美国政府欧安会政策考察（1969-1975）

【作者】 靳小勇；

【导师】 白建才；

【作者基本信息】 陕西师范大学 ， 世界史， 2012， 硕士

【摘要】 本文以美国政府解密档案为主要支撑,在借鉴国内外新近研究成果的基础上,拟就1969-1975年间美国政府欧安会政策的评估、制定和实施进行考察,分析美国政府欧安会政策背后的深层原因,并阐述这一时期的外交战略理念,最终探讨欧安会对冷战结束的影响。长期以来,欧安会一直被学界视为冷战期间东西方缓和的顶峰,而通向欧安会的“赫尔辛基进程(Helsinki Process)"及其后续会议对美国外交决策、美苏关系以及冷战的结束皆产生了深远影响,并加速了东欧地区民族民主意识的高涨,促成了东欧集团内部改革派力量壮大,且在引发苏东剧变、促成两极体系在持续了五十年之后宣告终结的过程中发挥了重要作用。与欧安会这般深远影响所不同的是,美国在整个会议期间的态度和立场却显得并不那么积极,这与尼克松——福特当局的欧洲安全政策有直接的关系。其中,基辛格个人的欧洲安全理念对当局的欧安会对策制定影响尤为明显。全文共分为五个部分：第一部分阐述欧安会问题的由来、发展及各方对策,重点分析苏联政府提出欧安会的动机和北约盟国的态度。苏联欧安会倡议是旨在寻求对战后欧洲边界的国际认可、在美国与西欧各国之间打入楔子,同时与西方开展经济合作,但该倡议却一再被西方拒绝,这与冷战肇始的国际环境、苏联自身的策略密切相关。在敌对尚未消退而缓和尚未开启之时,美国政府不可能轻易将欧安会纳入双边或者多边对话中,而处于马歇尔计划援助之下西欧各国,对美依存度尚高,更不可能摆脱美国追求独立自主的外交政策。但随着欧洲走上复兴之路,西欧各国开始在美苏之间逐渐发出自己的声音,欧安会召开的时机尚不成熟但却慢慢发生变化。第二部分则重点阐述缓和形势下,尼克松当局对欧安会政策的初步形成过程。在欧洲缓和浪潮推动下,召开欧安会的倡议逐渐被西欧各国所接受。尼克松-基辛格上台后对欧洲政策进行修订,根据关联的策略,相继提出了以柏林问题的解决和确定共同均衡裁军谈判召开日期作为召开欧安会的条件。这一时期美国政府的主要政策是尽可能借苏联的迫切心情来获取更多的战略利益,诸如首脑访问等。第三部分重点分析美国在筹备会议召开过程中的立场。这一时期美国对欧安会政策进一步形成发展。随着筹备会议各项议程的开展,美国与苏联、欧洲政治委员会之间的分歧日益凸显。在尼克松当局对欧关系原则指导下,尼克松当局成功地实现了筹备会议的召开与共同均衡裁军之间的关联。与此同时,对欧安会的“损害限制”政策也成为了美国在正式会议期间的基本政策。第四部分着重阐释欧安会政策的推进与执行。在这一阶段,苏联与西欧各国分歧重重导致会期相当冗长,谈判甚至一度陷入僵局。因需考量与盟国的微妙关系,以及受到苏联的催促和舆论的质疑,基辛格不得不在苏联和西欧各国中间调停。至水门事件后,福特总统上台,在基辛格领导的国家安全委员会指导下,美国与欧洲政治委员会之间依然保持了有效的沟通。经过长期的讨价还价,在基辛格的斡旋下,最终协定得以达成。第五部分是结论。赫尔辛基协定的签署是一次谋求集体安全的尝试,也是理想主义者和现实主义者之间的交锋,短期的历史也证明了这点。该协定是对60年代中期以来欧洲缓和的肯定,也是对美苏之间均势的一种认可。事实上,协定也并没有阻止苏联入侵阿富汗,所达成的协定也并没有有效地实施。但从长远来看,赫尔辛基协定第三个篮子所开启的人员、信息、文化交流,却给西方分化瓦解苏联提供了良好的机会,在二十年内加速了苏联阵营的解体,却是尼克松和基辛格等政策决策者当时并未预料到的。更多还原

