文最后对当前的各种模式进行归类比较，试图为国有股的上市安排提供一种理论上的参考。本文共分四章，系统论述了国有股问题的产生、实质、难点及解决思路。第一章是国有股问题的历史渊源及现实影响，属于研究国有股的基础部分。第一节对国有股禁止上市的历史背景进行考察。中国证券市场作为改革的产物，在它的发育成长过程中，具有浓厚的政策色彩。在传统思想影响下，为了‘维护社会主义公有制的主体地位，保障国有资产不受侵害’，有关部门严格禁止国有股上市流通，并在法规上予以明确。第二节考查国有股问题的政策演变。按照所有者划分股权进而形成的畸形股权结构是典型的政策产物。伴随经济体制改革不断深入，国有股权管理逐步放开、国有股流动性逐渐增强是一种必然的趋势。第三节研究国有股上市流通的必要性。首先分析国有股权的特征。国有股权的产生是政府干预经济的产物。国家的意志贯穿于股权的行使，使其行为目标区别于其他股东，已经超出纯经济的范畴。其次探讨国有股禁止上市的负面效应。（1）从企业治理结构分析。与现代企业制度下的股份公司相比，国有经济的委托代理关系更为复杂。当前国有股、尤其国家股的持股主体不能真正履行股东的权责。此时利用资本市场定价机制、企业接管机制激励约束经理人员，防止内部人控制，对公司的有效治理有着极其现实的意义。然而，国有股权占绝对比重，且禁止流通的格局，难以发挥股市的监控作用。（2）从证券市场规范运行分析。人为分割的股权结构，制度上内生中国股<WP=3>市的投机特征。股价无法反映企业真实状况，公司管理层缺乏维护市场形象，为中小股东谋利益的动力，其他投资者难以通过市场收购入主公司经营，结果转向投机炒作。因此解决问题的关键在于推动国有股上市流通，优化公司股权结构。第二章运用实证分析的方法具体考察当前国有股的流动情况。第一节概述上市公司国有股的流动现状。近几年，非流通股与流通股的比例基本衡定，但国家股对法人股比重则在不断降低，反映政府介入程度已经减弱，公司逐渐由国家经营转为法人经营。流通市值相对于总市值逐步提升，说明市场更加认同股本流动性良好的上市公司，并对其流通股价赋予了更好的市场定位。国有股的流动程度较以往有所提高，总体水平仍然偏低。国家股一般为大比例转让，且对上市公司的股东结构有较大影响，然而程度已有所减轻。资产重组与国有股转让之间存在一定的伴随关系。第二节分析国有股的流动效果。国有股的转让往往导致大股东的变更，并且转让分散了大股东控制权，控股比例越高的公司分散程度越大。转让后，公司业绩通常有较大提升，尤其是第一大股东发生变更的上市公司更为明显。同时，上市公司畸形的股权结构，导致市场监督缺位，使当前国有股流通中存在某些借助资产重组，恶意炒作公众股的情况。第三节探讨国有股的转让方式。（1）无偿转让，属于国有股权的划转，主要产生于国家政策的变更。（2）有偿转让。有偿协议转让是目前国有股流通的主要途径。由于两种方式均包含过多的行政干预，并非真正的市场化流动，使相关企业缺乏资本运作的动力，方案选择难以实现利益的公允。通过本章的实证分析说明利用现有的流通股市场，赋予国有股市场化的交易途径，不仅是理论上的要求，更是实践中的必然选择。第三章研究国有股上市流通的主要难题，包含三部分。第一节讨论国有股的上市价格。价格确定直接关系着国家、法人与公众投资者的相关利益,是决定国有股顺利上市与否的关键。本着国有资产保值增值、维护证券市场稳定的原则，从新股发行、分红、配股等环节探究，以净资产值为基准并根据公司的基本情况加以调整，符合利益公允的要求。同时国有股上市流通应尽量利用市场竞价机制，避免过多<WP=4>的人为因素所造成的利益偏颇。第二节上市国有股的行业选择。相对于公司分析，研究行业更为清晰、合理。国有股上市必须分行业逐步实施。首先，按照政策要求，国有股放开流通只能限于一般性竞争领域，对关系国计民生的部分行业，国家须保持相当的控股比例。目前各行业国有股比重过于平均，国家股分布并未反映行业的特点。其次，为维护二级市场稳定，应选择流通程度较大的行业率先完成国有股上市。具体而言，商贸旅游、家用电器、造纸等行业，可作为国有股完全流通的首批试点。第三节研究非流通国有股增量问题。股票发行方式是造成国有股问题的根源。目前股票发行并未考虑非公众股的流通，新公司的上市等同凝滞国有股的扩容。这种状况单靠二级市场上的配售、回购等措施根本不能解决问题，反而使问题更趋?更多还原

【Abstract】 This thesis is concerned with the circulation of China’s state-owned stocks. Current China’s stock-market is premature, one of the reasons is that state-owned stocks and entity-owned stocks, the most significant two components of corporate capital stocks, are forbidden to trade on stock-market. This abnormal capital structure and inner-generated over-speculation in China’s stock market hold back the improvement of corporate administrative structures. Therefore, to resolve problems of state-owned stocks is extremely imperative. The vast amount of state-owned stocks’ coming into market is undoubtedly to impact, directly or indirectly, on stock market. How to achieve the goal that state-owned stocks circulate in stock market with interests of every aspect considered is the key to solve state-owned stocks’ being blended with and circulating with common stocks. At the end of this thesis, various modes to achieve this goal are classified and then discussed separately, trying to provide its own idea on arrangement for state-owned stocks to come into market.This thesis is divided into four chapters, discoursing systematically upon the origin, essence, issues and solutions of the problem concerned with state-owned stocks. The first chapter, discussing the historical origin of such a problem and the necessity to research it, is the foundation of the research on state-owned stocks. The first section of this chapter focuses on the historical background of forbidding state-owned stocks to be traded. To maintain socialist public owning system dominant situation and to protect state-owned assets from being violated, state-owned stocks were forbidden to trade in stock market. And the second section digs into the transformation of policy of state-owned stocks problems. It is a trend that liquidity of state-owned stocks is increasing. The third section analyzes the imperative of state-owned stocks’ coming into stock-market. This section concerns negative effect of forbidding state-owned stocks to circulate in <WP=7>stock market. Compared with corporations under the modern enterprise system, agent-proxy relations of state-owned economy are more complicated. At present employing capital markets pricing system and corporate take-over system to stimulate and restrict manager staffs, and avoiding the insider control make a practical difference in effective corporate administration. Absolutely a large proportion of state-owned shares and the situation that state-owned stocks are forbidden to circulate, however, result in obstacle to stock market’s provision functionality. Artificially divided capital structures generate speculative feature of China’s stock market. Prices of stocks do not reveal real corporate operating situation, corporate manager layers lack motives to maintain corporate identity and to protect interests of small shareholders, and other investors cannot manipulate corporate operating by market acquisition. Therefore, the key to resolve this problem is to impel state-owned stocks to circulate in stock market, thus optimizing corporate capital structures.The second chapter analyzes empirically current circulation of state-owned stocks. The first section of this chapter generally describes present situation of the circulation of state-owned stocks. The second section focuses on the effect of movement of state-owned stocks. The transfer of state-owned stocks usually leads to alteration of primary stockholders. Moreover, such transfer diversifies primary stockholders’ control to the corporation. The more shares a corporation holds, the more transfer diversifies its control. Nevertheless, data illustrates that state-owned stocks dominated frozen capital structure gets in way to improvement of effectiveness of corporate operating. The third section analyzes modes of transfer of state-owned stocks. 1) Uncharged transfer; 2) Charged transfer. Involving too much government interference, both modes are not real market circulation, causing related enterprises to lack motives of capital operations. Empirical analysis in this chapt更多还原