【Abstract】 This thesis tries to take advantage of the declassified documents of the U.S. government and recent researches at home and abroad, to inspect the U.S. government policies assessment, formulation and implementation of the CSCE in1969-1975, to explore its underlying reasons, foreign strategic concept and historical influence on the end of the Cold War. Over the years, the academia regards CSCE as the pinnacle of the East-West detente during the Cold War. The "Helsinki Process" leading to CSCE and its follow-up meetings had a profound impact on the U.S. foreign policies, the US-Soviet relations as well as the end of the Cold War, it also accelerated the national democratic consciousness in the Eastern Europe, contributed to the growth of the reformist forces in these areas and played an important role in triggering Drastic Change in the Soviet and Eastern Europe along with the end of bipolar system. However, compared with such great importance, the attitudes and policies of the United States during the whole sessions were not so positive, and these had a direct relationship with the Nixon-Ford administration’s European security policies. Among them, Kissinger’s individual European security concept made remarkable influence on the authorities’policies of CSCE.The full text consists of five parts:The first part describes the origin and development of CSCE as well as the parties’ countermeasures, focusing on analysis of the Soviet government’s CSCE motivation and the attitude of the NATO allies. Soviet initiatives of CSCE were designed to seek to the international recognition of the post-war boundaries of Europe, to infiltrate the wedge between the United States and Europe, to engage in economic cooperation with west Europe countries. However, Russians’propose repeatedly been rejected by the West, this was closely related to international environment of the beginning Cold War and the Soviet Union’s strategy. When Soviet-U.S. had not receded in a hostile and ease did not open, the U.S government could not easily bring CSCE into bilateral or multilateral dialogue. Europe was in the assistance of the Marshall Plan with high dependence on the United States, impossible to get rid of the U.S to pursue an independent foreign policy. However, with the recovery of west Europe as a whole in the1970s, Europeans began to make their voices between the Soviet Union and the U.S. The opportunity to hold CSCE was immature but slowly changed.The second part focuses on the preliminary formation process of CSCE policy in the Nixon administration during the detente period. Driven by the Europe detente wave, the initiative of convening CSCE was gradually accepted by the west Europe countries. When Nixon-Kissinger came to power, they revised the policies towards Europe. According to the linkage theory, the U.S. government successively proposed quadripartite talks in Berlin as well as convened date of co-balanced Disarmament as the conditions of convening CSCE. During this period, the Americans’main policy was to obtain strategic interests, such as the summits.The third part focuses on the position of the United States during the preparatory meetings process. During this period, the U.S. government CSCE policy was further in formation and development. With the launching of the agendas of preparatory meetings, the divergence among the United States, the Soviet Union and the European Political Committee was increasingly prominent. Under the Nixon administration’s guidance of the principles governing relations with Europe, the Nixon administration successfully achieved the convening of preparatory meetings for the association with the co-balanced Disarmament. At the same time, Sonnenfeldt’s limit damage theory towards CSCE had become the basic position of the United States during the formal meetings.The fourth part focuses on the advancement and implementation of policy on the CSCE. At this stage, the divergence between the Soviet Union and the European countries led to fairly lengthy duration of the meetings, the negotiations were even deadlocked. Because of the need to consider the delicate relationship with allies, and urged by the Soviet Union along with public opinion to questioning, Kissinger had to mediate strongly. After the Watergate, President Ford took office. Under the guidance of the National Security Council led by Kissinger, the United States and the European Political Committee still maintained effective communication. After a long period of bargaining, Kissinger’s mediation led to a final agreement reached.The fifth part is the conclusion. The signing of Helsinki Agreement is the attempt of the collective security treaty, it is also the confrontation between the idealists and the realists, short-term history has proved this point. This agreement is more about the affirmation of European detente, to ascertain a balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States. In fact, the Helsinki Accords did not prevent the Soviet’s invasion to Afghanistan, and there was no effective implementation. But in the long run, the personnel, information and cultural exchange in the third basket of the Helsinki Accords gave the West a good opportunity to disintegrate Soviet Union, to accelerate the collapse of the Soviet bloc in twenty years, which was Nixon, Kissinger and other policy-makers never expected.更多还原